


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Hegel's Idea of Philosophy

with a new translation of Hegel's Introduction to the History of Philosophy

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Preface

According to Johannes Hoffmeister in his Preface to the critical edition of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, published in 1940, any attempt to justify the continued relevance of this text written well over a hundred years ago would be otiose. What we have here is not simply one among many histories of philosophy, rendered obsolete by an ongoing historical scholarship far surpassing in both scope and critical judgment Hegel's own. Its greatness lies not in its historical erudition, although that is enormous outstanding in its day but in the place it fills in Hegel's own "system" of philosophy. As *history* it may have been superseded; as *philosophy* it belongs among the great masterpieces of philosophy's literature.

That Hegel's *Introduction* to those *Lectures* should be published separately needs no excuse either. It is far more than an introduction to a book; it is perhaps the best introduction we can find to Hegel's philosophy itself. For Hegel, to speak of the history of philosophy is to tell us what philosophy is, if it can be said to have a history. This is not to say that Hegel gives us here a "definition" of what he means by philosophy. Hegel is unwavering in his insistence that philosophy cannot be defined as can other intellectual disciplines. There is only one way to learn what philosophy is, and that is

by *doing* it. It is for this reason that the history of philosophy is so crucial; it reveals what happens when men *do* philosophy, in this way revealing what philosophy *is*. To know what Hegel considered philosophy to be as a result of having traced its development is to have the key to Hegel's own philosophizing. Here, then, in a remarkably concise form we meet the principal themes of that philosophizing. Not without reason has Hegel been consistently considered one of the most difficult to understand of all philosophers. The reasons for this are multiple: he combines in an unprecedented way a rigor of systematic development, a richness of insight, and a style of expression which ranges from ponderous involutions to poetic flights of fancy; his writing manifests a vast unfootnoted erudition, which makes it difficult for the reader to grasp the very problems to which Hegel addresses himself, to say nothing of the solutions he proposes; his grammar and vocabulary are remarkably suited to his thought but remarkably unsuited for speaking either to those who think along more traditional lines or to those whose cast of thought is formal and analytical; his dialectical thinking is easy to describe but bewildering to follow, because it has, so to speak, a life of its own which constantly bursts through the confines of ordinary logic.

It would unquestionably be an exaggeration to say that the *Introduction* to the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* is free of these Hegelian difficulties. It is, however, different from Hegel's other writings. Hegel repeated his course on the history of philosophy nine times, each time to a larger audience, each time changing his manner of handling the material there are six extant *Introductions* to the *Lectures*. The result is a

presentation which is clear and popular in a way that no other work of Hegel's is (its only rival in clarity is the *Introduction* to the *Philosophy of History*). It is more than clear and popular, however; it is also comprehensive. Nothing else of Hegel's can in so few pages introduce us to the riches of his thought. If it is a good principle in philosophy that the best way to introduce a great philosopher is to let him introduce himself, the publication of this *Introduction* needs no further justification.

As for justifying the publication of a translation, to replace the Haldane translation of 1892, the reason has nothing to do with the merits of the earlier translation but only with the merits of what was then translated. Until 1940 the only available text of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* was the one edited in 1836 by Michelet, who had been a student of Hegel's. Michelet's edition was a compilation of many texts of which the only one written in its entirety by Hegel was that of the course as given in Jena in 1805-1806. For the rest, Michelet had Hegel's own much-abbreviated version of the course he gave at Heidelberg in 1816-1817 and 1817-1818, plus a reworked version of the *Introduction,* Michelet's notes of the lectures delivered in Berlin in 1823-1824, and two other collections of student notes, one from 1825-1826, the other from 1829-1830. These he wove together in a manner peculiar to himself for his edition of 1833, and it was this which Haldane translated.

The present translation, then, is not a retranslation; it is the translation of a text which apparently was not available to Michelet. It can be found, along with five other versions, in the Hoffmeister edition of 1940 or in

the Nicolin revised edition of 1959. It was put together from notes taken during Hegel's lectures delivered in 1825-1826, and it was chosen because it is at once the simplest and clearest and the most comprehensive. There is little by way of content in the other versions that will not be found here, while it treats of a number of problems which are simply not found elsewhere. In the interests of completeness, perhaps, it would have been better to translate the whole Hoffmeister (or Nicolin) edition, with its six *Introductions*, but that would have been so unwieldy and repetitious as to repel all but the most scholarly readers (who would, no doubt, prefer to read it in German). Since the editors of the German edition made no attempt to fill in or cover up the rather obvious gaps in the text, the translation does not try to do so either. This, it is felt, will create only minor difficulties for the reader, and it will obviate the incongruity of a twentieth-century editor's seeking to do what Hegel's contemporaries and students did not attempt.

1
The Hegelian System

The *Introduction* to the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* is particularly significant, as we have already noted in our Preface, because of the place which it holds in the overall "system" which Hegel's philosophy purports to be. What that place is can be clarified in an attempt to sketch the system as a whole, which is at once Hegel's philosophy and his reply to those who would discredit the whole metaphysical endeavor.

In an attempt to overcome the abstract speculations of both traditional Scholasticism and continental rationalism, the British empiricists in general, and Hume in particular, insisted on the primacy of the immediate presence of reality in sensation. In this context, then, thinking as opposed to sensation is a movement away from reality; thought is a progressive abstraction from the full, rich content immediately given in sensation. The empiricists would, of course, have been contradicting a constant in human experience did they not see a definite usefulness in this process if nothing else, it simplified reality to the point of making it more manipulable. Still, they felt that in thought there was

a definite loss of concreteness which could be regained only by a return to the immediacy which the senses guaranteed.

For Hegel, who in this was seeking to complete the endeavors of his great predecessors Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, to answer Hume, it simply was not true that the locus of concreteness was in the immediacy of reality's presence to consciousness through sensation. Taking his cue from Plato rather than from Locke, he was convinced that reality was more concretely present (more real) in thought, in ideas, than in sensation. For this he needed as a starter no more than the common human experience that in seeking to grasp reality more thoroughly we consult our ideas of reality rather than reality itself. Strangely enough, he found the warrant for this conviction in the experimental sciences, whose observations of the real world were simply sterile until they had been transformed into thought. With Kant he recognized only too well that "conceptions without intuitions are empty," but in true dialectic fashion he recognized equally well that "intuitions without conceptions are blind." This, however, meant more to him than simply that thought and sensation are complementary: it meant that, although a content of consciousness may be given in sensation, it cannot be fully grasped in sensation but only in a process moving from an initial minimal awareness to the (ideal) totality of awareness in complete rational knowledge; it meant, too, that the process of thinking is no more than an empty game, if it clings to its initial abstractness and is not characterized by a progressively more concrete manifestation of its content which is ultimately (again ideally) the totality of reality. The totality of awareness, then, which he calls

"knowledge" (*Wissen*) or "science" (*Wissenschaft*), is the awareness of a totality of reality; and this involves a realization that man will find the very reality of reality only in the awareness of reality which is at the same time reality's progressive self-manifestation.

The heart of Hegel's system, then, is his *Logic*, where philosophical thinking seeks to penetrate thought and find in it the revelation of reality. He himself characterized this *Logic* as "the presentation of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of the world or of a single finite spirit,"[1] which is but another way of saying that the totality of thought does not wait upon the unfolding of human history in order to be identified with the totality of reality even though man's awareness of this identification cannot be achieved independently of the historical process of developing consciousness. It is true enough to say that reality is truly real only when it is thought-reality; but it is equally true that thought is truly thought only as a process of coming to terms with the real. It is for this reason that, while contemplating the articulation of his monumental *Logic* as the cornerstone of his system, Hegel realized that it would be impossible to plunge into the depths of thought, there to find reality, without prefacing his effort with an account of the process whereby awareness becomes thought in the fullest sense of that term. Thus, the overall structure had to wait until its foundation could be laid in a *Phenomenology of Spirit* which would describe the route that consciousness takes through history in coming to the awareness that as

1 Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, ed. Georg Lasson (Hamburg: Meiner, 1934), Vol. I, p. 31. English translation by A.V. Miller (London: Unwin, 1969), p. 50.

Spirit[2] it could legitimately look into itself in order to find reality.[3]

Once its foundation was made secure in the *Phenomenology,* the most systematic of philosophical systems could begin to take shape (even though prior to the *Phenomenology* Hegel had already drafted more than one blueprint for the total structure). The *Logic* now becomes the articulation of an awareness that the categories of thought reveal themselves as the categories of reality. The progressive awareness of itself that Spirit achieves through history will be a gradual revelation of all that was there from eternity "before creation" but a condition for Spirit's recognizing all this in itself

2 Throughout this discussion and in the translation of Hegel's text it is inevitable that there will be a certain amount of arbitrariness in capitalizing or not capitalizing the term "spirit" (*Geist*). The German text, of course, offers no help whatever. Thus, each time the term occurs, a decision must be made, based on the context, about the meaning which Hegel intends. "Spirit" has, it would seem, at least five possible meanings (or connotations). (1) Absolute Spirit, which is the overall personalized Spirit which reveals itself progressively in the history of thinking in all its forms. It is, of course, debatable whether this Spirit should be identified with God, but the contrast noted above between "God" and "finite spirit" would seem to indicate that "Absolute Spirit" is infinite and, thus, scarcely distinguishable from God. (2) Each human individual, realized as what he most truly is, is "spirit" (participating, so to speak, in "Spirit"). (3) The "spirit" of a people or of an age, which is a sort of common source of collective activity. (4) "Spirit" is used as a sort of universal term, of which the other uses are instantiations. (5) There are instances when the term seems to combine all four of the above meanings. When the

meaning is clearly the first or when it seems to be the fifth, the term will be capitalized. In all other occurrences it will not be capitalized.

3 The *Phenomenology of Spirit* (rather unfortunately translated *Phenomenology of Mind*) is Hegel's attempt to trace the process of experience from mere sensation to absolute knowing and, thus, to show that the movement toward knowing is one of progressive concretization. The *Logic* which follows upon this, then, is a logic of concrete thought.

is that it first go outside itself, in order to return to itself enriched by the knowledge that all that "out there" is its own work. It goes out of itself, then, in a "philosophy of nature" (which, although it is admittedly not Hegel's strong point, does show that he had a penetrating awareness of the significance of the natural science of his day). Its point was to manifest that in nature was to be found a purposeful order which indicates that nature itself is the embodiment of ideas and that, thus, nature reveals itself as the work of Spirit. Science is successful because, as Kant had noted, it can compel nature to yield up answers to its questions, and these answers belong to the world of ideas.

What Spirit seeks in nature, however, are not merely answers to its questions about nature but also answers to its questions about itself. These answers, too, it will find in ideas, not insofar as nature with its laws constitutes the content of those ideas but insofar as the having of ideas reveals the nature, so to speak, of spirit. Thus begins Hegel's philosophy of spirit.

At first it is the philosophy of subjective spirit, which, we might say, tells us what man is capable of because he is spirit and not merely nature. In this there are three stages: (*a*) anthropology, wherein man discovers the sort of being he is, his nature; (*b*) phenomenology (not to be confused with the preface to the whole system), in which man examines his capacity to be conscious both of external reality and of himself; and (*c*) psychology, in which man sees himself as a subject determining himself by his own spiritual activities, at the summit of which is free activity. It is precisely this last sort of activity which provides the transition to the second step in the philosophy of spirit i.e., philosophy

of objective spirit which concerns itself with what is true of man, precisely because he is free, not merely acting and reacting but self-determining, in the sense that he determines himself to be a self. This philosophy of objective spirit, too, presents itself in three stages: (*a*) individual man as person, who is characterized by rights, initially the right to own that which is not himself; (*b*) the individual person as self determining to moral behavior (*Moralität*), which is a self-imposed limitation on his subjective willing; and (*c*) the person not merely as individual but as member of society family, city, and state whose free will is oriented toward a higher morality (*Sittlichkeit*) which governs the society as a society.[4]

Only when man, the free spirit, has been established both as an individual and as a member of society, is it possible to proceed to a third stage in the philosophy of spirit, which Hegel calls the philosophy of Absolute Spirit. This concerns itself not so much with what any individual man is, can do, or does, but with what man (or mankind) has produced by virtue of the fact that man is a free spirit who can act upon nature, on himself, or on other men, thus not only transforming the world in which he lives but also revealing all that man as such is capable of the seal of man is, so to speak, put upon all that man does. This last stage in the philosophy of spirit constitutes the quantitatively major portion of

4 There is an apparent conflict between the relationship of *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit* here (the schema comes from the description of the whole system contained in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*) and that described in the *Phenomenology.* In the latter, *Sittlichkeit* is a somewhat vaguer stage leading up to the more conscious *Moralität.* Whatever conflict there may be, however, is one

of terms rather than of concepts. *Sittlichkeit* simply does not have the same meaning in the two contexts.

the legacy Hegel has bequeathed to posterity (although, paradoxically enough, very little of it was published by Hegel himself the courses he gave were transcribed by students and ultimately published posthumously). The outline for this is provided by Hegel in the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* where he seeks to show that the ultimate in rationality is to be found in the relationship of the absolute Spirit to the absolute Idea. It is as absolute Spirit that consciousness reaches its apogee on the subjective side, and it is with the absolute Idea that the objective content i.e., "the whole of reality" adequately corresponds with its subjective conceiving, and Spirit is revealed as both subject and object in this ultimate synthesis. As the whole movement of the *Phenomenology* had revealed, content precedes form, in the sense that consciousness is constantly being impelled to catch up with, become adequate to, its own content. Thus, the content of Spirit's consciousness is absolute before Spirit's grasp of this content is itself absolute, and the stages through which man's spirit goes in approaching this adequacy are the three stages of man's activity whereby he relates himself to the Absolute i.e., art, religion, and philosophy.

The Works of Hegel

If at this point we go back over the whole corpus of Hegel's writings we find that they fit not only neatly but also convincingly into this systematically articulated structure. We have already seen the place of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and of the *Logic.* The *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* is an attempt to describe the entire structure. Hegel never did develop a philosophy of nature the only hint of what it might

have been is contained in the *Encyclopedia* under that heading.[5] By the same token the philosophy of subjective spirit is with the exception of the *Phenomenology* nowhere explicitly developed by Hegel (although, as we shall see, there are both anthropological and psychological implications throughout his writings). Under the heading of philosophy of objective spirit come not only his *Philosophy of Right*, the last of his works published during his own lifetime, but also the many political writings which have contributed so much to modern constitutional theory. There is, of course, no difficulty in situating either his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Art* (better known as *Aesthetics*) or the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* along with the sixteen lectures on the proofs for the existence of God. Under the same heading of philosophy of religion we can also place his *Early Theological Writings* which, apparently, he never intended to publish. We have difficulty in placing only the *Philosophy of History* and the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy.* The former, it seems safe to say, could well fit under the philosophy of objective spirit. To situate the latter demands a bit of conjecture.

When, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* Hegel elaborates the three stages of consciousness of the absolute, he is careful to point out that the absolute of which spirit is conscious is one and the same throughout. What differs is the form of consciousness. In art the absolute is present to consciousness in sensible form; in religion the form is representation (*Vorstellung,* which may be

5 With the publication, in 1923, of Hegel's *Jenenser Logik Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie* (2nd ed.; Hamburg: Meiner, 1957), of course, we have further manuscript evidence of how he developed

a "philosophy of nature" (pp. 187-359), but even that is little more than a sketch.

translated "imaginative representation," provided the term "imaginative" is not construed too narrowly); and in philosophy the form is thought, the only form of consciousness which is itself absolute. Now, it is not without significance that, in his teaching, Hegel developed a philosophy of art and a philosophy of religion; but nowhere does he present a philosophy of philosophy. It might, of course, be argued that the system in its entirety is precisely that, but it might also be pointed out that not only did he work out nine distinct courses on the history of philosophy but also in those courses he tells us exactly what philosophy is in a way he does not do elsewhere. It is precisely in and through its history that we see what philosophy is. On this interpretation, then, the history of philosophy would be the philosophy of philosophy, the coping stone of the philosophy of absolute spirit and of the whole Hegelian system. If nothing else, such an interpretation makes the *Introduction* to his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* much more intelligible

The Place of the Individual Philosopher

Before following out the indications given in this interpretation and thus attempting to make the *Introduction* more intelligible, let us say a word about the individual philosopher, who is, after all, the channel through which philosophy is transmitted. If philosophy has a history it is only because there have been philosophers who stand, as it were, as milestones along the path of human thought, revealing not only the distance that thought has traveled but also the direction in which it is traveling. It should be noted, however, that, although the name "philosophy" has been reserved for that which

is pre-eminently a rational discipline, and although history has accorded the title "philosopher" only to those who have contributed to the rational elaboration of human experience, it is also true that the greatness of the great philosophers who "make" philosophy's history does not rest solely on the inner consistency or on the convincing power of such rational elaborations. Rather their greatness consists (as does that of the great artist or great religious or scientific genius) in the quality of their experience, in the capacity of this experience to reveal in a new way the possibilities of human experience. The philosopher's formulations of that experience, then, are precisely the provisional in his contribution, even though they do serve to point up the significance of the experience which he has elaborated and through which he leaves his mark on the experience of those who come after him. Although we cannot minimize our admiration for the rational structures they have bequeathed to us, the influence of a Plato or an Aristotle, a Kant or a Hegel, even of a Whitehead or a Dewey, is the result not of the perfection of these structures but of the profundity of an experience which a combination of philosophical genius and hard work has made possible and which the lucidity and power of their elaboration have enabled them to communicate. The great philosopher's experience, in its turn, is not significant simply because it is experience as though experience infallibly delivered insight into the real but because it is the experience of genius, a sort of witness to the capacity of human experience at its best. Thus, it would seem, we can say that each great philosopher has so experienced that his experience in a very special way both belongs to and helps constitute the sum-total of human experience. To

the extent that this experience is philosophical, philosophy itself lives on in it.

It would be futile to attempt in a few lines or, for that matter, in a whole book to recapture the Hegelian philosophical experience, but we can begin doing so by pointing out that it was characterized first of all by an extraordinary confidence in reason. This confidence is opposed explicitly and rather obviously to the "romantic" glorification of emotion and intuition, which Hegel constantly characterized as an unwarranted short cut to knowledge. The absolute, he was sure, could be known in human thought, but only a systematic adherence to methodical thinking could make it known. Quite as explicitly but not so obviously, Hegel's confidence in reason was opposed to the sentimental rationalism of the "Enlightenment," which first deified reason and then knelt down in adoration of its own creation, without asking whether this was truly reason or merely non-faith, non-authority, non-tradition. This confidence was not, finally, the confidence of a Kant or a Fichte, a confidence which Hegel admired and even shared, but which, he thought, did not go far enough, since it handed over to a kind of faith the ultimate concerns of human living and confined reason to mundane considerations, thus settling for a reason that is not truly reason.

Hegel's was rather the confidence of a Plato, an Aristotle, or a Spinoza, who saw rational thought as that which in the highest degree characterizes man as man and which should, therefore, characterize man when he is concerned with that which is of the highest interest to him. Like Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza, he saw reason as infallible, in the sense that what reason saw to be

true (error is simply the work of non-reason) could not be other than true; and, again like them, he saw reason as absolutely one, so that what any human reason saw to be necessarily true had to be true for any other reason which was truly reason. Had he gone no further than this, however, Hegel would have involved himself in the deceptive tautology of defining reason as thought functioning in such a way that what it affirmed had to be true, because if what was affirmed were not true it would not be reason that affirmed it. This would be to guarantee truth by an appeal to reason and at the same time to guarantee reason by an appeal to the truth of its affirmations. Kant had recognized this dilemma and had, therefore, instituted a "critique" of reason which would lay down the conditions for reason functioning as reason. In Hegel's eyes, however, this was equivalent either to using something other than reason to set down the rules of reason like learning to swim before jumping into the water or using reason to formulate a set of rules to validate its formulating these rules. The remedy for this was, as we saw in our account of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, to follow consciousness from its first act of minimal awareness which had to be true, because it affirmed no more than that it was awareness, through all the successive purifications which were forced upon it by its own realization that it was not adequate to the implications of its very awareness, until it reached a form of awareness which was adequate to its content i.e., the absolute. The result of this process was absolute reason, the function of absolute Spirit, and its thinking was philosophy. What Hegel seeks to do, then, is not to formulate the rules which would certify that thought is proceeding rationally, as Aristotle does in his logic, or to de-

termine the conditions which must be fulfilled if reason is to be operative, as Kant does in his critiques, but to follow human consciousness until it reaches a level beyond which it cannot and need not go.[6] To call this reason or, better still, spirit as the fullness of reason is simply to say that reason is thought at its very highest and best. This is the reason which can justifiably look into itself in order to see what is true, and what reason does at this high level is philosophy. Reasoning is the highest form of experience, and the highest form of reasoning is philosophy.

It would, of course, be saying too much to claim that each philosopher even each "great" philosopher in history has come up with *a* philosophy which corresponds with this exalted Hegelian notion of philosophy. Nor does Hegel make such a claim; strictly speaking, he does not even make that claim for his own philosophy. What inevitably forces itself on us when we read Hegel carefully and consistently is a conviction that reason itself must constantly recognize that it is not rational enough, that it is rational only to the extent that it *becomes* more rational, that being rational is a process which no philosophy exhausts. Reason is truly reason when it is not merely reason, when it becomes spirit; and spirit is inexhaustible, infinite. What Hegel does claim, then, is to have delineated the character of genuinely philosophical thinking and to have been able to trace a history in which this ideal is the guiding thread

6 When consciousness or thought has reached this "level," we might say, it has discovered that there are no more pertinent questions to be asked. Strictly speaking, however, short of the totality of knowledge there are always pertinent questions still to be asked.

permitting him to situate the thought of individual thinkers, or of "schools," in the overall movement. It was with a view to making this claim intelligible that the *Introduction* to the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* was written.

2
The Text of Hegel's

Introduction

It should be obvious from even the very cursory account which we have been able to give of Hegel's system that his philosophy, no matter what its ramifications, is essentially a philosophy of man throughout (even "Spirit" is accessible to thought only to the extent that it manifests itself in the spirit of man). Thus, although the object of human thinking is not exclusively man there is a *world* of reality to be thought still, all that can be known objectively is significant to the extent that it ultimately is revelatory of man, of what is most characteristically human in man. What takes place in thought, then, is man's own gradual self-possession or a movement toward the freedom of self-determination. Self-determination, however, is meaningless if it is not rational, since short of reason it is no more than the negative rejection of other-determination or the relinquishing of determination to chance. Only if man determines himself rationally does he determine himself precisely as man. To become free, then, is to become rational, and the process is philosophy.

It has always been admitted, says Hegel (nor, he is

convinced, is it likely to be disputed in the future), that what characterizes man as man is thought. Even action, if it is to be specifically human action, is action guided by thought. To know thought, then, is to know man, or conversely, to know man is to know him through his thought. Whatever is specifically human, whether it be acting or being affected, faith or love, aesthetic or religious emotion, is so only because it has the stamp of thought on it. Even those things which are reputedly common to man and beast such as sensations, feelings, desires are not truly common, because in man they are set in a framework of thought. In this context the significance of philosophy is that it is thought at its best; it is the thinking which characterizes man as man, and it is functioning at its highest level. If to know thought is to know man, then to know man's philosophical thought is to know man at his ideal best, and whatever else characterizes man at his best, be it science, art, morality, religion, politics, social consciousness, or historical consciousness, will be related to philosophy will be, somehow, philosophical. It will be, ultimately, through philosophy that man will become what he most truly is. If to know man is to know his thought, then to know the history of man is to know the history of his thought, which, in the final analysis, is the history of philosophy.

The Nature of Thought

When Hegel says of thought that it is the "substantial" in man he means that it is the enduring element in man which characterizes him as man so much so that we must draw the conclusion that, if and when man is not thinking, he is not truly human. Now, thought is an activity, one among many possible human activities, but

unique in that it is an activity which produces only itself: the activity of thinking and the product of the activity are not to be distinguished no more than the shining of light and light itself. Although thought can and should guide other activity, its only purpose, precisely as thought, is itself. Conceived of in this way, however, thought is not simply something which individual subjects do as though it were a class concept covering all instances of a specific activity nor is it merely the sum-total of individual thinking. For Hegel, thought is a unified totality, to which of course individuals contribute, but having a unified life and, therefore, a history of its own. The history of thought, then, is not the record of a succession of events; it is a total process which unfolds in time. From the point of view of form, he tells us, this history can be seen as a succession of events of thoughts, so to speak, being thought but from the point of view of content it is one continuous process. In this we already have a hint of the relationship which Hegel will see between being and thought: although we cannot say unqualifiedly that whatever is is thought (except, perhaps, by God), Hegel can say that whatever is is related to being thought, and, to go even further, whatever is has its *true* being only in being thought. Ultimately, too, he will say that thought is true thought only to the extent that it approaches divine thought, wherein being and thought are fully identified.

What is important in this context is that it is not being which determines thought but rather thought which determines being a non-thought being is simply indeterminate and that thought determines itself. Thus when Hegel speaks of "free thought" he is not

distinguishing it from "unfree thought"; he is simply enunciating an essential characteristic of thought as such for it to be "thought" it must be "free," i.e. self-determining. It is the very essence of man as man to be free (he is to become what he is essentially), and he will progressively realize this freedom in the self-determination which is thought. There is nothing in this, as we learn from the *Phenomenology*, of either Stoicism or Romanticism, which seek a freedom they do not really have by taking refuge in thought; the free thought of which Hegel speaks is not a thought divorced from reality, but one which is at once determining of the reality in which it is immersed and self-determining.

At this point, however, a problem arises with regard to what has already been said about the vital unity of thought, whose history is its own process. If thought is free and undetermined by the changing world in which it lives, its validity would seem to be unconditioned, or conditioned only by itself. But this would mean that it is self-contained, identical with itself, always precisely what it is, and, therefore, not susceptible of development. In the fullest sense of the term, to think is to think truly, and to think truly is to think what is true. What is true, however, is not true today and not true tomorrow; the true is eternally true, and true thought is eternally true thought. How, then, can thought have a history, any more than truth or being? To speak of history is to speak of a past which no longer is, but true thought has no past, any more than it has a future, since as true it is eternally true, eternally is what it is, is eternally present. There can be, it would seem, a logic of thought but not a history.

Lest all this seem far-fetched, it might be recalled that

the timelessness of the eidos * was precisely the point of view from which Plato viewed the reality of the intelligible as opposed to the unreality of sensible appearances. By the same token, Aristotle's logic is timeless; it contains the eternal rules which govern a human thought which is eternally the same, and no less a protagonist than Kant had proclaimed that of all the traditional thinking of the West the only area which needed no revamping was the Aristotelian logic, because thought which is truly thought does not change. Or, to come closer to our own day, there is the Husserlian ideal of philosophy as a rigorous science, whose task it is to grasp eternal essences, which do not change no matter how often they are instantiated even if they are never instantiated at all. Thought such as this may think *about* history, but it itself has no history, because history is irrelevant to it its validity is independent of any history. A truth may be discovered today which was not known yesterday, but it has not *become* true in being discovered.

Without going into all the complexities of Hegel's thinking on this subject, we can say that, although he denies that thought must stand trial before the bar of a history which is not its own, he does see it as having a history of its own, and philosophy is not independent of this history. Not only is the thinking of each individual a process and not an instantaneous intuition of essence, but thought as a whole is a process manifesting a discernible unity and continuity. What is more, thought is an ongoing process whose past is integral to its present, and whose present can be what it is only because its past has been what it has been, whose present is knowable only if its past is also known. There can be

no question of starting thought (or philosophy) from scratch, not only because a thought without a history would be without a necessary awareness of its antecedents, but because a thought, or a thinking of thought, without a history simply would not be thought. Behind all this is the Hegelian contention, clarified in the *Logic*, that essential to thought is its manifestation, and that manifestation without process is meaningless. It is perfectly obvious, of course even to, say, a Husserl that the thinking of any individual is a process, but what Hegel is saying is that no thinking is genuinely thinking unless it is integrated into the total process of thought.

Philosophical Thinking

What applies to thinking in general applies also to philosophy in particular; not, however, because thinking and philosophical thinking are synonymous, nor because philosophy is simply one, even though the highest, among many forms of thinking. For Hegel, philosophy is thinking par excellence, because to philosophize is to think thought (not to think *about* thought), and to think thought is to go through the process which is thought. Thus, what distinguishes philosophy from other forms of thought each of which has its own importance is that philosophy comprehends (*begreift*) the very process of thinking and is, therefore, pre-eminently concept (*Begriff*),[1] which is to say, it is the process of its own

1 The tendency among translators of Hegel, most of whom up to the present have been British, to translate the Hegelian *Begriff* as the Berkeleyan "notion" is unfortunate. Hegel is at pains to point out that the activity (*begreifen*) which culminates in *Begriff* is a "conceiving," which is not the one-sided activity of a "subject" who thinks, but the

dynamic process which makes thought real and reality thought. *Begriff*, then, is "concept," not "notion."

thinking. Its task is to trace the process of thought, not by looking at it, so to speak, from the outside, but by *doing* it. In one sense, of course, this could be taken as a description of the Hegelian *Logic*, which purports to be a complete explication of the implications of thinking without reference to any actual thinking, what thinking *must* be independently of what thinking has been. In another sense, however, it is a description of the history of philosophy, which traces the actual process through which thought has gone by going through the process and not simply by recording what has been said in the process. Thus, Hegel is not interested in simply interpreting what a Plato or an Aristotle, an Augustine or an Anselm, a Descartes or a Leibniz, has said in the course of history; he seeks to show what has been going on by going through the process of which the thought of these thinkers constitutes an integral part. The ordinary historian may legitimately stand off and simply record what has taken place; the historian of philosophy must rethink the process of thought which he records.

In this view, then, philosophy has a history or is a history because it is a single unified process. Only a recognizable unit, after all, can have a history. A human individual can have a history only because throughout his life he is recognizable as the same individual. Rome could have a history, because from beginning to end it was recognizable as one political entity. The Jewish people can have a history, because they have always been identifiable as one people. Philosophy, then, can have a history only if it is constantly identifiable as one and the same no matter what its meanderings may have been. Thus, although it is possible to speak of a

succession of philosophies, this can constitute a history, only if each successive manifestation is an integral part of one and the same process, and this it will be only if what unifies the process is a single purpose a purpose which is the purpose of history, not merely of the historian who records it.

Here we meet the Hegelian concept of teleology which is, admittedly, one of the most difficult of all to comprehend not merely in the sense that it is difficult to grasp its meaning but, more significantly, that it is difficult to accept, once we have grasped the meaning. We mentioned before in discussing Hegel's "philosophy of nature" that the contemplation of nature revealed to Hegel an order which bespoke purpose, and a purpose which bespoke reason. In this view Hegel is in agreement with a long philosophical tradition. He goes further, however, in that his contemplation of history also reveals to him an order, a purpose, and an overall guiding reason. Thus, in his *Philosophy of History* he sees a unified direction in world history, which is the movement of man toward the achievement of freedom, a purpose which is not that of any individual merely as such but is the purpose of reason, which each individual serves whether he knows it or not. By the same token, philosophy is the unified work of one overriding reason, and its history is the "history of eternal unified reason presenting itself in infinitely manifold forms."2 Its purpose, too, is the ultimate realization of human freedom, which is synonymous with rationality. Thus, when Hegel says, in the present *Introduction*, that the purpose of thought is thought itself, he is saying that the process of thought in its total history is oriented toward

2 Hegel, *Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie* (*Sämmtliche Werke*, I, ed. Glockner), p. 73.

becoming truly rational and that to be rational is to go through this process. With Aristotle, Hegel will say that to speak of *what* thought is is to speak of *why* thought is, which is to say that the orientation to complete rationality is essential to thought as thought. This is also to say, however, that thought is truly rational only when it is historical, because the very rationality of thought is in its process. Thus, philosophy as the rationalizing of thought *is* the process itself.

Thought, then, has a purpose, but it is not the purpose of any individual thinker. Thinking, Hegel tells us, is spiritual activity, even when it is the activity of the individual. But spiritual activity is the activity of spirit, and, because spirit is one and undivided, its activity is one activity whose *process* philosophy is. It might be well here to point out once again that the unity Hegel speaks of is not the unity of a class concept, such that the sum-total of all individual spirits would be united under the one heading "spirit." However difficult it may be to grasp, what Hegel is saying is that the totality of all spirits down through history constitutes one concrete spirit, that spiritual activity is one ongoing process, that spiritual activity called thought is one, and that to philosophize is to recapture the unity of that process. This last means also that, without an overall view of the total philosophical process, no individual philosophy will be intelligible nor will history make sense because there is one spirit laboring throughout the entire process.

Reason vs. Understanding

Here it is that the distinction between understanding and reason, a constant for Hegel which he has highlighted in the *Phenomenology*

of Spirit and emphasized

in his criticism of Kant in the two Prefaces to the *Logic*, becomes important. Understanding (*Verstand*), he tells us, is the intellectual process of abstract conceptualization, a process which grasps abstractly what is thought about but does not comprehend (*begreifen*) the process of thought itself. It is the process Kant talks about, describing in general terms what goes on (or should go on) in each individual when he thinks correctly (formal logic is a logic of *understanding*; but for Hegel, even Kant's "transcendental logic" does not get beyond understanding). Reason, on the other hand, is the total human process. It is not confined to intellectual activity, but is the totality of spiritual activity and is recognizable both as subjective, in the activity, and as objective, in the results of the activity. Thus, while the function of understanding is narrowly intellectual and, therefore, inadequate to reality, the function of reason is much broader, taking in all specifically human activity, none of which is irrelevant to the truth which reason thinks. It is quite obvious, then, that the reason of which Hegel speaks is not the reason of which rationalism speaks. It is equally obvious that it is not the reason for which formal logic lays down the rules even though in its abstract (i.e., partial) functioning it cannot ignore the rules of formal logic. The logic of reason is a logic of the real, where the opposition of abstract concept to abstract concept is reconciled in the vital process which is both reality and thought.

Thought, then, as we have already seen, not only has no meaning beyond itself to which it points; it also has no purpose extrinsic to itself, in the sense that it would be ordered to something beyond itself e.g., action because the very opposition of thought and

action has been reconciled in genuinely rational thought. The purpose of all thought is to be itself, or rather its purpose is to become what it is not yet, or what it is only implicitly. A favorite illustration which Hegel uses is that of the seed which both is not yet the tree it is to become and is implicitly all that the tree will be. It should be pointed out, however, that the analogy limps somewhat, since the end result, the tree, is what it is simply as tree, whereas the end result in thought is nothing apart from the whole process. A better example is that of the human embryo which eventually becomes man, but as man sums up the whole process of becoming man a spiritual as well as a biological process.

Just as it was necessary for Hegel to distinguish between reason and understanding, so he stresses the distinction between thought (*Gedanke*) and representation (*Vorstellung*); the former is the work of reason, the latter of understanding. Whereas a representation represents (in the sense of standing for or taking the place of) a reality other than itself, thought is identified with the reality it thinks, because reality is what thought *thinks*. It is for this reason that true thought is genuinely concrete. Seen from the subjective side, or as concept (*Begriff*), its content is reality; seen from the objective side, or as idea (*Idee*), it is the reality with which thought is identified in thinking. One can see that Hegel not only took Aristotle seriously when the latter said that in thinking the mind *becomes* its object; he also spelled out what that becoming means. If it is true, as was stated before, that the real is truly real only as determinate, and that thought is the determination of the real, then thought becomes the real in determining it to be the real which it is. From this it should also be obvi-

ous that, for Hegel, the real itself can be genuinely known, not merely its appearances. For all his "absolute idealism" Hegel is quite convinced that speculative thought delivers reality as it really is because only in thought is it as it really is.

One of the chief ways in which Hegel's thinking differs from that of the philosophical tradition in general and from Kant in particular, whose position he is concerned to criticize by presenting his own theory of the rational concept, is in his notion of the universal. Traditionally it had been taught that universality in thought is arrived at by abstraction i.e., by the suppression of individual differences among objects and the abstraction (or extraction) of a common core of meaning. Without denying that such an activity of abstraction can be significant, and even necessary, in the overall process of thinking, Hegel insists that the universal is much more concrete than such a process of abstraction can make it. Thus, the concept of which he speaks is not the activity of this or that individual generalized so that it can stand for the activity of all; nor is it an impossible sum-total of individual activities. Rather it is the total process of thinking wherein reality is progressively more and more concretely present, as thinking becomes progressively aware of its own concrete unity. What has happened is that for the universality of abstract objectivity has been substituted the universality of concrete subjectivity.

The beginning of this process is intuition, in which reality is already present, but only inchoatively. Thus, the intuition in which reality is immediately present to mind is inchoative thinking and, as such, is abstract. It is significant *for* thought only as it grows *in* thought.

It should be noted here that Hegel is quite deliberately trying to avoid the Kantian dichotomy of sense and intellect: the activity of sense intuition he sees as already an activity of mind (i.e., distinctively human) and not as an activity which waits for intellect to raise it to the level of mind. Its object, however, precisely as immediate, is indeterminate and becomes determinate only in reflection. As thinking progresses, therefore, its object becomes progressively more determined and, therefore, more concrete, and the thinking, too, becomes more concrete. Thinking is not a movement away from the concrete, it is the very process of concretion. The difference between the abstract and the concrete, then, is the difference between the beginning and the term of the process; and to stop the process anywhere along the line is to stop in abstraction, which, precisely as an inadequate stopping-point, is error in regard to the reality which is its content. The progressively more concretely universal content of consciousness on the march cannot stop short of the totality of all content i.e., the ultimate concretization of reason's certainty "that it is all reality" (*Phenomenology*). What is more, and here is the paradox of the Hegelian dialectic, the movement of determination is one of progressive negation, since it is the indetermination of the immediate whether at the beginning or anywhere along the line which must be negated in the process of concretion (without negation there is no movement). The process called thought is one of determination when the process is complete, and no further determination is possible, it is called concept and it is a process wherein any incomplete stage involves contradiction by the very fact of its incompleteness and thus cries out, not for the rejection

but for the reconciliation of its contradiction. To say, for example, of something that it is, is to say as little as possible of it. To say of it that it is determinate, is to say more, but it is also to deny that it merely is. Furthermore, nothing is determinate merely in itself but only in being thought. Nor does the matter end here: it is not even adequately determinate in thought unless it is thought as related to others. And so the process goes on, a process of implying an ever more intricate network of relationships, so that no knowledge short of the total grasp of all the implications of the initial intuition is really knowledge at all, and whatever can be called knowledge is so only because of its place in the total scheme. It is for this reason that Hegel sees the paradigm of all knowledge in a divine knowing which is in itself infinite and has for its content the infinite totality of the knowable.

If that which thought thinks is progressively revealed in the process which thought is, then the progressive determination of thought's content and the development of thought itself are identical. Both being and thought are concurrently concretized in a process which is one and the same. As Hegel sees it, then, to know is not to stand off and watch the process; it is to be in the process. At the same time it is quite clear that there is thought only if there are subjects who think thought is not a disembodied process which simply goes on. Each subject can truthfully say of himself, it is I who think. Thinking is an activity which each shares with all who think, and all thought is potentially in each thinking I, since any thought as such implies all thought. By the same token, objectively, all reality is potentially in each idea, since each idea implies the totality of what can be

thought. In no one I unless it be God can there be the actual totality of thinking. In no one idea unless it be the absolute Idea can there be the actual totality of what is thought. Ideally, however, the totality of thinking is united in one subject, which Hegel calls absolute Spirit, and all that is thought is united in one object, which he calls absolute Idea.

Reason and Freedom

The thinking activity of absolute spirit is reason (whose unified overall process is the concept), and this activity wherein what is thought is determined is the supreme activity of self-determination. It is for this reason that Hegel calls the process of thought the process of becoming free self-determination is freedom. This applies to each individual I, since the process of thinking is the process of becoming aware of what it is to be an I. Just as the determination of any object, however, cannot be independent of the totality of objective determination, so too the self-determination of any individual I cannot be independent of the totality of self-determination. To be aware of being free cannot be distinct from the awareness that all men are free, or, what is the same, that man as such is free and coming to this awareness is the work of the whole historical process. It scarcely needs to be remarked, of course, that to be free and to be conscious of being free cannot be distinguished a freedom of which one would not be conscious simply would not be freedom. This is the meaning of Hegel's oft-quoted dictum from the Introduction to the *Philosophy of History* that in the East only one is free; in the Greco-Roman world some are free; in the

Germanic world all are free.[3] Behind this dictum, of course, is the conviction that in the East and in the Greco-Roman world none is truly free, since to be conscious of self-determination while other men are other-determined is not to be conscious of essential freedom, the freedom which belongs to the very fact of being man. To know the *reason* why one is free is to be truly free, but to know the reason is to be rational, and so rationality and true freedom are identified; the process of reason is the process of becoming free. Furthermore, the reason for being free must be the true reason, the essential reason. The I which is conscious of being free must be conscious that being rational which is essential to being human (not something extrinsic like being a king or a Greek or a Roman) is the ground for being free. The true ground, therefore, must be universally true, applicable to all rational beings; if the I does not recognize that all other I's are free for the same reason, it is really not conscious of its own true freedom.

To put all this in another way, a way which illustrates the character of the Hegelian dialectic: the very fact of being man means being free; if, however, the only ground of this freedom is simply *being* man, then one is free only in himself (*an sich*) i.e., only potentially free. When one is conscious of being free the process has advanced to the stage where one is free for himself (*für sich*), which is the stage of independence but not yet genuine freedom, because one does not really know the reason why. When the consciousness of freedom advances to a knowledge that the very fact of being man is the reason for being free, one is free in and for himself

3 Cf. Hegel, *Reason in History* (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), pp. 23-24.

(*an- und für sich*). Which is the stage of effective (actual) freedom. This last stage, of course, is meaningless unless the reason for one's being free is the same for all men. Thus, the condition both for being free and for being conscious of this is the acknowledgment that all men are free. The social and political implications of this are enormous, and Hegel's great follower Marx did not fail to exploit them.

The Life of Thought

To get back to the notion of process, it is process in a meaningful sense of the word only if what is in process is constantly the same and constantly different; from beginning to end it must be what it is and all that it is, at first only implicitly and gradually more and more explicitly. Not only is this admirably illustrated by the process of organic development which we call life (the seed which develops has the principle of its development within itself, and it is the seed which develops), but all true process is life and all true life is process. If, then, spiritual life the life of thought is truly life it is also process; where process stops there is death. This, for Hegel, has two gigantic implications. The first concerns thought. Not only is thought dynamic and not static, but thought itself is life, it is its own process of development, and the ordered (or organized) thought which we call knowledge or science is the authentic process of thought. To know scientifically, then, is to be in the process, and to be in the process is to be an integral part of the history of thought. This means that thinking cannot be scientific if it is not historical. It also means that only in doing the history of philosophy can we be scientifically philosophical, which is but an-

other way of saying that we can be philosophical only if our philosophizing is historical. The second implication of the identification of process and life is that the process of determination through which reality goes in being determined is also life. At the very least this means that, in the relationship between reality and thought whose middle term is the idea, there is life we might say that reality comes alive in thought or that the idea is live reality. Thus, when Hegel says in the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, "Whatever is actual is rational and whatever is rational is actual,"[4] he is not saying as both conservative friends and liberal enemies would have him say that it is rational for things to be precisely the way they are; rather he is saying that the very reality of the real is its rationality, and the very rationality of the rational is its reality, which is to say that the reality of the real and the rationality of the rational constitute one and the same life-process. It is for this reason that any thought implies the whole of thought, and any reality implies the whole of reality, and to know both thought and reality is to follow out faithfully these implications. This last, in fact, sums up the whole of the Hegelian methodology. The problem, of course, is just how to follow out the implications; and that means following Hegel throughout his entire system.

There is, of course, another problem, perhaps more basic, and we might call it the problem of unity. It is all very well to say that the whole of thought is one life or that the whole of reality comes alive in thought,

4 Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1955), p. 14. English translation by T.M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 10.

but the fact is that our experience of development is of many developments (or of many lines of development). Can we legitimately say that all coalesce into one? Hegel clearly thinks that they do and that the authentic view of historical process demonstrates that they do. This is, in fact, what he means by the notion of "concretion," which he derives from the Latin verb *concrescere* which means "to grow together." The concrete is not merely the solid, the factual, the perceptible. It is, of course, the real, but not as opposed to the ideal. Rather, it is the gathering together of the real, which occurs only in and through the idea (one is reminded of Heidegger's notion of the loyos * function is leyelv, * or to gather together). There are, then, developments, processes, we might even say concretions, but they are meaningful as diversified only if they are also unified. The overall process is one in which reality is gradually revealed to and in thought. Revelation, however, is ultimately self-revelation, and that which reveals itself is one i.e., spirit. "The goal of spirit," Hegel tells us, "is, if we may employ the expression, to comprehend itself, to remain no longer hidden to itself. The road to this is its development, and the series of developments form the levels of its development" (infra, p. 81).

It should be noted here that such notions as process, development, growth, although not confined to the organic and material, are meaningless, if the passage they indicate is not somehow manifest to consciousness. We can, in fact, say that process is progressive manifestation. In itself that which progresses is already all that it is to become, but in itself what it is to become is not manifested. Even Spirit's process is its progressive manifestation to consciousness, or its growth to con-

sciousness of itself. This progressive manifestation is accomplished in man's progressive awareness of what it is to be man. That the stages in the development are themselves developments is to be expected, since the process is continuous, and no segment of it is static. Furthermore, development is not simply rectilinear since continuity demands a forward movement which constantly returns to itself.

Thus, to speak of development in this context is to speak of a process whose stages are not stages in the strict sense, since each is itself a development; the result of one is the beginning of another. Since the process of which we speak is the process the life of thought, the movement, whether in the overall or in the particular development, is from the abstract to the concrete, which is but another way of saying, from the isolated to the united, from the immediate intuition, which is unrelated, to the full relatedness of its explicitated implications. It might be pointed out that, since abstraction is itself the *beginning* of concretion, there is no absolutely abstract; the abstract is always relatively abstract, just as the concrete, short of the absolutely concrete, is only relatively concrete. By the same token, it should be said that, short of infinite divine thought, there is no absolutely concrete but the process is process toward the absolute, and therefore shares the infinity of its goal; all thought is in this sense infinite, by sharing the infinity of the divine. One is reminded in all this of Plato's recognition in the *Theaetetus* that there is no passage from absolute ignorance to knowledge *ex nihilo nihil fit* but only from relative ignorance, which is relative knowledge, to knowledge (Plato also

saw that all knowledge is a participation in the ideal of absolute knowledge).

Idea and Reality

We have now reached a point where we can begin to come to grips with what Hegel means by philosophy of which he intends to present a history. To put it as succinctly as possible, philosophy, for Hegel, is the process of thought thinking thought, involving at once all thinking and all thought-objects. Since, quite obviously, thinking is not yet at an end, this includes the totality of thought up to the present and recognizes the process as continuing. The point, however, is not to assign either a beginning or an end, temporally, to thought, but to see that philosophy's concern is all reality insofar as it has been thought: i.e., it finds in thought the only reality with which it is concerned, nor does it recognize a reality outside of thought with which it might be concerned a sort of reality-in-itself. It simply does not recognize a reality which is unrelated to thought.

Now, since thinking is the activity of spirit, not spirit's being-acted-upon by a non-verifiable causality in things it must produce its own objects; there is no other way for them to come into being as objects. At the same time, if thought is to be true, its objects cannot be other than real; the problem, then, is the problem of any idealism: how to identify the products of thinking activity with reality. In one sense at least Hegel remains within the tradition of transcendental thinking, whose concern is to establish the necessary conditions for thought to be true. Reduced to a mini-

mum these conditions are two: that all thought be the product of spirit's thinking activity; and that the product of this activity be identical with reality. Where Hegel differs from the idealist tradition is not in his affirmation of identity between thought and reality but in his insistence on seeing this identity as a process of identification and in his refusal to accept the individual's rational insight as the ultimate criterion of truth.

As we saw before in speaking of the process through which man goes in arriving at rational freedom, the process as process involves three steps from the in-itself (*ansich*) through the for-itself (*fürsich*) to the in- and for-itself (*an- und fürsich*). If, as we have also seen, overall process is always a process of processes (a development of developments), the process of identification of thought and reality will be a series of processes passing from a minimal identification of thought with being, and no more than that, through a recognition that being is essentially thought being, to the ultimate identification of the total thought-process with the manifestation of being in its totality.[5] The result, then, is not a simple affirmation of identity (an affirmation which, Hegel claims, stands at the beginning of the systems of both Fichte and Schelling), but the demonstration of a movement, at no point of which is the identity of thought and reality ever sundered. The immediate *qua* immediate, it is true, is unreal (because undeveloped),

5 The "logic" of the process of identification is in the unbroken chain of implications whereby the inevitable identification of thought and abstract being (to think at all is to think being) is progressively concretized, because its implications are explicitated. In the *Phenomenology* this logic is at work empirically, so to speak, as consciousness manifests this development in time. In the *Logic,* the

de facto development is shown to be logically necessary independently of time.

but since it is also the beginning of development it is the beginning of the process of becoming real. Thus, the concretion which we have already described as the passage from the relatively abstract to the concrete could also be described as a passage from the relatively unreal to the real.

None of this, quite obviously, can make any sense except in terms of the total interconnectedness of thought which Hegel calls its "system." Nor, as an identification of thought and reality, can it make any sense unless reality, too, consists in an interconnected totality. Just as thought is truly thought only in and through its relatedness, such that the identity of any thought with itself is meaningless except in the framework of its total relatedness, so the interrelatedness of what thought thinks is constitutive of its very reality. Whatever is, or is true, is mediated[6] in its being and truth by that to which it is related the reality of the real is *in* that to which it is related. To speak of reality as related, however, is to speak of reality as thought; it is to say that the reality of the real is constituted by its being thought, since there is relatedness only where there is thought. Nor is this to say that the real is not real in itself; it is to say that the real is real in itself only when it is in and for itself i.e., as ideal that the

6 The concept of "mediation" is one of the most important and at the same time one of the most difficult to comprehend in Hegel's thought. Without writing an entire essay on it we might say at this point that it has no one meaning throughout, except to the extent that the mediate is always to be understood in its opposition to the immediate. Wherever, then, there is negation of the abstractness or emptiness of the immediate there is mediation. For the most part this means giving a more concrete content to what is at least relatively abstract and

contentless. When a concept, for example, is related to its opposite, without which it does not say all that it has to say, it is thus mediated.

totality of relationships which constitute the real as real is not different from the totality of relationships which constitute thought as thought as thought *of* the real.

Philosophy, then, is the totality of spirit's development, of spirit's activity as an interconnected whole. There is, of course, a sense in which the total interconnectedness of spirit's activity is not dependent on its empirical verification in a sequence of "thoughts" the reason why Hegel can characterize his *Logic* as the "presentation of God . . . before the creation of the world or of a single finite spirit," the timeless interconnectedness of all thought that makes a logic possible. It is also true, however, that *de facto* the development of spirit does work itself out in time; it does have a history, and this history is the history of philosophy, the "empirical" proof of a development which is "essential." It is for this reason that Hegel calls history itself a "science." At any given moment in its development such a history will contain in a way, perhaps, which no other history does the whole of its past. Philosophy, we might say, is unique in being always its own history, the whole of its history. Philosophy, therefore, can never be particularized. No one philosophy can ever be philosophy as such; nor can any one philosophy even Hegel's stand for the whole of philosophy, although the philosophy of any given age, which is the crystallization of the spirit of that age, will be the summation of philosophy's progress up to that time. It is possible, of course, to speak of "philosophies" (in the plural), but only if it is borne in mind that they are but "moments" in the one process which is philosophy. A consequence of this, incidentally, is that there can be "philosophies"

which are unphilosophical, which simply are not part of the history of philosophy. For the most part it is not necessary for the historian to make a decision regarding these; history will have made the decision for him. The process itself is only apparently contingent, in the sense that at any given moment in the process we are confronted with "opinions." The whole process, however, is not a matter of opinions but of a steady march toward truth.

What we have seen in regarding philosophy as the "life" of the spirit permits Hegel to say that "the thought which is fundamental to a given time is the all-pervading spirit" (infra, p. 83). A philosophy, then, which is not timely will not be a philosophy. Nor is the judgment about its timeliness simply an arbitrary one although, it must be admitted, contemporaries of a given philosophy do, in fact, seem to have difficulty in making such a judgment. Hegel does not say so, but a certain temporal distance seems to be required for making the judgment of timeliness. In this connection, Hegel is somewhat more difficult to follow in his contention that the development of philosophy which is empirically manifested in its history simply mirrors its essential development perhaps because it is hard to convince us that "Reason" is all that rational. On the other hand, it would seem that Hegel is saying something which is really not too difficult to accept, namely that the history of philosophy is not simply the record of what has *de facto* been thought by men who, rightly or wrongly, have been classed as "philosophers" even in the case of great philosophers it should be possible to distinguish the philosophical from the unphilosophical in their

thought, and the "rationality" of the overall process should in some sense be a criterion for making such a distinction.

It is not difficult, certainly, to admit that a process of unfolding even if it be the unfolding of what is "essential" to thought should necessarily take time, since even what is essential can be manifested in successive stages. What is difficult is to admit that there is a "logic" which determines the necessary process (and the necessity of the process) of thought, such that the very order of its "mediations" (the explicitation of its implications) is, so to speak, mapped out ahead of time. One of the principal, and constant, objections to Hegel's thinking, particularly in the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic,* is the seeming arbitrariness of the *order* of implications, which he presents as *necessary.* Whether or not we can accept such a notion will depend upon our ability to accept Hegel's contention (and to grasp what he means by it) that throughout the process of thought (throughout philosophy's history) there is one subject i.e., Spirit thinking. In saying this, Hegel is certainly not denying that each subject each philosopher down through the ages does his own thinking. If nothing else, the writing of a history of philosophy demands that he name names. What he is saying, however, is that in thinking his own thoughts each philosopher is participating in universal thought and universal thinking and that the universality of thought must be objective, if logic is to have any meaning whatever. In his *Philosophy of History,* as well as in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel has familiarized us with what he calls "the trickery of Reason" (*die List der Vernunft*). According to this, each figure in history simply acts with a view to

achieving his own goals, but in so doing is unconsciously promoting the overriding goals (or goal) of Reason itself. Similarly the history of philosophy reveals to Hegel that each thinker thinking his thoughts is simply the overriding Spirit thinking itself. This is not a particularly comforting thought, perhaps perhaps something of a metaphor but it does give meaning to the affirmation that, although historically the process of thought is particularized in its successive moments, it is one continuous process, the principle of whose unity and continuity is one subject thinking. If nothing else, this permits the writing of far more interesting and rewarding history than is usual among historians of philosophy (it will permit Hegel, at the end of his *Introduction*, to pass judgment on various "histories of philosophy" available in his day). There is, however, something else: the notion of teleology which underlies all that Hegel says about the unity of the process of thought is properly speaking a theological notion, which he makes quite clear by introducing at this point the notion of "providence." If the whole process is under some sort of divine guidance (whatever "divine" can mean in the context), the unity and teleology of thought does make more sense. It also makes us wonder whether an Hegelian history of philosophy is viable outside the framework of a theology of history.

Nevertheless, without further pursuing the theological question, which is unanswerable here, we must look more closely at the notion of unity in the philosophical process. The unity of philosophy, Hegel tells us, is of two kinds. It has, first of all, a formal unity, in the sense that philosophy is a genus of which the various philosophies are species. This is not the unity of which

we have been speaking up to this point, but it has its importance. There has to be a sense in which, when we say of this or that philosophy that it is a philosophy, we are not only saying the same thing but also know what we are saying, a sense in which it means something to say that someone is "doing philosophy." If we could not speak of philosophy in this way, it is doubtful that we could speak meaningfully of any other kind of unity of philosophy. The second kind of unity is essential if there is to be a "history" of philosophy in the strict sense, and this kind of unity Hegel calls "speculative," because it exhibits the unity proper to rational process. It is the unity of one ongoing process, of which the various philosophies are not species but "moments" in a total movement (the term "moment" is better than steps, or levels, or stages, because it has a dynamic connotation which the other terms do not). The process is one of "Reason (Spirit) coming to consciousness of itself," which it does in the many philosophies the world has known. This process, it would seem, does not turn back on itself, no more than does any process of coming to consciousness of self (or, for that matter, any genuine process), and this is the reason why a resurrected philosophy (a "neo-" this or that philosophy) is always a misfit; it does not properly belong to the age which resurrects it, because it turns the process back. The implication would also seem to be, however, that there can be only one philosophy for any given age, but Hegel does not spell that out. Still, he does tell us that the relation of one philosophy to another is dialectical, which means that a subsequent philosophy does not supplant but rather complements the one which preceded it, and that the order of succession is not arbitrary it is dic-

tated by the necessity of thought in development. It is that familiar function of *Aufhebung* which characterizes every dialectical process; what is *aufgehoben* is not simply canceled, even though it is not left as it was; it is retained but at the same time lifted up to a higher level. According to this, then, the philosophy of Plato would not be supplanted by that of Aristotle, or that of Kant by that of Hegel. Neither, however, would the one be succeeded by the other and thus simply remain what it was. Through the philosophy of Aristotle the philosophy of Plato becomes more than it was by itself; a light is thrown on it which reveals more clearly how it functions in the process which is philosophy. It is certainly with this in mind that Hegel "does" the history of philosophy, and it is certainly what happens to the philosophy of Plato, or of Aristotle, or Spinoza, or of Kant, when anyone "does" the philosophy of Hegel. One might even use this as the touchstone of the great philosopher; when anyone "does" his philosophy seriously one sees the rest of philosophy differently.

Philosophical Involvement

The unity of the speculative process which Hegel describes, then, is not a unity imposed by the synthesizing of those who do history; it is a unity achieved in and through the process itself. Various positions relate themselves to each other and their synthesis is in their mutual complementarity. Nevertheless, Hegel sees in a process such as this certain outstanding points of unification "nodal points" philosophies which, so to speak, gather up and summarize the total movement anterior to them. Such was the philosophy of Plato in its day. Such, too, was the philosophy of the Neo-

platonists (the "Alexandrians") in the third century of our era. Such, finally, was Spinoza in the seventeenth century, and what Hegel says about Spinoza indicates just how important he considered this "gathering" function to be; it constituted a sort of point of no return in the philosophical process, where the past is assigned its enduring position in the ongoing present of our own thinking. Thus, the philosophy of Spinoza becomes in its time *the* mode of philosophizing: "Spinoza is the highpoint of modern philosophy; either Spinozism or no philosophy at all."[7] Had Hegel been writing as a post-Hegelian, we might surmise that his own philosophy would also have been one of those "nodal points." It should be remarked, of course, that this characterization of certain philosophies in no way changes the nature of philosophy as an ongoing process, which is always of the present. Thus, to know philosophy, even as the historian knows it, is not to know *about* something belonging to the past; it is to be *in* the process as it is taking place. It is for this reason, too, that the philosopher (or the historian of philosophy) can never merely look at or record the process: he must be involved in it. Hegel had to say this, because a certain prejudice in favor of "objectivity" in his own day tended to absolve the historian from the obligation of philosophizing. Hegel would not accord either the philosopher or the historian of philosophy (if, in fact, the distinction is even admissible) the luxury of scholarly indifference to philosophical issues the *whole* process is *always* a live issue, and "objectivity" without involvement is simply meaningless. The historian is not free simply to

7 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie,* Vol. III (Glockner ed., XIX), p. 374.

record what philosophers have said; he must think their thoughts philosophically.

To speak of "involvement," however, is to bring in a wider spectrum of human interests than merely the philosophical. Hegel had said earlier that philosophical thinking did not exhaust the spiritual activities of man. To put it another way, philosophy is not all that spirit does, it is not the only manner in which spirit manifests itself. Science and art, morality and religion, legal thinking and politics, are spiritual activities manifestations of Spirit and they are neither synonymous with philosophy nor simply to be subsumed under philosophy. At the same time these other activities of Spirit are not mere matters of indifference to philosophy (or to the philosophers). The Spirit which manifests itself in all these activities is one and the same Spirit, and so it is to be expected that the activities themselves should be interconnected; and their relation to each other is through the Spirit they all manifest. There is a sense, of course, in which the various spiritual activities of any age (or of successive ages) influence each other, but Hegel is more interested in the way in which they bear diversified witness to the one Spirit that is made manifest in them.

Still, among these various activities philosophy performs a unique function; it unifies them all in a way in which none of the others does. If, as we saw before, it is precisely thought which characterizes man as man, and if the other activities mentioned are specifically human activities (Hegel is not even speaking to those who would conceivably think that they are not), then each of these activities is characterized by thought. What is unique in philosophy, then, is not that it is

characterized by thought, but that the form which characterizes it is the form of thought in a way not true of the others. The philosophy of an age, Hegel tells us, is the thinking of that age's spirit or the thinking of Spirit in that age. Philosophy expresses the spirit of an age in a way that nothing else does or, in any age Spirit expresses itself in philosophy as it does in no other of its activities. Thus, to employ Hegel's own language, to identify with the spirit of an age is to be conscious of what is substantial (the enduring) in that age. It is to do the thinking which characterizes the age in which the thinking is done. This, I think, is what Hegel means when he refers to any age as the stage which Spirit has reached in coming to consciousness of itself the philosophy of an age is the thinking of Spirit when it has come to that stage in the process of becoming conscious of itself. What man thinks as a scientist or artist, a moralist or man of religion, a jurist or statesman, may very well be time conditioned; what really shows, however, whether one is truly in tune with his times is his philosophy. In philosophy, he will say, not in art, religion, and so forth, Spirit is truly conscious of itself, and only through philosophy does man share in that self-consciousness. It is certainly true that we can know man historically only if we know how he reveals himself in these diverse manifestations of his thought. His philosophy, however, unites all these and reveals man in a unique way. The intellectual history of man is above all the history of his philosophical thinking.

This is really not so difficult, or so complicated, as it may seem. No one denies, for example, that in any age one can legitimately speak of "modern science" or "modern art" nor is it inconceivable that morality,

religion, jurisprudence, or politics, might legitimately be characterized as "modern." What is precisely modern in any of these, however, is the thinking which takes place, and only philosophy, in any age, is concerned with thinking as thinking. Science is concerned with results; art is concerned with producing the art work; morality is concerned with human behavior, and so on. Only philosophy, however, is concerned with scientific thinking, artistic thinking, moral thinking, and the like. To put it another way, when the scientist, artist, moralist turns the light of thought onto his own thinking he becomes a philosopher, and what he does is philosophy.[8]

By the same token, of course, the philosopher in any age will not be in tune with his age if he is not concerned with *all* the thinking of that age. If philosophy is the spirit of an age expressed in thought, then the thought which is philosophy must think all spirit's thought in that age. The program, it is true, is colossal, and no philosophy of any individual philosopher can encompass all that philosophy in his age must be (in a sense Plato and Aristotle had it easier), and here we may have at least a partial answer to the question concerning the complementarity of diverse simultaneous philosophies; they would seem to constitute together the overall philosophy of the age to which they belong, thus functioning as moments of a moment in the ongoing process of philosophy. This Hegel does not spell out, although he does attempt (at least as a project) to unite all the thought of his own age in his philosophy. It would

8 It should, perhaps, be emphasized here that Hegel by no means identifies philosophy and epistemology although there is an important

sense in which he identifies philosophical ("speculative") thinking and logic.

be an exaggeration to say that he succeeded, but his "system" bears witness to his awareness of the necessity of making the attempt.

Thought as "Negation"

One of the things that Hegel's philosophy did succeed in doing was to emphasize the negating character of all thought. When thought thinks nature, for example, it negates nature by turning it into thought. The philosophy of nature, then, does not think nature it thinks the thought of nature. Whether or not one goes along with Hegel in this particularly in his philosophy of nature one is forced to admit that the thought of nature reveals more of nature than nature alone does, which is but another way of saying that nature must be negated in order to reveal nature. This sort of thing Hegel will extend to the whole field of thinking. If all thinking is the thinking of reality, in one form or another, then all thinking negates reality, in the sense that by conceptualizing it negates reality in its immediate relationship to consciousness (one is reminded of the contemporary emphasis on "pre-reflexive consciousness," which is negated in reflection). Hegel, however, is saying more than that philosophy turns reality into thought that in itself is too obvious to need belaboring. He is also saying that, as philosophy turns reality into thought, reality itself becomes more concrete, not more abstract.[9] This is where the distinction between understanding and reason comes in. Understanding is thinking which turns reality into thought by fixing it in formal categories, thus making it abstract. This, he

9 In other words, in being thought, reality becomes more real; it "realizes" itself in revealing itself; it *appears* more and more adequately in the *consciousness* had of it.

says, is what positive science does. Reason, on the other hand, continues the work of understanding and, so to speak, reconcretizes what understanding has rendered abstract puts together again what understanding had put asunder. In this process, consciousness progressively negates each successive stage in its development, thus actualizing what is initially only potential in its awareness. On the world scale, Hegel will say, this means that with the advent of philosophical reflection a certain decadence sets in as a preparation for a further advance spirit withdraws from the real world into a world of thought, only to emerge again at a higher level of reality-awareness. Reason is not content to leave reality merely objective, since as objective it is only partly what it truly is. The transformation of reality into thought effectuated in reason, then, subjectivizes that which in itself is merely objective, thus manifesting what had been elaborated in the dialectic of reason in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, that the true essence of reality is to be subject, not merely substance. Here again, the language is somewhat obscure, but the thought is not. If we see thought as nothing more than an activity of the subject who thinks, the grasp of reality which thought effects leaves reality itself entirely passive or, at best, indifferent to the activity in which it is grasped and transformed. If, on the other hand, when reality is grasped in thought it manifests itself to thought, then in the activity which is thinking, reality, too, is active. The activity in question, however i.e., self-manifestation is an attribute not of substance but of subject, and so reality has become subject, or has revealed itself as subject, in the process of being thought. In the thought-reality synthesis of identification, which is knowledge, thought and

reality grow together (*concrescere*), both being thus concretized: short of being thought in the full sense of the term (i.e., in reason), reality is not concrete but abstract; short of having the real as its content, thought is not fully thought and is, therefore, abstract.

Now, since the other forms in which spirit manifests itself are forms of thinking, even though not fully concrete, it should be clear that philosophical thought cannot be completely separated from the other manifestations of spirit of which we have been speaking. Rather than go through once more all the forms of this manifestation, Hegel here confines himself to a discussion of the relationship between philosophy and religion with a side glance at science. The reason for this is that religion is the paradigm of all not-fully-concrete presence of absolute reality to consciousness, and philosophy is the paradigm of rational thought. By speaking of religion, Hegel can throw light on the content of what is knowledge in the strictest sense, i.e., philosophical (speculative) knowledge, and by speaking of science he can throw light on its form. To begin with science, its similarity to philosophy, Hegel tells us, lies in its thinking character. As we saw before, in thinking it reduces nature to thought, thus negating nature, and finds its own truth in the resulting ideas. Unlike Kant, Hegel will not find the models of rational thinking in Newtonian mechanics and in mathematics, seeking to make of philosophy a rational discipline after the same model. This, he feels, would be to formalize philosophy and to condemn it to the same abstractness which characterizes both mechanics and mathematics. Rather he will seek to show that the capacity which both have to operate with ideas alone gives a kind of foretaste of what

philosophy will do with purely rational ideas, finding in them not only the whole of reality but also the concreteness of reality. In comparing philosophy with science, however, he is not concerned to show what philosophy finds in ideas, but only that philosophy looks to ideas and to ideas alone for what it seeks. By spiritualizing nature, thought can make it yield up secrets it would not yield up if left alone (even experiment is no more than a technique for transforming nature into idea). For centuries, of course, what has come to be called science was called philosophy, the reason being that it shared with philosophy both the appeal to autonomous reason (as opposed to mere opinion, tradition, or authority) and the form of universality which is the product of the thinking involved. In the sense that scientific thinking is concerned with laws, forces, natural classes, causes, even moral principles, it universalizes what in experience is initially particular and this function it shares with philosophy.

Religion and Philosophy

Religion, on the other hand, does not share with philosophy the form of thinking in ideas, its form being rather that of representation, but it does have the same content as philosophy i.e., the absolute (the infinite, the divine). Thus, the opposition which the Enlightenment, in particular, sees between religion and philosophy is in fact only a seeming opposition; in reality they are complementary. It is characteristic of religion, says Hegel, that it accomplishes in two moments what philosophy accomplishes in one. First of all, in religion, man represents to himself the divine, which is to say that the divine is not directly present to him but only in

the images he forms to himself, whether it be the crude images of some religion of nature, or the exquisite metaphors in which the Judeo-Christian revelation expresses its truth. Having thus rendered God present to itself through a medium somehow other than the actual presence of God Himself, religion then accomplishes union with the divine through the activity of cult. Philosophy, on the contrary, needs no second step, since in the fullest sense its thinking is an activity whose content is the divine in such a way that the divine is present in the very thinking. Here, too, we may experience difficulty with a thought which is scarcely articulated in this *Introduction.* In seeking to comprehend it we must bear two things in mind: first, that for Hegel religion is not the work of unreason, but as a manifestation of man's consciousness of the absolute it is the "supreme work of reason" (infra, p. 106), i.e., *objectively* rational; not something imposed on man by the self-interests of a priestly caste, but something natural to man as a rational being; and secondly, that to raise religious consciousness to the level of thought is not to supplant it as religion but to fulfill what is as yet only implicit in the form of consciousness of the divine which is characteristic of religion. If we consult the *Phenomenology of Spirit* we find there that reason, simply as reason, cannot be final for Hegel, since "absolute knowledge," or knowledge of the absolute, belongs to spirit and not to mere reason. This means that reason itself is not truly reason when it is merely reason; dialectically speaking, the truth of reason is in spirit i.e., concretized reason. All along we have been speaking of human thought, and we have been justified in doing so, since that is the thought with which philosophy is concerned; but it should be added that, for

Hegel, human thought is genuinely thought only when it is simultaneously divine. The spirit which finds itself in the process of human thinking is the divine Spirit. Now, thought will not be divine until its content is the divine, and for this, thought itself needs religion as revelatory of the divine, and that is why religion is "the supreme work of reason": it reveals to reason what is its own proper content. On the other hand, the reason to which this content is revealed will be inadequate to this content, if that thought is not the totally concrete thought which is at once human and divine. We might say that thought is complete as thought (philosophical thought) when its content is the supreme content i.e., the absolute and the content is complete as content when the manner of its presence is complete as thought in the fullest possible sense of that term. The progressively more concretely universal content of consciousness of which the *Phenomenology* speaks cannot stop before the content is the totality of all content and the consciousness is the highest possible form of consciousness, needing nothing more to complete it as consciousness.

In religion there is an awareness of this divine Spirit, but only as external to the spirit of man. In the concrete thinking which is philosophy, the divine, infinite Spirit is internal to man's spirit. It certainly could be objected at this point that the only consciousness of which this could be true would be a divine consciousness. This is precisely what Hegel is saying, even though it may not be thoroughly clear what he means by "divine" in this context. It is clear, however, that he does mean that the knowledge of truth is the presence of the divine Spirit in man (not unlike Plato's "divine

spark" or Augustine's "divine illumination"): in the sense that to know in the full sense of the term is a divine activity, the *Aufhebung* of the limitations of the individual *qua* individual. Individual reason must be universalized, and this it is in the spirit which is the divine in man. Ideally speaking, this can mean simply that the paradigm of all knowing is divine knowing, where the knowing itself is infinite and what is known is the infinite totality of the knowable, and that is certainly saying a great deal. If it says nothing else it says that short of knowing God knowledge is not fully knowledge an ideal, perhaps, to be aimed at but never attained; still, an ideal. To spell it out a bit more fully, Hegel will say that short of knowing God knowledge is not fully knowledge. Even the finite can be truly thought only when the infinite is thought: i.e., a thought which is not yet thought of the infinite is not yet fully thought.

The Concrete Universal

If we are to understand the foregoing we must come to grips once more with what Hegel means by his notion of "universality." When, for example, he speaks of the "concrete universal" or of God as the universal, it is quite clear that he is not speaking a language with which the traditional philosophy (or logic) has made us familiar. When, in addition, he says, "The individual is the universal," we have difficulty not only with the term "universal" but also with the expression "is." Now, Hegel does not challenge the legitimacy of the traditional notion of universality, which he calls "external," belonging as it does to an idea which is separate from the totality subsumed under it and arrived at by sup-

pressing the determinations which differentiate the members of the totality. This, he will say, is abstract (objective) universality, manifesting only an isolated aspect of the universal its capacity to "represent" (stand for) all the members of a class by simply naming the class. The universality with which Hegel is principally concerned, however, is not external to the totality but somehow contains it with all its manifold determinations. This universal is not abstract but "absolute," not objective but subjective; the totality is recognized as being meaningful only when it unites the manifold of interrelationships among its members. What can be said of all members can be said of one, not because differences have been suppressed or disregarded, but because differences are constitutive of what each and all are. In this sense God is the universal, because to think God is to think the totality of all possible determinations; the very notion of determination is meaningless except as implying the totality of determinations, from which it follows that it is impossible to think without thinking God. In this sense, too, the universal is subjective, because determination is a function of subjectivity "objectivity" being achieved by suppressing determination.[10] This, finally, can make comprehensible the affirmation that the individual *is* the universal, because the individual is intelligible only in the framework of and as implying the universal.

Because, as we said before, Hegel is essentially "humanist" in his thinking, what he says about the universal takes on particular significance, when man thinks

10 In the sense that the "objectivity" of the abstract universal consists precisely in the absence of those determinations which would seem to particularize it.

of man, or when he thinks of what it is to be man. What is most characteristic of man as man is that he is spirit; both his awareness and his self-awareness are the work of the spirit in him. As spirit, then, man comes to know that the totality of awareness is self-awareness; but he also comes to know that self-awareness is the totality of awareness or that to be aware of himself is to be aware of the totality. Thus, in becoming aware of itself as what it is in itself, the human spirit universalizes itself. This reads very much like what has been said of God's self-awareness, which is indistinguishable from His awareness of the totality of reality and this is what Hegel means. For him, the apex of human self-awareness is the realization that to know is a divine activity, to be aware of the divine Spirit in human self-awareness. This, then, brings us back to the relationship of philosophy and religion. Philosophical knowing is the awareness of being united with the divine Spirit in being aware. Religion is awareness of the divine Spirit as separate, requiring for union the distinct activity of cult. Religion, we might say, represents God in order to go to Him; philosophy *thinks* God and is thus united with God or with divine thinking.

The Infinity of Spirit

In a way unprecedented in Western thought, except perhaps in the thought of Augustine, Hegel insists on the relationship of God and man as revelatory of both. Just as Augustine saw in man the image of God, the place men must look if they are to find God, and in the ascent to God an opportunity to learn more of His image, man, so Hegel sees in the human spirit a revelation of God, to be complemented by a clearer grasp of

human thought gained by looking at the divine. Hegel is under no illusions regarding the finitude of man his weaknesses, failures, and errors manifest this all too clearly. On the other hand, it is also clear to him that to regard only man's finitude is to see only half the picture and, thus, a false picture. Man's activity, precisely as human, is spiritual activity, and what is spiritual has the mark of the infinite on it. The human spirit is not infinite; it is the "finite spirit" whose creation is subsequent to the thought of God, as he tells us in the *Logic.* At the same time, by virtue of a grammar which does not confine "is" to the expression of mere identity or class-inclusion, he can also say that the human spirit *is* infinite; its thinking is a constant movement beyond the bonds of finitude and is what it is as spirit's thinking only in infinity. As the human spirit universalizes itself in thought, the divine Spirit dwells in it, so that in reality its thinking is the absolute thinking in it, is absolute thought, because only as absolute is thought truly thought. "When man's attitude is genuinely rational," Hegel tells us, "he is without limits, infinite" (infra, p. 110). Man, to put it succinctly, is divinized in truly rational thinking, because to be truly rational (spiritual) is to be more than merely human. To put this in another way, and thus to return to the theme of religion, the absolute which in religion remains still external to man, is interiorized in thought; in thought man raises himself to the divine without resting in the intermediary stage of mere "representation."

Traditionally the God of philosophy has been interpreted as an abstract God, before whom no man could bend his knee in adoration. With this Hegel will agree,

if by the God of philosophy is meant the God about whom any particular philosophy speaks. Such a God is abstract precisely because He is indistinguishable from the abstract representations which obscure Him. Thought, however, becomes more concrete in proportion as it dispenses with representations and becomes the presence of its own proper content to it. Thus, says Hegel, to conceive of God as "the supreme Being" is to conceive of God abstractly, because the very notion "supreme Being" conceals more than it reveals, and because it includes God, so to speak, under the objective category of being (no amount of insistence that the term "being" does not mean the same when said of the finite and the infinite will purify it of its abstractness). "Supreme Being" simply raises the indeterminacy of "being" to the highest possible level, while leaving it indeterminate. As concrete, on the other hand, God is not Being but Spirit, which is not an abstract category but the concrete source of the very activity in which God is present. The activity, of course, is a process (as is any activity), and the religious moment is essential to the process, because the human spirit would not discover that the absolute is its true content, if that content were not first revealed to it in faith. *Fides quaerens intellectum*[11] is not a catch phrase to describe intellectual curiosity; it is an elaboration of the path which faith must take if it is to be truly what it is. By the same token, it indicates a step which thought must take if it is to become what it truly is. Faith is not opposed to knowledge; it is completed in knowledge. The *Aufhebung* of religion in philosophy is not simply a passing-beyond but also a retention of religion (i.e., its content).

11 "Faith seeking understanding."

Philosophy thinks out a content which religion (as a form of experience) makes available, and faith does not disappear but finds its true essence in thought.

One could get the impression from all this that philosophical thought, which is the paradigm of all thought, enjoys the unique privilege of dispensing not only with all representations but also with all images or symbols of any kind. Nothing could be further from the mind of one who, like Hegel, endeavors to express his thought in a language suitable to convey that thought. More than that, Hegel does not think of philosophical thought employing language simply in the interests of communication. Language is what he calls the "element" proper to thought, and it is essential not merely that thought express itself, but that it express itself in the kind of language which is suitable to that expression. This means that a philosophy which is not expressed is not a philosophy it is not even thought, properly speaking any more than poetry without words could be poetry. Furthermore it means that the language in which thought expresses itself is not the language of myth (Hegel had little sympathy with Plato on this score), nor is it the language of poetry; it is the language which he calls "speculative," a dynamic language capable of expressing the dynamics of thought.[12] This does not mean that Hegel failed to see the philosophical (rational) content of the mythological or that he did not recognize the element of thought in poetry. It does mean that he refuses to call myth or poetry philosophy.

To say that philosophical thought is the paradigm of

12 Incidentally Hegel thought of German as an ideally speculative language: next came Greek!

all thought is not to say that philosophy precedes all other forms of thought, so that the latter, so to speak, derive from it. In his *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel makes it abundantly clear that the process is quite the reverse; thought must become philosophy. This begins, Hegel tells us, with thought's reflection on itself, which takes place when the individual reflecting on himself becomes conscious of himself precisely as an individual. To be conscious of oneself as an individual is to be conscious that one's consciousness is his own (a consciousness that his thought is his own) and thus self-determining or free. This is what might be called consciousness of freedom in its simplest form without going through the whole dialectic of self-consciousness which Hegel considers essential to the realization of a freedom that is accomplished only when consciousness is thoroughly rational. This thorough rationality, however, is achieved only when the individual knows himself as universal i.e., as being what man as such is. When one knows himself in this way he knows his own thought as being more than merely his own, as universal or in tune with thought as such. The culmination is full consciousness of free individuality. The synthesis to be achieved, then, is the identification "of the substantial and the individual" (infra, p. 126), where the freedom realized is not accidental but essential to man because he is man.

It might be objected, of course, that this final stage is not freedom at all, since it means subjection of individual thought to thought in general. The objection, in fact, is a rather superficial one. It is equivalent to a complaint that thought is not free if it is subject to the laws of logic or that man is not free if he is subject to

the laws of morality. The freedom to be irrational is no freedom at all; nor can the individual be rational by cutting himself off from the universal unity of reason. Freedom is self-realization, the realization of self as truly a self, and only the genuinely rational self can be that. It is not too difficult to see that the freedom to say "two plus two equals five" is an illusory freedom. Hegel will go further and say that the freedom to say "murder is justifiable" or "there is no God" is an equally illusory freedom. Only true thought is free thought, whether the truth in question be mathematical, moral, or theological. The individual is free only when he is in the truth, when the spirit of truth lives in him. It should, of course, be added that the thinking which makes man free will be an ineffectual liberator if it does not take place within a framework of political freedom, but even this latter will be meaningless, if thought has not universalized the concept of "rights," if the political "institution" lacks the support of thought.

The Stages of Philosophy

The history of philosophy, then, as Hegel had said at the beginning, is the process of free thought coming to consciousness of itself as true, and therefore free, in the spirit of man. Like other historians, Hegel divides this process into stages; but, for him, there are only two principal stages, corresponding (roughly) to what we call ancient and modern philosophy the period between the two is, he says, a period of transition and maturation, whose catalyst is the Christian revelation of the divine-human and the human-divine. The first stage, then, is the Greek, or objective, stage; the second is the Germanic, or subjective (pagan *vs.* Christian). The

foundation both for the distinction of stages and for the titles assigned to them can be seen more clearly, perhaps, in the light of the movement he describes in the *Philosophy of History.* There he characterizes universal history as the overall movement of man toward a realization of his essential freedom. Geographically, he sees the movement as going from East to West; logically it is a movement from individuality, through particularity, to universality. In the East, then, which is represented by Persia, there is only one individual conscious of being free, and at that stage there is no philosophy, properly speaking, at all. Between the East and the West is Greece, which Hegel calls the birthplace of philosophy, and there (as in Rome), Hegel contends, some are conscious of being free; not, however, free because they are men but simply because they are Greeks or Romans. The movement continues to the West, which is represented by the Germanic peoples, and there the consciousness of freedom becomes universal in the sense that it recognizes that freedom belongs to all men because they are men and not because they are this or that kind of man.

Since, then, the eastern stage in the historical process is not a stage in philosophy at all (like most of his contemporaries Hegel knew practically nothing of Oriental thought, and what he did know he did not call "philosophy"), the process of philosophy, as a reflection on thought, begins in Greece and moves to the West. Since, however, in German as well as in English, thought can mean both thinking and what is thought, the process can be divided according to an emphasis on what is thought or on thinking the former dominated by *Idea,* the latter by *Spirit.* From the *Logic* we learn that

the awareness of objective thought is antecedent to the consciousness of subjective thinking, and this is the way in which Hegel sees in the historical process a sort of mirror of the logical. In this context, then, Hegel can identify what he calls the Greek stage in the history of philosophy with the objective. Since what is in question is philosophy, it is thought reflecting on itself, but the aspect under which it reflects on itself is the object, what is being thought corresponding to "objective logic." It is a stage of abstract generalization, where no attention is paid to the thinking subject except insofar as thinking can generalize about "man" as an object of thought. Emphasis here is on the idea, whether in the form of the distinct eidos * for each intelligible object or of the many eidn * combined in one thought-object. In either case the many are unified in one idea, and the unity is objective. Thought, it is true, is infinite, but only objectively, not subjectively; the being which the mind thinks is infinite, but the mind is not. To put this in words which are not Hegel's: Greek thinking is essential, not existential.

In a very significant sense, the tide turns with the advent of Christianity. Here for the first time, Hegel tells us, is revealed the infinite subject, not merely in the sense that God is infinite, and God is subject, but also in the more important sense that each individual subject is somehow infinite. In Christianity "an infinite worth is attributed to each individual" (infra, p. 130). Because God Himself, the universal, has become a human individual, each individual is recognized as being what all are. What the Greeks had recognized only implicitly in their (Aristotle's) concept of a logic valid for all thinking, Christianity recognizes explicitly in its

theology of the person who is at once supremely individual, unique, and supremely universal, since all are equally persons. As Hegel sees it, however, there is more to it than even that: each individual is what spirit is, a totality of consciousness over against a totality of reality. This is only the beginning, of course, but it is the beginning of a realization that to be man is to be free, that this is what it means to be a human individual. It is only a beginning, because this consciousness has not been *thought* in all its implications. To do this is the task of modern philosophy, which begins with Descartes (for Hegel he is "Germanic"[13]) and his explicit emphasis on the thinking subject, the affirmation that the truth of thought, i.e., its guarantee, is to be found in the thinking. The infinite subject is seen as the source of objective infinity, and the process of seeing this is one of self-fulfillment.

From a description of the "Germanic" stage in the history of philosophy one might be tempted to draw the conclusion that all that is needed is to examine it and find there all the philosophy that is significant for modern minds. Hegel is insistent, however, that at no point in its career can philosophy make sense except as the result of all the work which thought has done down through the ages. The life of philosophy is one continuous life, and no part of this life is insignificant; the life it lives today is the life it has lived from the beginning. Because life is process, it manifests itself differently at successive stages, but at no stage can it manifest

13 Lest the reader be shocked that Hegel should have transformed so quintessential a Frenchman into a German, it should be remarked that "Germanic" and "Western European" are for Hegel practically synonymous. He is not talking about nations or ethnic groups but about characteristics of philosophizing.

itself other than in continuity with the whole of its past. Thus, the history of philosophy is not a matter of indifference or of idle curiosity for the philosopher; without it he simply cannot do philosophy. Nor, if he is a true philosopher, can he be impatient at the slow pace which spirit takes in thinking its own thoughts philosophy knows no impatience.[14]

> The point at which we now stand is the result of all the work that has been done over a period of 2300 years; it is what the World-Spirit has brought before itself in its thinking consciousness. We should not wonder at the slowness of this. Universal, knowing Spirit has time, it is not in a hurry; it has at its disposal masses of peoples and nations whose development is precisely a means to the emergence of its consciousness. Nor should we become impatient because particular insights are not brought out at this time but only later, or that this or that is not yet there in world-history advances are slow. Thus, insight into the necessity of such a long time is a remedy for our impatience [infra, p. 134].

There is only one way to philosophize "scientifically" today, and that is to go through the process which thought has gone through in becoming what it is. There is no criterion for thought's truth outside thought itself,

14 It has more than once been objected against Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy that it implies that philosophers. (or philosophies) are getting better and better, deeper and deeper, richer and richer, as time goes on. Since the implication is obviously not true, and since Hegel himself devotes more space in his *History of Philosophy* to Plato and Aristotle than he does to any of the other important figures in that history (including Spinoza), his meaning has to be different. What he is saying is that philosophy itself, as the *one* process of which successive philosophies are moments, becomes

more rich and profound, precisely because as it progresses it retains all the true riches of its past. It is for this reason that we must not be content merely to know *about* the philosophies of the great philosophers; we must also philosophize with them.

but there is no thought outside the process through which spirit has gone in coming to consciousness of what it is to be "all reality." To know spirit as Hegel conceives it is to know all there is to know.

What Hegel has to say in the last pages of his *Introduction* is of interest only as an illumination of his ideal of doing philosophical history. The history of phi losophy is unique in that its events and its documents are identical; in the very works of the philosophers is to be found the process of thought itself. Historians of philosophy are significant only to the extent to which they let philosophy speak through philosophers. One may, after reading Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy,* be dissatisfied with what he makes the philosophers say; one cannot but marvel at the gigantic attempt to let philosophy speak for itself.

3
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Introduction to the History of Philosophy

The matter under consideration here is history. History's form is the presentation of a succession of events and deeds. But what are the deeds proper to the history of philosophy? They are the activities of free thought; this means the way the intellectual world has come into being, been produced, developed. What we are to consider, then, is the history of thought.

There is an age-old assumption that thinking distinguishes man from the beast. This we shall accept. What makes man nobler than the beast is what he possesses through thought. Whatever is human is so only to the extent that therein thought is active; no matter what its outward appearance may be, if it is human, thought makes it so. In this alone is man distinguished from the beast.

Still, insofar as thought is in this way the essential, the substantial, the active in man, it has to do with an infinite manifold and variety of objects. Thought will be at its best, however, when it is occupied only with what is best in man, with thought itself, where it wants only itself, has to do with itself alone. For, to be occupied with itself is to dis-

cover itself by creating itself;[1] and this it can do only by manifesting itself. Thought is active only in producing itself; and it produces itself by its very own activity. It is not simply there; it exists only by being its own producer. What it thus produces is philosophy, and what we have to investigate is the series of such productions, the millennial work of thought in bringing itself forth, the voyage of discovery upon which thought embarks in order to discover itself.

This says in general what our subject-matter is. Still, the statement is so general that there is need to determine more precisely our purpose and the manner of attaining it.

The general remarks we have just made already provide the occasion for further reflection, and it is proper to philosophical consideration to reflect immediately on what has been thought, not to let it be put to use in the way it has been unreflectively thought. As we have said, our subject-matter is the series of free thought's productions, the history of the intellectual world. The statement is simple, yet it seems to involve a contradiction. The thought which is essentially thought is in and for itself; it is eternal. What truly is is contained only in thought, and it is true not only today and tomorrow but eternally, outside all time, and, to the extent that it is *in* time, it is forever, at all times, true. Now, right here the contradiction immediately appears, i.e., that thought should have a history. What is presented in history is mutable, has taken place, was once, and is now past, has sunk into the night of the past, is no longer. Thought,[2] however, is not subject to change, it is not something that has been or is past, it is. The question, then, is:

1 Addition in the Michelet edition: "The history we have before us

here is the history of thought's finding itself" (Glockner edition, XIII, 15). [Translator: Here and in the text translated in the Appendix, numbered footnotes reproduce notes in the German edition; alphabetically indicated notes are my own.]

2 Addition in the Michelet edition: "true, necessary thought and here we are concerned only with that" (Glockner, XIII, 16).

how can what is outside history, since it is not subject to change, still have a history?

The second reflection concerns the relation of philosophy to the other forms and products of the spirit. We have already said that man thinks and that precisely this is essential to him. We have also said, however, that thought has purposes other than those of philosophy, that it has to do with a large number of other objects which are also products or activities of thought. Religion, art, statecraft, and the like, are also works of the thinking spirit, and yet they must be kept separate from our theme. The question, then, is: how are these distinguished from the activities of spirit which constitute our subject-matter? Similarly: what historical relation is there between the philosophy of a given time and its religion, art, politics, etc.?

In this Introduction we shall bring out these two points of view in order to orient ourselves regarding the manner in which the history of philosophy is to be handled in these lectures. These two points of view provide a path to a third, to a division which permits a general overview of the total historical process. I shall not, however, concern myself with external reflections on the history of philosophy, such as its usefulness and other things which can be said regarding it. Its usefulness will be revealed in the revelation of philosophy itself.

At the end, however, since this is customary, I shall touch briefly on the sources for the history of philosophy. An Introduction should have only one purpose to give a more precise picture of what our purpose is. The notion[a] which is to be developed here is the concept itself. This concept

[a] The German word which is here translated as both "picture" and "notion" is *Vorstellung.* Literally the term means "representation." It has, however, so many shades of meaning that we are forced by the context to translate it in a variety of ways. In general, then, where the translation is not "representation," the term *Vorstellung* will be indicated in parentheses. The term *Begriff,* which in so many British translations is rendered as "notion," will here be consistently translated as "concept."

does not admit of being proved here (since it is in and for itself); proof of it belongs to the science of philosophy, in the order of logic. The concept does, however, admit of being made acceptable and plausible by being related to other familiar notions (*Vorstellungen*) in ordinary cultivated consciousness. Still, this is not philosophical; it merely contributes to clarity.

First, then, we shall consider the concept, the purpose of the history of philosophy. Secondly, we shall consider the relationship of philosophy to other products of the human spirit, such as art, religion, statecraft, etc., and especially its relation to history itself.

A. Concept of the History of Philosophy

What we shall here consider is a *succession* of the manifestations[b] of thought. This is the first and, therefore, the most superficial way in which the history of philosophy appears. Following immediately on this comes the need to become acquainted with its purpose, with the universal through which the diversified plurality manifested in the succession is bound together in such a way that the multiplicity is so related to its own unity as to be formed into a whole, a totality. It is this unity which first of all constitutes the purpose or concept. We are quite correct, then, in wanting to know a purpose or concept in a determinate way before going into detail. We want first of all an overall view of the woods and only after that to know the individual trees. One who looks first at the trees and sticks only to them does not get an overall view of the woods and becomes lost and confused. The same is true of philosophies; they are infinite in number and are conflictingly opposed to each other. One

[b] Here, as in the instance above, the German term, *Gestaltung(en),* is

not easily translated by one English term. It signifies the form in which something appears, but again the translation must vary with the context. For the most part it will be rendered as "manifestation," which emphasizes the participial connotation of *Gestaltung,* as opposed to *Gestalt.*

would be confused, then, if one wanted to know first individual philosophies. It would mean failing to see the woods for the trees, failing to see philosophy for philosophies. Nowhere does this happen more readily and more frequently than in the history of philosophy. The multiplicity of philosophies frequently occasions a failure to know and esteem philosophy itself.

On an acquaintance such as this is built the sort of shallow know-it-all claim to show that nothing comes of the history of philosophy. One philosophy contradicts another; the very multiplicity of philosophies proves the inanity of the philosophical endeavor. This is said, presumably in the interests of truth or of what one thinks is the truth: the one thing to be sought is unity, i.e., truth, since truth is one, and the multitude of philosophies, each one claiming to be the true one, contradicts the principle which says that the true is in unity.

Thus, the chief consideration in this Introduction centers on the question: what is the situation here in regard to the contradiction between the unity of truth and the multiplicity of philosophies? What is the result of this long labor of the human spirit, and how is it to be comprehended? What sense do we want to give to our treatment of the history of philosophy?

The history of philosophy is the history of free, concrete thought which is to say, of reason. Free concrete thought is concerned only with itself. Nothing can be called reason which is not the result of thinking not, however, of abstract thinking, for that is the thinking proper to understanding, but of concrete thinking, which is reason. The question, then, should be expressed more precisely in this way: in what sense should the history of thinking reason be considered,

i.e., what meaning is to be given to it? To this we can answer that no other meaning can be given to it than what is found in the sense of thought itself or we can say that the question itself does not make sense. We can ask

with regard to anything whatever what its sense or meaning is. Thus, with regard to a work of art we can ask what the picture means, with regard to language what a word means, with regard to religion what a symbol or a ceremony means, with regard to other kinds of activity we can ask about their moral value, etc. The meaning or sense of which we speak is none other than the essential or the universal, the substantial in an object, which is the object concretely thought. Herein we always have a double aspect, an exterior and an interior, an external appearance which is intuitively perceptible and a meaning which, precisely, is thought. Now, because the object with which we are concerned is thought, there is here no double aspect; it is thought itself which does the meaning. Here the object is the universal; so we cannot ask about a meaning which is separate or separable from the object. The only meaning or determination which the history of philosophy has, then, is thought itself. Herein thought is the innermost, the highest, and one cannot, therefore, settle on a thought *about* it. With regard to a work of art we can reflect on it, advance considerations whether the form corresponds to its meaning; which means we can have a position regarding it. The history of free thought can have no other sense or meaning than that of speaking about the thought itself. The characterc which here takes the place of sense and meaning is simply the thought.

It is our task now to provide the more precise viewpoints which come into consideration when there is question of thought.

Here we must propose a series of thought-determinations, i.e., we must preface the whole thing with some thoroughly general, abstract concepts, which we shall come back to

c*Bestimmung*. Here, once more, we are faced with a term whose literal translation i.e., "determination" does not always carry its meaning in context over into English. Where any ambiguity might result the German will be given in parentheses.

later, and by applying them get a more precise notion of the concept of history of philosophy. At this point, however, the abstract concepts in question are merely presuppositions; they are not to be treated logically, philosophically, or speculatively, nor are they to be proved. Here it should be sufficient to present these concepts historically and in a provisional way.

I. Preliminary Notions

The notions (*Bestimmungen*) in question are: thought, concept, idea or reason, and their development.

1. Thought as Concept and Idea

a. Thought. First, Then, There is Thought.

(1) *As Concept.* Thought is not something empty and abstract; it is determining, in fact self-determining. In other words, thought is essentially concrete. This concrete thought we call concept. Thought must be a concept; no matter how abstract it may seem to be, of itself (*in sich*) it must be concrete. As soon as thought is philosophical it is of itself concrete. From one point of view it is correct to say that philosophy deals in abstractions, insofar as it has to do with thoughts, which are abstracted from the sensible, the so-called concrete. From another point of view it is quite incorrect to speak in this way: abstractions belong to the reflection proper to understanding, not to philosophy; and it is precisely those who condemn philosophy for being abstract who are most immersed in the sort of reflections which are proper to understanding, even though they think they have to do with the concretest of contents. Because they reflect on the matter at hand (*die Sache*), what they

have is a combination of the merely sensible and subjective thoughts i.e., abstractions.

(2) *As Idea.* In more precise terms, concrete thought is concept. Still further determined it is *idea.* The idea is the concept insofar as it is realized. To be realized it must determine itself, and this determination is nothing else but itself. Thus, its content is itself. Its infinite relation to itself, then, means that only from itself does its determination come.

Now, the idea is what we call *truth* a large word. To the unprejudiced it will ever continue to be a large word, and it will make his heart swell. Recently, of course, the conclusion has been reached that we are incapable of knowing the truth. The object of philosophy, however, is concrete thought, and when this is further determined it is, precisely, idea or truth. As for the claim that the truth cannot be known, this claim is made specificially (*für sich*)[d] in the history of philosophy, and when we come to it we shall examine it more closely. Here need only be mentioned that it is to some extent the historians of philosophy themselves who give the prejudice a semblance of validity. Tennemann, for example, who is a Kantian, is of the opinion that it is absurd to want to know the truth; and the proof of this is the history of philosophy. What is difficult to understand is that anyone with this conviction should work so hard at philosophy, could in fact continue to be concerned with it, with no purpose in mind. This sort of thing makes the

[d] Since Hegel is not employing this expression here in its technical dialectical sense, a meaning which suits the context has been chosen. "Specifically," too, of course, is not being used in its technical sense. What Hegel is seeking to show here is that the contradictory claims of this or that philosophy (even if all truth-claims of all philosophies are contradicted by claims in some others) neither cancel nor relativize the truth which philosophy as such pursues. It is because particular

claims are particular that they are partially untrue. But philosophy itself is oriented to universal truth, and it is only by sharing in this overall orientation that particular truths are truths at all. If they do share this orientation they are not the less philosophical (or scientific) for not being wholly true.

history of philosophy a mere account of all kinds of opinions, each of which falsely claims to be the truth. Another prejudice says that we can, of course, know about the truth, but only after we have reflected on it (that truth is not known in immediate perception or intuition neither in external sensible nor in so-called intellectual intuition since every intuition is as such sensible).[3] I should like to call attention to (*appellieren an*) this prejudice. Granted that it is one thing to be capable of knowing about the truth and another to know the truth. It is only by reflection, however, that I experience what the truth of the matter is. First, then, there is the contention that we cannot know the truth and, secondly, that we know truth only through reflection. If we give a more precise account of these contentions we shall have progressed further in the picture (*Vorstellung*) we are trying to give.

The first determinations we have arrived at, then, are that thought is concrete, that the concrete is truth, and that the truth can be the result only of thinking. To be even more determinate we can say that the spirit develops itself out of itself.

2. Idea as Development

The first point was that thought, free thought, is in itself essentially concrete. This implies that it is alive, that it moves of itself. The infinite nature of spirit is its own process in itself, which means that it does not rest, that it is essentially productive and exists by producing. More precisely we can understand this movement as *development*; the concrete as active is essentially self-developing. This involves making distinctions; and if we understand

3 Alternate reading in the Michelet edition: "Here provisionally I call

attention to the old prejudice that there is truth, but that one knows about the true only to the extent that one reflects, not in the way that one simply walks or stands still . . . but only by the effort of thinking" (Glockner, XIII, 27).

more precisely the character of the distinctions involved in the process something different necessarily emerges the movement turns out to be development. These distinctions come out, even when we stop simply at the familiar notion of development; it is merely a question of reflecting on the notion of development.

a. *Being-in-Itself.* With regard to development, what immediately comes to our attention is that there must be something there that develops, which is to say something hidden the seed, the tendency, the capacity, what Aristotle calls duvamls, * i.e., possibility (not some superficial possibility as such, but real possibility), or, as it is called, the in-itself, that which is in itself and at first merely that.

Customarily we have in regard to what is in itself the high opinion that it is what truly is. To get to know God and the world is to get to know them in themselves. What is in itself, however, is not yet the true but only the abstract; it is the seed of what truly is, the tendency, the being-in-itself of the true. It is something simple, something which, of course, contains in itself multiple qualities, but in the form of simplicity a content which is still hidden.

An example of this is the seed. The seed is simple, almost a point; even through a microscope it can scarcely be seen. This simple thing, however, is pregnant with all the qualities of the tree. In the seed is contained the whole tree, its trunk, branches, leaves, its color, odor, taste, etc. Nevertheless, this simple thing is the seed, not the tree itself; the fully articulated tree does not yet exist. It is essential to know that there is something utterly simple, which in itself contains a manifold, which latter, however, does not yet exist for itself. A more important example is the I. When I say I, this is the utterly simple, the abstract universal, that which is common to

all, for everyone is an I. Still, the I which each one is is the most diverse wealth of notions, drives, desires, inclinations, thoughts, etc. In this simple point, the

I, all this is contained. It is the force, the concept of all that man develops out of himself. With Aristotle we can say that in the simple, which is in itself, in the duvamls, * *potentia,* in the tendency, all that develops is contained. In development no more comes out than what is already there in itself.

b. *Being-there.*e What follows is that the in-itself, the simple, the hidden, develops and unfolds. For it to develop means to posit itself, to enter into existence, to be as something distinct. At first it is distinct only in itself, and it exists only in this simplicity or neutrality, like water which is so clear and transparent and yet contains within itself so many physical and chemical materials, even organic possibilities. Whether it is in itself and hidden, or whether it is revealed and, as such, exists, it is one and the same thing, or rather, one and the same content. The difference is simply one of form, but on this difference everything depends.

The big difference consists in this: Man knows what he is, and only when he does so is he actually what he is. Without this, knowing reason is nothing, nor is freedom. Man is essentially reason; man and child, educated and uneducated, each is reason; or rather, the possibility of being reason is present in each, is given. Still, reason is of no use to the child, to the uneducated. It is only a possibility; and yet, not an empty but a real possibility, with its own orientation to fulfillment.f Only the adult, the educated, knows through experience that he is what he is. The difference is simply that in the one case reason is present only as a tendency, only in itself, whereas in the other case it is so

e*Dasein.* Although the term is familiar enough, various philosophers give to it different shades of meaning. For Hegel, it signifies

"empirical being" i.e. being as manifested in experience.

ƒ*Sich treibende.* It needs no impulse from without to actualize it.

explicitly, beyond the form of possibility and posited in existence.

The whole difference in world-history is reducible to this difference. All men are rational, and the formal element in this rationality is human freedom; this is man's nature, it belongs to his essence. Still, among many peoples slavery has existed, to some extent it still does, and people are satisfied with it. Orientals, for example, are men and as such free, and yet they are not free, because they have no consciousness of their freedom but are willing to accept every sort of religious and political despotism. The whole difference between Oriental peoples and those who are not subject to slavery is that the latter know that they are free, that to be free is proper to them.

The former are also in themselves free, but they do not exist as free. This, then, introduces an enormous difference into man's world-historical situation, whether he is free merely in himself or whether he knows that it is his concept, his vocation, his nature, to be as a free individual.

This, then, is the second point simply this difference of existential separateness. In itself the I is free, but it is also free for itself; and I am, only to the extent that I exist as free.

c. *Being-for-itself.* The third determination is that what is in itself and what exists and is for itself are one and the same. This is precisely what is meant by development. If the in-itself were no longer the in-itself, then something else would be there, and a complete change would have taken place. In this case there is something and it becomes something else. In regard to development, it is true, we can also speak of change, but the

change must be such that the other which results is nevertheless still identical with the first, such that the simple, the in-itself, is not annihilated. It is something concrete, something differentiated, but still maintained in the unity of the original in-itself.

This is what the seed does; it does not change completely but develops. If it changes completely, by being crushed or pulverized, then it cannot develop. This unity of what is present, the existing, and what is in itself is the essential in development. The unity of the differentiated, of the seed and that into which it has developed, is a speculative concept, where they are two and still one. It is a concept of reason; all other determinations in this regard belong simply to understanding. But abstract understanding cannot comprehend this unity; it sticks with the difference and can grasp only abstractions, not the concrete, the concept.

At the same time, development involves mediation; the one is only to the extent to which it is related to the other. What is in itself has the drive to develop, to exist, to pass over into the form of existence; and existence requires the mediation of this sort of tendency. Actually, nothing is immediate. In recent times much noise has been made about immediate knowledge, intuition, etc., but this is only a bad, one-sided abstraction. Philosophy has to do with the real, with concepts. The immediate is simply the unreal. In all that is called immediate knowledge, etc., it is easy to show that mediation is present. As soon as anything is true, it contains in itself mediation; just as mediation, if it is not merely abstract, contains immediacy.

If, in regard to realization, what came first was the in-itself, the seed, etc., and second, existence, i.e., what emerges, then third comes the identity of both, more precisely the fruit of development, the result of the entire movement; and this is what I call, abstractly, *being-for-itself*. It is the being-for-itself of man, of spirit itself, since a plant does not have being-for-itself, if we speak in a

language which has reference to consciousness. Only spirit becomes truly for itself, identical with itself.

There we have the concept of development, a thoroughly general concept. It is vitality, movement as such. The life of God in Himself, the life of universality in nature and

spirit, the life of whatever lives, the lowest as well as the highest, that is what development is. It is a self-differentiation, a bringing of itself into real being (*Dasein*), into being-for-another while still remaining identical with itself. It is the eternal creation of the world, which in another form is the generation of the Son, and it is the eternal return of the Spirit into itself an absolute movement which is at the same time rest, absolute rest eternal self-mediation. This is the being-with-itself of the idea, the capacity to return into itself, to join with the other and in the other to have itself. This capacity, this power, to be with itself in what is the negative of itself, is also the freedom of man.

3. Development as Concretion

What concerns us here more precisely is the formal. If absolute development, the life of God and of the Spirit, is only *one* process, only *one* movement, then it is merely abstract. But universal movement as concrete is a series of manifestations (*Gestaltungen*) of the Spirit. This series should not be pictured as a straight line but as a circle, a return into itself. This circle has as its circumference a large number of circles; *one* development is always a movement passing through many developments; the totality of this series is a succession of developments curving back on itself; and each particular development is a stage of the whole. Although there is progress in development, it does not go forward into (abstract) infinity but rather turns back into itself.

Spirit must know itself, externalize itself, have itself as object, must know itself in such a way as to exhaust its own possibilities in becoming totally object to itself. It must reveal itself completely, going down into its uttermost depths and revealing those depths.

The higher spirit's development is, the deeper it is; in this way it is really deep, not just in itself; in itself it is neither deep nor high. Development is precisely a self-deepening of spirit, such that

it brings its own depths to consciousness. The goal of spirit is, if we may employ the expression, to comprehend itself, to remain no longer hidden to itself. The road to this is its development, and the series of developments form the levels of its development.

Now, to the extent that something is the result of a level in a development it is once again the starting-point of a new and further development. The end of one level is always the beginning of another. Goethe, therefore, is correct when he says somewhere,4 "What has been formed becomes ever again matter."

The levels are distinct; each subsequent level is more concrete than the preceding; and the lowest is the most abstract. Thus, in regard to spirit, children are the most abstract; they are rich in sensible intuitions but poor in thoughts. At the beginning of a lecture we usually have much sensible material, which is poorest in regard to thoughts. Our first thoughts are more abstract determinations of our thinking than are later ones. Thus, we first come up against the notion of thing. There is no thing;g it is only a thought; and so in the beginning only such abstract determinations of our thinking emerge. The abstract is simple and easy. Subsequent stages are more concrete. They presuppose the determinations proper to previous stages, and they develop them further. Each subsequent stage of the development, then, is richer, augmented by these determinations and, thereby, more concrete. There is, then, no thought which does not progress in its development.

These are the notions (*Bestimmungen*) I wanted to present by way of preface to my remarks. I have not proved them, only given an ordered enumeration of them, seeking

4 [Editor's note in Hoffmeister edition:] "The reference is probably to Schiller's *Votivtafel* 39, `The Imitator.'"

g The mere designation "thing" ignores or suppresses the determinations belonging to the real.

to make them plausible to those who follow our way of thinking.

Now we have to make an application of these notions and see their concrete consequences. For that reason I have proposed them. We now turn to what is more precise, more determinate, in the matter of history, i.e., of the history of philosophy.

II. Application Of These Notions (Bestimmungen) to the History of Philosophy

1. a. In accord with these notions *philosophy* is thought brought to consciousness, occupied with itself, made into its own object, thinking itself, and that in terms of the various notions proper to it. Thus, the science of philosophy is a development of free thought, or rather it is the whole of this development; it is a circle which returns into itself, remains entirely with itself, is entirely itself, and wants to return only to itself. When we are occupied with the sensible we are not with ourselves but with something other. It is different when we are occupied with thought; thought is with itself only. Philosophy, then, is the development of thought, undisturbed in its activity. Thus, philosophy is a system. In recent times, system has become a term of reproach, because from it one gets the impression that it clings to a one-sided principle. The proper meaning of system, however, is totality, and it is true only as such a totality, whose point of departure is the most simple but which makes itself ever more concrete through development.

b. Now, the *history of philosophy* is precisely that and nothing else. In philosophy as such, in the present, most recent philosophy, is contained all that the work of millennia has produced; it is the result of all that has preceded it. And the same development of

Spirit, looked at historically, is the history of philosophy. It is the history of all the de-

velopments which Spirit has undergone, a presentation of its moments or stages as they follow one another in time. Philosophy presents the development of thought as it is in and for itself, without addition; the history of philosophy is this development in time. Consequently the history of philosophy is identical with the system of philosophy. Admittedly, this identity is at this point simply asserted; the proper speculative proof cannot here be given. The proof involves the nature of reason, of thinking, and this is to be taken up in the science of philosophy itself. The history of philosophy provides the empirical proof. Such a history's task is to show that its own process is the systematizing of thought itself. In it will be presented what is presented in philosophy, simply with the addition of time, of the incidental historical circumstances connected with countries, various individuals, etc. *When* in time philosophy appears is a matter we shall consider in the second part of the Introduction.

Spirit in and for itself is quite completely, through and through, concrete. Since it is active, not only does its form consist in its becoming conscious of itself in pure thought, but it emerges in the totality of what belongs to its manifestation (*Gestaltung*), a world-historical manifestation. When Spirit progresses it must progress in its totality, and, since its progress takes place in time, its total development, too, takes place in time. The thought which is fundamental to a given time is the all-pervading spirit. This latter must progress in consciousness of itself, and such a progress is the development of the whole mass (*Masse*), of the concrete totality, which is externalized and, therefore, takes place in time.

Since the history of philosophy has to do with pure thought it is

itself a science, i.e., not an accumulation of knowledge ordered in a certain manner but a thought-development which in and for itself is necessary. It must, however, take into account the necessity that the emergence

of thought take place in time. This, after all, is a course in history, and we must proceed historically, i.e., we must take up these manifestations (*Gestaltungen*) in their temporal succession, whereby they give the impression, in the manner in which they appear, of being contingent and unconnected. In so doing, however, we must emphasize the necessity inherent in the process of philosophy.

This is the sense, the meaning, of the history of philosophy. Philosophy develops through its history, and vice versa. Philosophy and history of philosophy mirror each other. To study the history of philosophy is to study philosophy itself, and this principally as a logic.h We shall speak further on of the concrete. In order to interpret the history of philosophy in this way, one must, it is true, previously know what philosophy is and what its history is. Still, one must not take an *a priori* view of the history of philosophy based on the principles of one philosophy. Purely historically, thought shows the way it progresses for itself.

c. More precisely, then, how does the development of philosophy make its appearance in time? We said, with regard to thought, that there is no asking what its meaning is, since it is its own meaning; there is nothing hidden behind it not, however, in the ordinary sense of that expression, for thought itself is the ultimate, the deepest, behind which there is nothing further; it is entirely itself. Still, thought also has an appearance, and to the extent that one distinguishes the appearance from the thought, it is possible to speak of thought's meaning. One of the ways thought appears, after all, is in one's own idea of it; another is the historical.

The first appearance of thought is such that thinking, or thought,

appears as something particular. In addition to the

h Whose development is rational and, therefore, necessary.

fact that we think, that there are thoughts, there are sense-perceptions, drives, inclinations, determinations of the will, etc. We have, thus, other faculties or activities of the soul which possess a right equal to that of thinking. In this way, then, thought is there as a particular among particulars. In philosophy, however, an entirely different notion (*Vorstellung*) of thinking and of thought must be formed. Thinking is the activity of the universal. Insofar as in addition there are other activities, of course, this activity is particular. It is its true nature, however, to subsume under itself all the others. Thus, it is through thinking that man is distinguished from the beast. Feelings, drives, etc., are common to man and beast. Still, special types of feeling, such as religious, legal,i or moral feelings, are proper to man alone. In themselves feelings are as such in no way either worthwhile or true. What is true in them e.g., that a feeling is religious derives only from thinking. The beast has no religion, but it does have feelings. Moreover, man has religion only because he is a thinking being. Thinking is the simply universal, and concrete thinking has in itself its own particularization, which is to say that in thought the particular is not equivalent to the abstract.

Connected with this last, another way that thinking appears is as subjective. Thought is proper to man alone not, however, to man only as an isolated individual subject; we have to look at thought as essentially objective. Thought is simply the universal; even in nature, with its class-conceptsj and its laws, we recognize the presence of thoughts. They are, then, not only in the form that consciousness gives them but in and for themselves and, by that very fact, objectively. The world's reason is not subjective reason. Thought is the substantial, the true, as compared with the

[i] *rechtlichen.* The term is untranslatable; it refers to the sort of moral entity whereby men are related to each other in society.

[j] *Gattungen.* There are classes in nature, only to the extent that man (spirit, thought) thinks nature.

singular, which is momentary, passing, temporary. To know the nature of thought is to eliminate the subjective manner in which it appears. This means, then, that it is not merely something particular, subjective, belonging only to our own consciousness, but rather the universal, the objective in and for itself.

A second appearance of thought is, as we have already mentioned, the historical, according to which the determinations of thought have emerged at a particular time, in a particular place, to a particular individual, with the result that the sequence in which thought is manifested seems accidental. We have already spoken of how such an impression is supported. We take up thoughts historically, in the way they have made their appearance in this or that individual, etc. Here there is a temporal development, but one which follows the inner necessity of the concept.

The only worthwhile way of looking at the history of philosophy, what makes it truly interesting, is seeing that it shows there is rationality in the world, even from this point of view. There is a strong antecedent presumption that this is so; the history of philosophy is the development of thinking reason; hence its growth can be presumed to have been rational. The temple of reason in its consciousness of itself is loftier than Solomon's temple and others built by man. The building of it has been rational not like the way the Jews or the Freemasons go about building Solomon's temple.

One can bring with him to the enterprise the belief that the building process has been rational. This is a belief in providence in a somewhat different way. What is best in the world is what thought has produced. It makes no sense, then, to see reason only in nature and not in spirit, in history, etc. If on the one hand we are of the

opinion that providence governs the world and, on the other, hold that world-events in the realm of spirit which is what philosophies are are accidental, the second view (*Vorstellung*) contra-

dicts the first. To put it more forcibly: the belief in providence is not serious; it is mere empty chatter. What has happened, however, has happened, because providence with its thoughts has been in charge.

2. a. The first conclusion we can draw from the foregoing is that in the history of philosophy we are *not dealing with opinions.* In everyday life, of course, we have to do with opinions, i.e., thoughts about external things; one has one opinion, another has another. But in the business of the world's Spirit there is a completely different seriousness; it is there that universality is. There it is a question of the universal determination of the Spirit, nor do we speak of this or that one's opinion. The universal Spirit develops in itself according to its own necessity; its opinion is simply the truth.

b. The second conclusion is the answer to the question: *What is the situation in regard to diverse philosophies*, about which we hear it said that they are a proof against *philosophy* itself, i.e., against truth? First of all we must say, there is only *one* philosophy. Now this, of course, has a formal sense, since each philosophy is at least philosophy (to the extent that it really is philosophy frequently what is called philosophy is simply chatter, arbitrary caprice, etc). Just as different kinds of fruit are all fruit, so are we to look upon the relation of various philosophies to the one philosophy.[5] A more precise sense in which we can speak of many philosophies is to say that they are the necessary stages in the development of reason coming to consciousness of itself, a reason which is one in the way we previously understood it. The manner in which they succeed each other,

5 [Editor's note in Hoffmeister edition:] "Cf. Schiller, *Votivtafel* 53:

`Which of all the philosophies remains, I know not. But *Philosophy,* I hope, will endure forever.'"

then, is necessary. No philosophy, therefore, can make its appearance sooner than it does. It is true, of course, that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ancient philosophies were resurrected this was necessary to the progress of Christian culture. Nevertheless, when past philosophies return again they are like mummies of earlier thoughts. The World-Spirit has progressed, and a past philosophy is not its proper garment, the form in which it finds expressed what it in fact is.

With regard to the refutation of one philosophy by another, a more precise characterization (*Bestimmung*) is required, one which will be made manifest in the history of philosophy itself, one which shows in what relation philosophies stand to each other and to what extent the position (*Stellung*) of their principle has changed. Refutation, as we have seen, involves a negation, namely that what had been believed regarding a system of philosophy no longer holds. Now, such a negation is of two types. In one form, when some philosophy or another is compared with an earlier one and the principle of the later one is affirmed, then the subsequent system shows the untenability of the earlier. In itself every principle of the understanding is one-sided, and such a one-sidedness is brought out by the fact that another principle is contrasted with it. This other principle, however, is equally one-sided. In this situation there is present no totality as the unity in which they are reconciled; it exists only as completeness in the process of development. In this way, for example, Epicureanism stands in opposition to Stoicism, or the Spinozistic substance of absolute unity is opposed to that of the Leibnizian monad, in its concrete individuality. Thus, the self-developing Spirit integrates the one-sidedness of the one principle by making the other appear.

The second, more profound form of negation consists in the unification of diverse philosophies into one whole in such a way that no one of them remains independent, but all appear as parts of the one. Their

principles are united by being reduced to elements of the one idea; or they consist merely in moments, determinations, aspects of the one idea. This, then, is the concrete which unites the others in itself and constitutes the true unity of these diverse forms.

The concrete of which we speak is to be distinguished from the eclectic procedure, i.e., from a mere combining of diverse principles and opinions, like combining different pieces of cloth in one garment. The concrete is the absolute and complete identity of those differences, not an external combining of them just as the human soul is the concrete in relation to souls in general, since the vegetable soul is contained in the animal and the latter in the human. Convergences (*Knoten*) such as these, where certain particularities, certain philosophies, are united in one, we shall become acquainted with in the history of philosophy. One such, for example, is the Platonic philosophy. If we pick up Plato's dialogues we find that some are Eleatic, others Pythagorean, and still others Heraclitean in character; yet Plato's philosophy has united in itself these earlier philosophies and in so doing has transformed their inadequacies. This is no eclectic philosophy but rather an absolute, true penetration into the unification of these philosophies. Another example is Alexandrian philosophy, which has also been called Neoplatonic, Neopythagorean, and Neoaristotelian it unified in itself precisely these opposites.

c. A third conclusion to be drawn from what has been said up to this point is that we are *not dealing with what is past* but rather with actual thinking, with our own spirit. Properly speaking, then, this is not a history, since the thoughts, the principles, the ideas with which we are concerned belong to the present; they are

determinations within our own spirit. The historical, i.e., the past as such, is no longer, it is dead. The tendency to be abstractly historical, to be occupied with lifeless objects, has in recent times gained ground.

But the heart must be dead which finds satisfaction with dead bodies. The spirit of truth and life lives only in what is. The living spirit speaks: "Let the dead bury their dead; follow me!" If I know thoughts, truths, cognitions, only historically, they remain outside my spirit, i.e., for me they are dead; neither my thinking nor my spirit is present in them; what is most interior to me, my thought, is absent. The possession of merely historical knowledge is like the legal ownership of things which I do not know what to do with. If we simply stop at the knowledge of what this or that philosophy has thought, of what has been handed down (*überliefert*), then we surrender (*überliefert*) ourselves, and we forgo what makes man to be man, we forgo thinking. We are, thus, occupied merely with the thinking and the spirit of others, we investigate only what has been truth for others. Now, we must think for ourselves. If our interest in theology is merely historical if, for example, we learn only what Church councils, or heretics and non-heretics, have known about God's nature we can, of course, have had edifying thoughts, but we do not have the spirit properly speaking. To have this there is no need of theological erudition. When the historical tendency has taken over a given age, it can be taken for granted that the spirit has fallen into despair, has died, has given up the attempt to satisfy itself otherwise it would not be concerned with the sort of objects which for it are dead.

In the authentic history (*Geschichte*) of thought it is thought with which we are concerned; there we have to consider how the spirit enters into its own depths in order to arrive at consciousness of itself, as man renders to himself an account of his spirit's consciousness. In order to do this, man must be present to *his own spirit.* Here, however, I speak only against the merely historical

(*geschichtliche*) attitude. In no way should this make the study of history as such something to be despised. We ourselves, in fact,

want to take up the *history* of philosophy. Still, when an age treats *everything* historically (*historisch*k), thus being constantly occupied solely with the world which no longer is and so wanders around in mausoleums, then has the spirit given up its own life which consists in its thinking itself.

Connected with the purely historical (*historischen*) manner of treating philosophy is the demand that one who teaches the history of philosophy be uninvolved (*unparteiisch*). This *insistence on non-involvement* means for the most part simply that the one who teaches history of philosophy shall act like a dead man in presenting philosophies, that he should treat them as something separated from his own spirit, something external, that he should himself be without thought in treating them. Tennemann, for example, conveys this impression of non-involvement. If we look at him more closely, however, we find him completely caught up in the Kantian philosophy, whose main contention is that the true is not to be known. In that case, however, the history of philosophy is a sorry affair, where one knows ahead of time that one must put up with unsuccessful efforts. Tennemann praises the most diverse philosophers for their erudition, their genius, etc., but he finds fault with them for not having adopted the Kantian point of view or, simply, for having philosophized. One should not, if one follows this view, be on the side of thinking spirit. Still, if one wants to study the history of philosophy properly, then non-involvement consists in not opting for the opinions, thoughts, concepts of individuals. But, one must be involved in philosophy and not be satisfied with limiting oneself merely to the knowledge of what others have thought.

k Ordinarily Hegel distinguishes sharply between the inner movement which is history (*Geschichte*) and the external account (*Historie*) of this movement. Here the terminology becomes somewhat confusing.

Truth will be known (*erkannt*) only when with his spirit one is in it; mere knowledge about (*Kenntnis*) it does not show that one is in it.

To all this I should like to add a few remarks regarding the manner of treating the history of philosophy.

III. Consequences in Regard to Treating the History of Philosophy

It is obvious before we start that one semester is too short a time in which to come quite thoroughly to terms with the history of philosophy, a work of the Spirit which spans millennia. The field, therefore, has to be narrowed. From what we have already said concerning the kind of history we want to speak about, there are, in regard to its extension, two conclusions to be drawn.

1. We limit ourselves to principles and to their development in the various philosophies. This will be particularly true when we are treating of the earlier philosophies, not so much because of the lack of time, but rather because in them only principles can be of interest to us. They are the most abstract, simplest, and consequently also the most indeterminate principles i.e., wherein determinateness has not yet been posited, even though in them all determinations are contained. To a certain extent these abstract principles are adequate; they go far enough to be of interest to us. Because, however, their development is not yet complete, qualitatively they are particular, i.e., in their application they extend only to a delimited sphere. Such, for example, is the principle of mechanism. Were we to consider what Descartes has to say about animal nature on the basis of this principle we should not be satisfied. Our own more profound concept demands for this a

more concrete principle; it would not be enough for us to use this
principle in explaining plant or animal nature. There is a sphere of

reality suited to an abstract principle; thus the principle of mechanism is valid for inorganic nature, which belongs to the sphere of abstract existence. (The living is the concrete, the inorganic the abstract.) For a higher sphere, however, the principle of mechanism is inadequate. To give another example, the ancient abstract philosophies looked at the universe from the standpoint of the atomistic principle. Such a principle is totally inadequate, when there is question of life, of spirit. A consideration, therefore, of its relationship to life or to spirit is of no interest to us. From this point of view, then, it is philosophical interest which determines us to consider here only the principles of these philosophies.

2. In regard to older philosophers, then, we must confine ourselves exclusively to the philosophical, leaving out the historical, biographical, critical, etc. thus disregarding what has been written about them, what is only peripheral to them. In this connection all sorts of extrinsic considerations have been injected, e.g., that Thales was the first to predict an eclipse of the sun, that Descartes and Leibniz were skilled in mathematical analysis, etc. All such considerations we eliminate.

By the same token the historical account of the way systems were disseminated can be of little concern to us here. We treat simply the content of philosophical systems, not their extrinsic history. We know, for example, a host of Stoic teachers who had a great influence in their own times and even developed this or that detail. We abstract from such details and pass over these men. To the extent that they were famous only as teachers, the history of philosophy is silent about them.

The second point to be taken up in the Introduction is the

relationship of philosophy to other manifestations of spirit, the relation of its history to other histories.

B. Relation of the History of Philosophy to the Rest of Spirit's Manifestations

As we know, the history of philosophy is not independent (*für sich*) but is connected with history in general, with external history as well as with the history of religion, etc. It is natural, then, that we should recall the principal moments of political history, the character of the time and the overall situation of the people, wherein philosophy comes into being. In addition, however, the connection with general history is internal, i.e., essential and necessary, not merely external; nor is it merely a question of one being simultaneous with the other (simultaneity is no relationship at all).

There are, then, two aspects we must take into consideration: first, the properly historical aspect of the relationship, and, secondly, the factual connection, i.e., the connection of philosophy itself with religion and with the other sciences which are related to it. These two aspects are to be looked at more in detail, in order to distinguish more precisely the concept which characterizes philosophy.

I. The Historical Status of Philosophy

1. With regard to the historical status of philosophy the first thing to be taken into account is the general relationship which the philosophy of an era has with the rest of the manifestations which characterize the same era.

It is customarily said that the political situation, religion, mythology, etc., are to be taken account of in the history of philosophy, because they have greatly influenced the philosophy of

an era, and, in its turn, philosophy has had a great influence on them. If, however, one is to be content with categories such as "great influence," the effect of one on the other, etc., all one has to do is to show an external connection, i.e., the point of view implies that each is for itself, one independent of the other. Here, however, we

must take an entirely different view of this relationship: the essential category is unity, the inner connection of these diverse manifestations. We must be convinced that there is only *one* spirit, *one* principle which manifests itself just as much in the political situation as in religion, art, morality, social relations, commerce, and industry in such a way that these diverse forms are but branches of one main trunk. This is the main point of view. The spirit is only one, it is the one substantial spirit of one period, one people, one era, but a spirit which takes multiple forms; and these diverse forms are the moments which are to be brought out. It is not to be imagined that politics, civil constitutions, religions, etc., constitute the root or the cause of philosophy, nor that conversely the latter is the foundation of the former. In all of these moments there is *one* character, which is the foundation of all and penetrates all. No matter how diverse the different aspects are, there is nothing contradictory in this. No one of them contains anything heterogeneous to the foundation, however much they may seem to be mutually contradictory. They are simply shoots coming from the same root; and philosophy is one of them.

2. Philosophy, then, is one aspect of the total manifestation of spirit consciousness of spirit being its supreme flowering, since its effort is to know what spirit is. It is, in fact, the dignity of man to know what he is and to know this in the purest manner, i.e., to attain to the thinking of what he is. The result of this is a revelation of the place which philosophy holds among the other manifestations of spirit.

a. Philosophy is identical with the spirit of the era in which it makes its appearance; it is not superior to its era but simply the

consciousness of what is substantial in it or, it is thinking knowledge of what belongs to that era. By the same token an individual is not superior to his era;

he is its son; what is substantial in it is his essence, he simply manifests it in a particular form. No one can escape from what is substantial in his era any more than he can get out of his own skin. Thus, from the substantial point of view, philosophy cannot leap beyond its own times.

b. Nevertheless, philosophy does stand over and above its own era, which is to say, from the point of view of form, since it consists in the thinking of what is substantial in that era. To the extent that it knows the substantial, i.e., makes it an object over against itself, it has the same content but as a knowledge of it goes beyond. The difference, however, is simply formal; there is no difference in content.

c. Now, this very knowledge is the actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) of spirit I am only to the extent that I know myself. It is the spirit's self-knowledge which formerly was not present. Thus, the formal difference is also a real, actual one. This knowledge it is, then, which produces a new form in the development of spirit. In this context developments are simply ways of knowing. By self-knowledge spirit posits itself as distinct from what it is; it posits itself for itself [as independent], develops in itself. This involves a new difference between what it is in itself and what its actuality is; and, thus, a new manifestation emerges. In itself, then, philosophy is already a further determinateness or character of spirit; it is the interior birthplace of the spirit which is later to appear in actuality. Its concretion emerges in the history of philosophy itself. In this connection we shall see that what Greek philosophy was came to actuality in the Christian world.

Here, then, is the second determination, i.e., that philosophy is first

and foremost simply the thinking of what is substantial in its own time, that it does not stand above that time but only brings out its content.

3. The third thing to be taken into account with regard to its historical situation has to do with the time when philosophy emerges, in comparison with other manifestations of spirit.

The spirit of an era is its substantial life; it is the spirit as immediately vital, actual. Thus, at a time when Greek life flourishes, we see the Greek spirit in the freshness and strength of its youth, unaffected by decadence. The Roman spirit we see during the era of the republic. And so it goes. The spirit of the era is also the way a particular spirit is present as actual vitality. Philosophy, however, is this spirit's thinking; and thought, no matter how *a priori* it may be, is essentially the result of spirit, for spirit is the vital activity which produces itself; in its progress it produces itself as a result. This movement contains a negation as an essential moment. If something is to be produced, then it must be produced from something else, and precisely that other is negated in the movement. Thus, thinking negates the natural way of living. The child, for example, exists as a human being, but still immediately, naturally; education, then, is the negation of this natural way, it is the discipline which spirit imposes on itself in order to raise itself from its immediacy. By the same token, thinking spirit as it begins its movement is in its natural form. Then, as it becomes reflective it goes beyond its natural form, i.e., it negates it; ultimately it realizes itself by grasping itself in concept. This is where thinking enters. The consequence of this is that the spirit with its given [*realen*] norms based on custom (*Sittlichkeit*), which constitute its vital force, is negated. This means that thought, which is the spirit's substantial manner of existing, attacks and weakens simple custom, simple religion, etc., thus ushering in a period of decadence. Then, with further progress,

thought recollects itself, becomes concrete, and in this way produces for itself an ideal world in contrast to the former real one. So, when

philosophy is to make its appearance among a people, a rupture must have occurred in the actual world. Then philosophy remedies the decadence which thought had begun. The remedial action takes place in the ideal world, the world of spirit where man takes refuge when the earthly world satisfies him no longer. Philosophy begins with the decline of a real world. When it appears and painting gray on gray spreads its abstractions, then is the fresh color and vitality of youth gone. What it produces, then, is a remedy, but only in the world of thought, not in the earthly world. Thus the Greeks, when they began to think, withdrew from the state; and they began to think at a time when in the world around them there was nothing but turbulence and wretchedness, e.g., during the time of the Peloponnesian War. That was when the philosophers withdrew into their thought-world; as the people said of them, they became idlers. So it has been with almost all peoples; philosophy makes its first appearance when public life is no longer satisfying and ceases to hold the interest of the people, and the citizen finds it so difficult to take any part in government.

All this is an essential determination of philosophy, which the history of philosophy preserves. As the Ionic cities declined, Ionic philosophy blossomed. The external world no longer satisfied the spirit. In the same way among the Romans, philosophizing began with the fall of the republic, when demagogues took over the government, and everything was caught up in a dissolution of the old and a striving toward the new. It was not until the decline of the Roman Empire, which although so great, so rich, and so imposing, was internally already dead, that the earlier Greek philosophies experienced their highest cultivation in the work of the

Neoplatonists or Alexandrians. In similar fashion with the decline of the Middle Ages we see the revival of older philosophies.

This brings us to the more precise connection between philosophy and the other forms of spirit's existence.

II. More Precise Characterization of the Relationship Between Philosophy and the Other Manifestations of Spirit

Our second point concerns the more precise and determinate connection between philosophy and other manifestations of spirit. We are confronted with sciences, art, mythology, religion, politics, etc., whose general connection with philosophy has already been treated. Now we want to look at the difference between philosophy and these other manifestations. We do this by delimiting the concept of philosophy, selecting out the moments which thus become important, and applying them to our own subject matter which is the history of philosophy. In so doing our purpose is to separate off and exclude what does not belong to the subject. It is easy enough to say that in the history of philosophy only philosophy itself, in the process peculiar to it, is to be considered, and that everything else, such as religion, etc., is to be left to the side. In general that is quite correct. Still we ask: what is philosophy? Much is put under that heading which we must exclude. If we are to look only at the name we should have to include much that has nothing to do with the concept of philosophy. As for religion, we can also say in general that we have to leave it to one side. In history, however, religion and philosophy have frequently been both connected with each other and in conflict with each other in the Greek as well as in the Christian era and their opposition constitutes a very definite moment in the history of philosophy. Properly speaking, then, philosophy only

seems to leave religion aside. Historically speaking neither has allowed the other to go untouched; nor must we do so either.

In our investigation we want to look first at the sciences,

or at scientific culture as such. After that we must look at religion and particularly at the more precise relationship between philosophy and religion. This relationship must be looked at openly, directly, and honestly; one must not give the impression of wanting to leave religion untouched. To give this impression is to attempt simply to hide the fact that philosophy has been opposed to religion. Religion which is to say the theologians pretends to ignore philosophy, in order not to be troubled in its own arbitrary reasonings.

1. Relation of Philosophy to Scientific Culture as Such

We begin, then, with scientific culture as such; more precisely with the empirical sciences, which are based on observation, experiment, and reasoning. We must look at them, of course, bearing in mind that this sort of thing has also been called philosophizing. What they have in common with philosophy, after all, is thinking. They belong within the framework of experience, but they are also characterized by thinking, since they strive to discover the universal in experience. Scientific culture, then, shares its formal aspect with philosophy. Religion, on the other hand, shares with philosophy its other aspect, the substantial, which is to say God, the Spirit, the Absolute. To know the essence of this world, of truth, of the absolute Idea, is common ground for both philosophy and religion.

With regard to the matter proper to scientific culture, on the one hand principles have been established as to what is to be done; this involves practical requirements (*Gebote, Pflichten*). On the other hand we recognize laws, forces, natural classes,[1] causes. Matter,

then, corresponds to what in the external world are forces and causes and to what in

1 This does not conflict with what was said in note j above. Natural classes (*Gattungen der Natur*) belong to nature as determined in thought.

the spiritual world of morality is the substantial, the motivating, the enduring. A content such as this demands, as does philosophy, thinking; and whatever has been thought from this point of view has been called philosophy. Thus, in the history of philosophy what we first meet are the seven wise men of Greece. They, too, are called philosophers, principally because they enunciated a number of moral sayings and principles concerning general moral obligations and essential relationships. Then, in more recent times we see that man began to turn his gaze to things of nature. That was the case particularly in the period subsequent to that of scholastic philosophy. *A priori* reasoning about the things of nature based on religion or metaphysics was given up, and nature itself was investigated; it was observed, and an attempt was made to know its laws and forces. By the same token research was instituted into moral relationships, civil law, etc. and this was also called philosophy. It was customary, for example, to speak of Newtonian philosophy, even though it concerned itself principally only with things of nature. In general, then, the form which characterizes philosophy is one according to which, from experience regarding nature, the state, justice, religion, etc., general principles are derived and are enunciated as formal, quite universal principles.

Philosophy, it is said, investigates universal causes, the ultimate grounds of things. Thus, wherever in the sciences universal causes, essential grounds, and principles are enunciated, the sciences have this universality in common with philosophy, and, to be more precise, such principles and grounds are derived from experience and from reflection on it (*innere Empfindung*). No matter how foreign to the principle of philosophy this last may seem to be, it is

nevertheless true with regard to any philosophy that *I* have received it through *my* senses and through reflection on what they present to me (*meine innere Empfindung*) i.e., through experience and that on the basis of this expe-

rience alone I consider it true. This form of knowing, of taking into oneself, has appeared not only in opposition to religion but also in a negative relation to other philosophies; and this, too, was called philosophy, because it was opposed to whatever is merely positive. *Newtonian* philosophy comprises only what we now call philosophy of nature a science based on experience and perception, containing knowledge of laws, forces, and universal properties of nature.

It was a great period in history which saw the emergence of this principle of experience, when man began to see for himself, to feel, to taste, to look on nature as worthwhile, to rely significantly on the testimony of his senses, to hold for true only what was known through the senses. This conviction of the immediate certitude afforded by the senses was the foundation for this so-called philosophy; it was from this testimony of the senses, after all, that the sciences of nature took their impetus. This reliance on the senses was opposed to previous ways of looking at nature; formerly the point of departure had been metaphysical principles. Because men now based their procedures on sensible representations they came into conflict with religion and the state. It was, however, not merely the testimony of the senses which they had set up against a metaphysics of the understanding; still another testimony was highly regarded namely, that the true could count as true only to the extent that it was to be found in both the heart and the understanding of man. Through this kind of understanding, this thinking and feeling for himself, there resulted an even greater opposition to what was merely positive in religion and contemporary government. Man learned now to do his own observing and thinking, to form his own representations, opposing

them to the fixed truths and dogmas of the Church and to then-accepted civil law or at least he sought new principles to support the old civil law, in order to justify it in the light of these principles. In the precise

context in which religion is positive had been found the validation of those principles according to which subjects owed obedience to the authority of the princes; it was the divine authority which gave validity to these principles, because rulers were appointed by God. The basis for this was found in the Jewish laws according to which kings were the anointed of the Lord. (The Mosaic laws had a special validity even with regard to marriage.) Against this whole positive position, against whatever had been imposed by authority, man's own proper understanding and free thinking rebelled. Among those who thought this way can be counted Hugo Grotius who formulated a law of nations based on what was accepted as law by all peoples, i.e., the *consensus gentium.* According to this law the purpose of the state was posited as something proper to the state itself, as something immanent in man, rather than based on a divine command. What was accepted as law was derived from what is the ground for man's being recognized as man, whereas previously everything had been regulated by authoritarian legislation (*nach dem Positiven*). Positing in this way a ground other than that of authority was called philosophizing, and for this reason philosophy was also called world-wisdom. Because this kind of philosophizing had as its object external nature and the rights of human nature, and because a content such as this owed its origin to the activity of man's mundane understanding and reason, it was correct to call this world-wisdom. There is no question that philosophy does not limit itself to internal objects; it extends its interest to everything in the surrounding world and, thus, is occupied with mundane, finite things. On the other hand, however, it does not confine itself to the mundane; it has the same goal as religion; and the mundane which it has as its object is nonetheless a determinateness of the divine

Idea. In recent times Schlegel has warmed over again the term world-wisdom as a name for philosophy. He intended it, however, ironically; what

he meant was that philosophy must give way, when there is question of higher things for example, of religion. In this he has had a number of followers.

In England under the heading of philosophy is understood natural science. Thus it happens that a journal (like *Hermbstädts Journal*), for example, which talks about agriculture (manure), economics, industry, chemistry, etc., and tells about discoveries in these areas, is called a philosophical review. By the same token optical instruments, barometers, thermometers, etc., are called philosophical instruments. Even theories, especially those concerned with morality, which are derived more from the feelings of the human heart and from experience than from the concept or from determinations of what is right, in England belong to philosophy. The Scottish moral philosophers in particular should be mentioned in this connection; they reason in a Ciceronian manner, taking as their starting point drives, inclinations, and immediate certainty, i.e., from the sort of thing which Cicero calls *insitum natura*. In the same way modern English theories of political economy, e.g., that of Adam Smith and of those influenced by him, are counted as philosophy. The result is that, at least in England, the name philosophy is respected, because there whatever is derived from general principles or can be taken out of the realm of experience and brought back to determinate principles is called philosophical. A short time ago a banquet was held in honor of Canning. In his speech of acknowledgment it comes out that he congratulates England, because there philosophical principles are employed in government. Thus, in England at least, philosophy is not a term used ironically.

Now, even though all these ways of viewing things go under the heading of philosophy, we must exclude them from our treatment of the subject, despite the fact that in all of them there is a principle which they have in common with philosophy, i.e., that in them it is one's self which

sees, senses, thinks, is present. Whatever the area may be, this is the great principle opposed to authority. In perception it is I myself who perceive; and the same is true of sensing, understanding, thinking. What is to have significance for man must be contained in his own thinking. Properly speaking, "in his own thinking" is a pleonasm; every man must think for himself, no one can think for another, any more than he can eat or drink for another. It is this moment of the self, plus the form which is produced in thinking, the form of universal laws, principles, fundamental determinations, in short the form of universality, that philosophy has in common with those sciences, philosophical points of view, representations, etc., of which we have been speaking; they are what has given to all of them the name philosophy.

2. Relation of Philosophy to Religion

The second sphere of those manifestations of spirit which are more closely related to philosophy is the area of religious representations in general. Here belongs primarily religion as such, then mythology and the mysteries, and even to a certain extent poetry. Just as the first area of which we spoke had in common with philosophy its formal element, the I and the form of universality, so what is common here is the other side, i.e., the substantial element, the content.

In the various religions, peoples have left a record of the way they thought regarding the being of the world, the absolute, that which is in and for itself. There we find what they held to be the cause, the essence, the substantial, in both nature and spirit. There, too, we discover their opinions regarding the manner in which human spirit or human nature is related to such objects to the divinity, the true.

In religion, then, we immediately observe two characteristics (*Bestimmungen*): first, how man is conscious of God, i.e., how in consciousness he represents God, this being the

objective form or determination of thought whereby man sets the essence of divinity over against himself, represents it as something other than himself, as an alien being in the beyond. The second characteristic is to be found in devotion and cult, which constitute the overcoming of this opposition, whereby man raises himself to God and becomes conscious of his unity with God's being. This is the sense which cult has in all religions. Among the Greeks cult served rather to raise them to an enjoyment of this unity, since for them the being of God was not in itself something beyond them.

Religion and philosophy, then, have as an object in common what is true in and for itself God, insofar as He is in and for Himself and man in his relation to God. In religions, men have made manifest the consciousness they had concerning the supreme being. To this extent religions are the supreme work of reason. Thus it is absurd to believe that priests invented religion in order to deceive the people as though men would permit anything to be imposed on them with regard to the ultimate and supreme being.

Although philosophy has the same object as religion, still in relation to each other they have developed many differences. The first question, then, is: how does philosophy differ from theology and religion[6] in general? The second is: to what extent must we in the history of philosophy take the religious into account?

a. *The Form of Philosophy Distinguished from That of Religion.* First, then, the question how philosophy and religion differ from each other. In this connection I intend to present their general characteristics and so far as possible discuss them.

6 Alternate reading in the Michelet edition: "How does philosophy

differ from theology (knowledge of religion) or from religion (as consciousness)?" (Glockner, XIII, 80).

b. *Divine and Human Spirit.* Common to both is what is in and for itself, the universal, absolute Spirit. This is spirit, but at the same time it includes nature within itself; it is itself and the grasp of nature within itself. It is not identical with nature in the superficial sense in which the chemically neutral is, but is rather in its own self identical with nature, or one with itself in nature. Such is its identity with nature that the latter, its negative, the real, is posited only as ideal. That is the idealism of spirit. The universality of spirit, to which both philosophy and religion are related, is absolute, not exterior, universality. It is a universality which penetrates everything, is present in everything. We have to represent spirit to ourselves as free, and freedom of the spirit means that it is with itself, has a rational awareness of itself. Its nature is to grasp the other in such a comprehensive way as to find itself in the other, to unite itself with itself in the other, there to possess and enjoy itself.

Here, then, is manifested the relationship of Spirit to the human spirit. No matter how fragile and isolated individuality may be represented, abstraction must simply be made from this sort of atomistic representation. When spirit is represented in truth it is what is rationally aware of itself (*das sich selbst Vernehmende*). The difference between the individual and the universal, then, is so to be expressed, that the subjective, individual spirit is the universal divine Spirit, to the extent that there is rational awareness of the latter, to the extent that the latter manifests itself in each subject, each man. The spirit which is rationally aware of absolute Spirit is, then, the subjective spirit.

If we take this determination as our point of departure, then as

further determinations we have simply various forms of this rational awareness. What we call religious *belief* is the substantial, universal manner in which man is rationally aware of the divine Spirit. Apart from belief the divine Spirit is not what he is according to the teaching of

the Church. In this way the divine Spirit is not in himself but is present in the spirit of man, in the spirit of those who belong to his community. Then it is that the individual spirit is rationally aware of the divine Spirit, i.e., of the essence of *his* own spirit, of *his own essence*, of what is substantial in him; and this essence is precisely the universal in and for itself, the enduring. That is the faith of the Evangelical Church not an historical (*historischer*) faith, not a belief in historical (*geschichtliche*) things; rather this Lutheran faith is the spirit's own faith, the consciousness whereby it is rationally aware of the substantial in spirit. According to a recent theory of faith it is said: I believe, I have immediate knowledge that I have a body. This, then, is called belief, that something determinate, some content or other is immediately in us, is produced in our consciousness. That is belief in the external sense. But the internal, the religious sense of belief is precisely the knowledge of the absolute Spirit of which we have been speaking; and this knowledge, as it is first of all in the human spirit, is immediate and, as a result, is immediate certitude. It is simply a testimony of man's spirit, which is the profound root of the identity of spirit in general. Spirit generates (*erzeugt*) itself, manifests its own self, shows itself and gives testimony of itself also, of its unity with itself. It also has consciousness of itself, consciousness of its unity with its object, because it is itself its own object. Now, when consciousness of this object comes on the scene, develops, and takes form, the content in question can seem to be something given in sensation, sensibly represented, coming from outside; the way in mythology a myth has of coming into being according to an historical pattern. This pattern is external. To faith, however, belongs the testimony of the

spirit. The content can, of course, come from outside, be given and received, but the spirit must give testimony to it.

To be more precise and to speak of the Christian religion, we know that Christ came into the world almost 2000 years

ago. He said, however, "I am with you all days, even to the end of the world,"[7] and "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, I am there in the midst of them."[8] Still, this was not to be the sensible presence of this individual person. He also said, when I am no longer with you, "the Spirit will lead you to all truth,"[9] i.e., the relation of externality must first be removed; it is not the true relationship. Herein we find an elucidation (*Erklärung*) of what we said above.

On the one hand we have to do there with a representative consciousness, where the content is an object, and it is outside us, separated from us. On the other hand we have devotion, cult, the feeling of union with this object. The result is a certain ambiguity; at one time externality is stronger, at another, devotion. At one time the indwelling Christ is sent back 2000 years to Palestine and is simply an historical person in that land and those surroundings. At another time, however, in devotion and in cult, the feeling of His presence is predominant. Consequently, at this point there is to be found a contrast in religion.

c. *Representation and Thought.* The form of philosophy differs from the aforementioned form of religion, and we must now get a more precise understanding of this difference. The fundamental connection between religion and philosophy is the nature of spirit itself.

(1) With regard to spirit the point of departure must be [the realization] that spirit is in manifesting itself; it is this *one* substantial identity, but at the same time, in manifesting itself it is differentiated within itself. This is where its subjective, finite consciousness comes in. (That which has

7 Matt. 28:20.

8 Matt. 18:20.

9 John 16:13.

its limit in another, because at its limit the other begins, is finite; and this is true only where there is a determination, a difference.) Spirit, however, remains free; it remains with itself in being manifested, with the result that it is not disturbed by reason of the difference. To spirit, that which is differentiated is transparent; it is something clear, not something obscure. To put it another way, for spirit there is nothing determinate in the sense that determination means difference. Now, when there is talk of a limit to spirit, from one point of view this is correct; man is limited, dependent, finite except insofar as he is spirit. Finitude has to do with the other modes of his existence. To the extent that, even though he is spirit, his attitude is spiritless, he is involved with external things; but when he is spirit and truly spirit he is unlimited. The limits of reason are only the limits of this subject's reason; but when man's attitude is genuinely rational he is without limits, infinite. (Of course, infinity is not to be taken in the abstract sense, as a concept of understanding.) Because spirit is infinite it continues to be spirit in all its relationships, expressions, manifestations. The difference between universal, substantial spirit and merely subjective spirit is a difference for spirit itself. Both spirit as object and the content of spirit must be at the same time immanent in subjective spirit; and this can be only when the immanence is spiritual, not natural or immediate. This is the fundamental characteristic of Christianity, which sees man illuminated by grace, by the Holy Spirit (who is essential Spirit). Then it is that the spirit is immanent in man, is, thus, his own spirit. A living spirit such as this is, is, so to speak, phosphorus, the volatile, flammable material which can be ignited both from without and from within. It is ignited from without, for example, when man is taught the content of religion, when his

emotions and imagination (*Vorstellung*) are aroused by such a teaching, or when he accepts it on authority. When his attitude is spiritual, he is on the contrary

inflamed from within himself; because he looks for the content of religion within himself, it is from out of himself that he manifests it. Then he is his most intimate self.

(2) To go further, we must speak of the way in which spirit is objective to itself, of what it is for it to be for itself. The form in which it is present can vary; thus it can assume a variety of forms. From these diverse ways of appearing (*Gestaltungsweisen*) comes the diversity of forms of spirit and, thus, the difference between philosophy and religion.

In religion, spirit has its own peculiar form, which can be sensible, e.g., in the form of art, when art pictures divinity, or in poetry, where likewise the sensible representation constitutes the essence of the being-present. In general we can say that this way of manifesting spirit is *representation*. It is true, of course, that in religious representation thinking, too, is to some extent involved, but the representation contains thought in such a way that the latter is mingled with an ordinary external content. By the same token, law and morality too are, as it is said, suprasensible, but my representation of them takes its origin from custom, from legal prescriptions (*Bestimmungen*) which are already there, or from feeling. With regard to philosophy, then, the difference is that in it the same content is grasped, but the form is that of thinking. In religion there are two moments: (1) there is an objective form or determination of consciousness, whereby essential Spirit, the absolute, is present as external to subjective spirit, i.e., as its object, and is represented as historical or as an artistic image, separated in time and space; (2) there is the character or stage of devotion, of intimacy, wherein the separation is removed, the gap is bridged,

wherein Spirit and object are one, and the individual is filled with the Spirit. Philosophy and religion have the same object, the same content, the same goal. But, what are in religion two stages, two modes of objectivity,

i.e., art, faith and then devotion,[m] are in philosophy united into one; for thought is (*a*) from the point of view of the first character objective and has the form of an object; whereas (*b*) it has also lost the form of objectivity, such that in thinking, content and form are posited as unified. To the extent that what I think i.e., the content of thinking is in the form of thought, it no longer stands over against me.

In religion and philosophy, then, there is *one* substantial content, and only the manner of manifesting it in each is different. These two manifestations, however, are not merely different; in their difference they can appear to be opposed, even contradictory, because the content is represented as essentially linked to the image. Still, even within the framework of religion it is conceded that the different manner of presentation which characterizes religion is not to be taken literally. Thus, it is said: God generated His Son. The divine Spirit's self-knowledge, His making Himself into an object, is here called generating His Son. In the Son the Father knows Himself, because the Son is of the same nature as He. This relationship, however, is taken from vital nature, not from the spiritual; its expression is characteristic of representation.[n] It is said, of course, that the relationship is not to be taken literally; but it is simply left at that. So too, when the mythologies speak of the wars of the gods, it is admitted that this sort of thing is being said partly of spiritual and partly too of natural forces. Because they are opposed to each other they are in this way imaginatively represented.

(3) It is natural that these diverse forms, as for the first time they appear in a determinate way, and are aware of

[m]*Kunst, Glaube und Andacht.* What Hegel calls "two" modes might here seem to be three. Art and belief, however, as objectifying the Absolute the one in sensible form and the other in the form of representation constitute one stage or mode. Devotion, then, is a second.

[n]*Vorstellung* can in this context take on the connotation of "metaphor."

the differences which separate them, should be inimical to each other; it is, in fact, inevitable. Thought, after all, first makes its appearance as abstract, i.e., as formally incomplete. The same is true of religion, since initial immediate religious consciousness, even though it is consciousness of spirit, of that which is in and for itself, still involves a sensible form and sensible attributes, i.e., it too is abstract. Thereafter thinking becomes more concrete, penetrates more profoundly into itself, and brings to consciousness the concept of spirit as such. Thus aware of itself, it is no longer inseparable from its abstract determination. The concept of concrete spirit is its own self-conception, or it involves an essential conception of itself, having determination in itself (determination being what is counted as belonging to understanding, to the essence of appearance). Within itself abstract understanding denies all determination and, thus, with regard to God retains what is left, which is no more than His abstract designation as supreme being. On the contrary, the concrete concept has nothing to do with such a *caput mortuum;* its object is concrete, active, self-determining, living spirit. Subsequently, therefore, concrete spirit recognizes in religion the concrete, determinateness in general, not the sensible but the essential. The Jewish God, for example, God the Father, is abstract. In a later stage of its development spirit recognizes what is essential in that. The concrete, however, is not merely God as such, but rather God determining Himself, positing another than Himself, and yet as Spirit He does not leave the other simply another but is with Himself in this other. Only this latter is the complete divine Spirit. What is concrete in religion, however, can be known and recognized only in the concept which is itself concrete. Therein lies

the possibility of reconciling religion and philosophy, when abstract understanding struggles against the former.

The historical progress of this opposition is approximately the following. Thinking takes its start at first within

religion's representations and subsequently parallels them, with the result that the opposition is not yet conscious. Later, however, when thinking is strengthened and relies on itself, it declares its opposition to the form of religion and will not recognize its own concept therein, seeking as it does only itself. This fight against the form of religion took place early in the history of the Greek world. In as early a case as Xenophanes' we see a philosopher most vigorously combating the representations of Greek popular religion; and later we see the opposition stiffen, as philosophers arose who expressly denied the gods and hence the divine character of the popular religion. Socrates was charged with having introduced new gods. As a matter of fact, his dalmovlov * and the overall principle of his system were contrary to the form of Greek religion and of customary morality. Still, he held on to the practices of his religion, and we know that as he was dying he ordered that a cock be sacrificed to Aesculapius. It was only very late that the Neoplatonists recognized the universal content of the popular religion, which had been either expressly attacked or put aside by the philosophers. We see not only that the Neoplatonists gave to mythological representations a meaning proper to thought but that they also employed these representations as a sort of imaginative language for their own system.

The path which this opposition follows in the Christian religion is quite similar. At first thinking is dependent, unfree, tied to the religious form. Thus it is with the Church Fathers. With them, thinking develops the elements of Christian doctrine. (The latter becomes a system only in the hands of the Church Fathers who were also philosophers. The developed aspect of ecclesiastical faith emerged in a special way in Luther's time. At that time and

frequently thereafter in more recent times there was a desire to effect a return of Christian religion to its primitive form. This sort of thing has, it is true, a good sense, in that men

were concerned with what is authentic and original in Christian teaching, something which was particularly necessary at the time of the Reformation. Nevertheless, it also involves the incorrect notion that the elements should not be developed.) The first step, then, was that thinking expanded the teaching and developed it into a system; subsequently the doctrine was fixed and made into an absolute presupposition for thinking. First, then, comes the development of doctrine; secondly comes its fixation. Only after that does the opposition of believing and thinking, of immediate doctrinal certitude and so-called reason, enter in. Thinking reached the point where it relied only on itself; the first thing the young eagle of reason did was to soar as a bird of prey to the sun of truth, from there to declare war on religion. Then, however, once more justice is done to the religious content also, in that thinking finds its completion in the concrete concept of spirit and enters into a polemic against abstract understanding.

Religion, then, has a content common to itself and to philosophy; it differs from philosophy only in its form. Thus, all that is required for philosophy is that the form of the concept be so far perfected as to be able to comprise the content of religion. This content is primarily what have been called the mysteries of religion, which is to say, the speculative element in religion. Under that heading is understood first of all something mysterious, something which must remain secret and is not to be made known. It is true, of course, that by their nature, i.e., precisely as a speculative content, mysteries are something mysterious for understanding; not, however, for reason. They are, in fact, precisely the rational element, in the sense of being speculative, i.e., in the sense of the concrete concept. Philosophy is opposed to rationalism,

particularly in contemporary theology. Rationalism, it is true, is always talking about reason, but what it is really talking about is merely dry, abstract understanding. Nothing in it is recognizable as reason, ex-

cept the moment of self-thinking; but even that is a completely abstract thinking. This sort of rationalism is opposed to philosophy both in its content and in its form. From the point of view of content: it has made heaven empty reduced the divine to a *caput mortuum*, and everything else to mere finite entities in space and time. Even from the point of view of form it is contrary to philosophy; for the form of this rationalism is ratiocination (*Räsonnieren*), unfree argumentation, and it declares its opposition to philosophy in particular, in order to be able to continue this sort of argumentation forever. That is no philosophizing, no genuine conceptual thinking (*Begreifen*). Within religion the opposition to rationalism comes from supranaturalism, and this latter is in regard to true content like philosophy and in agreement with it, but different as regards form; for in supranaturalism the spirit is entirely absent, it has become wooden and accepts only positive authority for its corroboration and justification. The Scholastics, on the contrary, were not this sort of supranaturalists; in their thinking they put the dogma of the Church into the form of concept.

As a thinking of this content in the form of concept, over against the representation which is proper to religion, philosophy has the advantage of understanding both. It understands religion and can accord it a justification; it understands rationalism and supranaturalism too; and it also understands itself. The converse, however, is not true; religion as such, because its point of view is that of the representation, recognizes itself only in representation, and not in philosophy, i.e., not in concepts, not in universal thought-determinations. Often enough no injustice is being done to a philosophy when the complaint is made that it is opposed to religion; frequently, however, the complaint is also unjustified,

namely, when the complaint is made from the religious point of view, simply because religion does not understand philosophy.

Philosophy, then, is not contrary to religion; it *grasps* the latter in *concept.* For the absolute Idea, however, for absolute Spirit there must be the form of religion, for religion is the form proper to consciousness of the true, the way it is for all men. The structure of religion is (1) sense perception, and (2) mingling with the latter the form of the universal, i.e., reflection, thinking, but still, abstract thinking, which still contains much that is external. Thereafter a transition is made to the concrete structuring of thoughts, there is speculation on the true, which is then in consciousness according to its true form. Nevertheless, the speculative element which enters into the structuring at this point is not the externally universal form of thinking which is common for all men; and so the consciousness of that which is in itself true must have the religious form.

This is the general justification of the religious form [of spirit's manifestation].o

Up to this point we have given an account of the difference between philosophy and religion. With regard, however, to what we want to treat of in the history of philosophy there are a few further remarks to make in connection with and partly as a consequence of what has already been said.

3. The Kinds of Religious Contents which Are to be Eliminated from Philosophical Consideration

a. The first remark concerns the *simply* (*überhaupt*) *mythological.* It is said that *mythology contains philosophical affirmations*, and, it is also said, since in general religious forms of expression involve philosophical affirmations, philosophy must concern itself with such forms of expression. (1) In this regard the work of my friend

Creuzer is well known; therein in a distinctively philosophical way he

o Cf. Appendix.

treated mythology and in general the religious representations, expressions, and usages of ancient peoples, showing what was rational in them. Now this method of treatment is attacked by others as an incorrect and unhistorical procedure. The objection is that it is not an historical fact that such philosophical affirmations are contained therein. Included in the mythological are also the mystery religions of the ancients, and in them we are presented with perhaps more philosophical affirmations than in mythology. That objection has already been taken care of by what was said earlier. It is clear enough that in mythology and in the mystery religions of the ancients such thoughts are to be found, since religions and, by the same token, the mythological elements in them are products of man, wherein he has bequeathed to posterity (*niedergelegt hat*) what to him was supreme and most profound his consciousness of what the true is. Consequently there is no question that in the forms of mythology are contained reason, universal notions and determinations, and hence philosophical affirmations also. Now, when Creuzer is faulted for introducing such thoughts where they are not really present, for allegorizing, it is important to note that Creuzer shares with the Neoplatonists the tendency to seek philosophical affirmations in the mythological. That does not, however, mean injecting such elements; they are actually there. This sort of consideration, then, is rational and is to be raised to the absolute level. The religions and mythologies which peoples have developed are products of reason becoming conscious of itself. No matter how naïve or nonsensical they may seem, they still contain the rational moment; instinctive rationality is fundamental to them. The method employed by Creuzer and the

Neoplatonists, then, is to be recognized as in itself the true and essential method.

Because, however, the mythological is the sensible, contingent presentation of the concept, what has been thought about it or developed out of it always continues to be

bound to its external form. But the sensible is not the genuine element in which thought or concept can be presented. This sort of presentation, then, is always inadequate to the concept. The sensible form must always be described from many sides, e.g., from those of history, of nature, and of art. It involves so much by way of contingent addition, which makes it fail to correspond exactly with the concept and, in fact, to contradict the intrinsic concept. Nevertheless the Neoplatonists did achieve a new recognition of their own philosophy under the sensible image proper to mythology, and they employed such images as forms for the expression of their own concepts. It is natural to assume that in the explanation of those images, even when they are connected with an intrinsic concept, a good deal of error gets in, especially when it comes down to details, to the multitude of usages, activities, utensils, vestments, ritual sacrifices, etc. Therein can be found something analogous to thought, a relationship to thought; but this simply shows how separate from each other are the image and its significance and how much contingency and arbitrariness can intervene and obscure the issue. Still, there is rationality here, and it must be taken into consideration. It is to be excluded, however, from our examination of the history of philosophy, for in philosophy we have nothing to do with such vague philosophical affirmations i.e., with general ways of representing the true or with thoughts which are merely contained in some presentation or other or lie hidden and undeveloped under some sensible image. We are concerned with thoughts which are externalized and only to the extent to which they are externalized to the extent, then, that the sort of content proper to religion has appeared, been manifested, and come to consciousness. The difference is enormous. In a child,

too, reason is present, but only as a capacity. In the history of philosophy, however, we are concerned with reason only insofar as it has been articulated in the form of thought. The philosophical affirmations

which are contained only *implicite* in religion, then, do not concern us.

(2) We can also believe that many philosophical affirmations were to be found in the mystery religions; in any event they presented symbolically adumbrations of later, superior representations. Still, a good deal of the sensible is mingled in them. They probably belong to the very ancient remnants of nature-religion which have, in fact, retreated into darkness. In general what is retained in the mystery religions belongs to a stage of culture far below that to which the people have attained. In the Christian religion, mysteries essentially contain the speculative. The Neoplatonists called the speculative concept mystical. The terms mvelv, * mvelsoal * (consecrate oneself, be consecrated) signified to be engaged in speculative philosophy. Consequently there is nothing unknown in these mysteries; their name signifies not something hidden (*Geheimnis*) but rather consecration. Thus, all Athenians were consecrated into the Eleusinian mysteries (and philologically speaking the same observation is to be made, for the same notion [*Vorstellung*] holds there); Socrates alone is an exception. The only thing that was forbidden was to reveal these things publicly before strangers; with regard to some of them it was made a crime to do so. What we find in the Christian religion is similar; there dogmas are called mysteries. They are what is known of God's nature and disseminated as doctrine. Thus, a mystery is not something unknown or hidden; it is something revealed, familiar, what everyone in the community knows; and it is by this knowledge that they are distinguished from members of other religions. Here, too, then, *mysterium* does not mean secret (since every Christian is in on the secret); it is simply another name for the speculative. For the

senses, for sensual man with his desires and his ordinary understanding, it is, of course, a secret; for understanding finds only contradic-

tions anywhere in the speculative; it finds difference impenetrable and cannot grasp the concrete. *Mysterium*, or the idea, however, is at the same time the resolution of contradictions. We are here concerned with mysteries, then, only to the extent that in them thought as thought, articulated in the form of thought, is present.

b. *Mythical Philosophizing.* It can also be claimed that *myths are a way of philosophizing;* and that they have also often been so. Mythical language is also deliberately used, as it is said, in order to evoke sublime ideas. Plato, for example, employs many myths. Jacobi, too, belongs to this number, since he employs the forms of Christian religion in his philosophizing and in this manner says the most speculative things. This form, however, is not the correct one or the one which suits philosophy. Thought which has itself as object must be, in its form too, object for itself; it has to have risen above its natural form and to have appeared also in the form of thought. There is a fairly prevalent opinion that Plato's myths are superior to his more abstract mode of expression; nor is there any question that Plato does present them beautifully. When we consider them more carefully we see that his myths are partly the result of an inability to get thought across to human beings in a purer form. Partly, too, Plato speaks this way only to introduce his themes when he comes to the principal theme, however, his manner of expression is different. Aristotle says: "Those who philosophize mythically do not deserve to be taken seriously."[10] That is true. Still, when Plato employs myths he certainly has good reasons for so doing. In general, however, the mythical form is not the one in which thought is best portrayed; it is only a subordinate way.

10 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, 4. [Transl.: 1000A 18-19 the translation

is rather free, but the sense is correct.]

Just as the Freemasons have symbols which count as deep wisdom deep in the way that we call a well deep when we cannot see the bottom so men are easily convinced that what is hidden is deep. But, when something is concealed, it may well be the case that there is nothing behind the concealment. Thus, among the Freemasons what is totally hidden (not only from outsiders but also from insiders) is really nothing and requires neither a special wisdom nor science. It belongs precisely to thought, on the other hand, to manifest itself; it is its very nature to be clear. Manifestation is not, so to speak, a situation which can take place or not, such that thought would continue to be thought whether manifested or not manifestation is its very being. [This paragraph inserted from Michelet's first edition of 1833.]

Others have employed *lines, numbers,* and *geometrical figures* as symbols. A snake biting its own tail, for example, or a circle count as symbols of eternity. Such a symbol is a sensible image; spirit, however, does not need that sort of symbol, it has language. If spirit can express itself in the element proper to thought, then the symbolic is an incorrect, a false mode of presentation. When we talk about Pythagoras we shall come back to this point. This sort of thing is found among the Chinese, too; they use lines and numbers to signify thoughts.

So, the mythical as such and mythical forms of philosophizing are excluded from what we have to say.

c. *The Place of Thoughts in Poetry and Religion.* The third remark to be made is that *religion as such,* like *poetry,* contains *thoughts.* The form in which religion is presented is not merely that of art, as it is particularly in Greek religion; rather it contains thoughts,

universal notions. By the same token, poetry (i.e., the art whose element is language) attains to the expression of thoughts; in poets, too, we find profound universal thoughts. Thoughts such as these e.g.,

on fate in Homer and the Greek tragedians, or on living and dying, being and ceasing to be, birth and death then, are clearly abstract and important thoughts, which also are often imaginatively presented, for example, in Indian poetry. Still, in the history of philosophy we are not to consider this mode of presentation either. One could speak of a philosophy of Aeschylus, of Euripides, of Schiller, of Goethe, etc. But, such thoughts are to an extent merely incidental and, thus, not germane to our presentation; they constitute general ways of representing the true, the vocation of man, morality, etc. To an extent, also, these thoughts have not attained to the form which is proper to them; and the form which is required is that of thought, wherein what is expressed must be the ultimate and constitute the absolute foundation. With regard to the thoughts we have just spoken about that is not the case; in them there is an absence of distinction from and relation to each other. Besides, in the case of the Indians, whatever has a relation to thought is shot through with confusion.

In addition we are not concerned with those thoughts which have their source in Christian religion or in the Church. The Fathers of the Church were, it is true, great philosophers, and the growth of Christianity owes a great deal to them. Still, their philosophizing moves within the framework of an already fixed and given doctrinal concept which is fundamental to it. In the same way we do not see among the Scholastics the sort of free thought which develops from itself and builds upon itself; rather we see that their thought is tied to all sorts of presuppositions.

This, then, is what I wanted to say by way of introduction to our treatment of the history of philosophy. Two points in particular

have been emphasized in what we have said about the relationship which these last types of thinking have to philosophy. One of these concerned the formal element, self-thinking in general as it occurs in the natural sciences, in what might be called popular philosophy. In

that case it was the form which is common to them and to philosophy; whereas the determination of content, the matter, is not developed from the thought itself, but comes from elsewhere, from nature or from feeling, or, as is often the case, sound common sense (*Menschenverstand*) is adopted as a criterion (as in Scottish philosophy). The other aspect was the substantial, which religion in particular shares with philosophy. In this case, however, what is lacking to the substantial element is the form of thought. Thus, what remains for philosophy is simply the substantial element in the form of thought.

C. General Division of the History of Philosophy

I. The Beginning of the History of Philosophy

The question now to be asked is: where is the history of philosophy to begin? The answer to this question is already contained immediately in what has preceded. The history of philosophy begins where thought in its freedom comes into existence, where it cuts itself loose from its immersion in and unity with nature, constitutes itself for itself, where thinking goes into itself and remains with itself.

From the historical point of view this emergence of spirit is intimately connected with the flowering of political liberty; and political liberty, liberty within the state, begins where the individual feels himself to be an individual, where the subject knows himself in a universal manner, or where the consciousness of personality, of having in oneself infinite value, comes into the open because I posit myself for myself and have value simply for myself. Herein is contained, too, free thinking of the object, the

absolute, the essential universal object. To think means to put something into the form of universality. To think oneself, then, means to give oneself the determination of universality, to know oneself as universal to know that I am a universal, an infinite i.e., to know oneself as a free being relating

oneself to oneself. That is precisely where the moment of practical political freedom comes in. Philosophical thinking is immediately connected with this sort of thing because it, too, appears as thought of the universal object. Thought is determined as something universal; which means (*a*) it makes of the universal its *object* or of the objective something universal. It determines the individuality of natural things, the way they are in sensible consciousness, as a universal, a thought, an objective thought. There we have the objective, but as thought. *(b)* Added to this is the second determination: *I recognize* this universal, thought *knows* that the universal happens. This more precise relation of recognition and of knowledge to the universal enters in only to the extent that the objective in question continues to be for me the objective and that I continue to grasp myself for myself. Insofar as I think the objective, it is mine; and even though it is my thinking, it counts for me as the absolutely universal. Insofar as it is present as objective, I have thought myself in it; I myself am contained in this infinite and at the same time I am conscious of this. Thus, I retain the standpoint of objectivity and at the same time that of knowing, and I maintain the latter standpoint. That, in general, is the connection between political freedom and the emergence of freedom of thought.

Philosophy, then, makes its appearance in history when there exist free political institution.p In this connection the Orient first comes to mind. In the Oriental world, however, there can be no question of philosophy properly speaking: for, to characterize the situation briefly, spirit does arise in the Orient, but conditions are such that the subject, the individuality, is not a person, but is determined as being

p*Verfassungen.* Literally the word means "constitutions," but here it stands for the political entities regulated by constitutions. From his earliest years, Hegel was concerned with constitutional government, the only form of government in which he saw the freedom of the people guaranteed by their participation in legislating the laws which bind them.

swallowed up in the objective. There the substantial relation is dominant. There substance is represented partly as suprasensible, as thought, partly as more on the side of the material. The relation which the individual or the particular has, then, is simply that of being a negative over against the substantial. The highest which such an individual can achieve is eternal blessedness, which consists in being simply submerged in this substance, in abdicating consciousness, and thus being annihilated as subject, with a consequent destruction of the difference between substance and subject. The supreme relationship, then, is unconsciousness. Now, insofar as individuals have not attained this blessedness but exist still in an earthly way they are excluded from the unity of the substantial and the individual. The relation they have is that of being determined as without spirit, without substance and as regards political freedom without rights. Will in this case is not substantial will but only one which is determined by the arbitrariness and contingency of nature (e.g., by the caste system); it is a being without inner consciousness.

There is the fundamental situation of the Oriental character. What is affirmative is simply substance, and the individual is without substance, it is accidental. Political liberty, rights, moral freedom, pure consciousness, thinking all are absent. If these are to come about, it is necessary that the subject, too, posit himself as consciousness over against the substance and be recognized for what he is. But, in the Oriental character the subject does not count as thus knowing himself. The subject is not there for himself and he has in his own self-consciousness no value for himself. The Oriental subject can, it is true, be great, noble, sublime; still what characterizes him chiefly is that as an individual he is without

rights and that what he makes of himself is determined either by nature or by arbitrariness. Nobility, sublimity, the utmost magnanimity of attitude, are among the Orientals arbitrariness of character and by the

same token contingent. Missing are such things as rights and moral standards, which consist in objective and positive determinations, to be respected by all, are valid for all, and in which all are accorded recognition. When the Oriental acts he has the advantage of complete independence, since for him there is nothing fixed and determined. The freer and more undetermined his substance is, the more arbitrary and independent is he. A free substance such as this no more has the character of an objectivity which is valid for all universally than it has freedom. What we call rights, moral standards, the state, are there present in a natural, substantial, patriarchal way, i.e., without subjective freedom. The kind of morality which we call conscience is also nonexistent there. What does exist there is a petrified natural order which permits what is worst to exist side by side with supreme nobility. The situation is such that in it supreme arbitrariness holds the highest place.

Consequently philosophical knowledge is not to be looked for in the Orient, since it is proper to philosophical knowledge to be conscious of, to know, the substance, i.e., the universal insofar as I think it, develop it within me, determine it, in such a way that in the substance I have my own determinations and am also contained subjectively or affirmatively. In this way the determinations in question are not merely subjective, not merely opinions, but just as they are my thoughts so too are they thoughts of what is objective; they are substantial thoughts.

What belongs to the Orient, then, is to be excluded from the history of philosophy. Still, in the overall treatment, I shall, nevertheless, say a few words about it, particularly the Indian and the Chinese. Previously I have ignored Oriental thought, but recently it has

become possible to pass judgment in its regard. Formerly it was customary to acclaim Indian wisdom and even to make a great fuss about it, without anyone knowing exactly why. Only now do we have more precise information, which corresponds naturally

to its somewhat general character. It is not enough, however, simply to contrast the universal concept with the former sort of vague conjecture; we must now, wherever possible, proceed historically.

Philosophy properly so called has its beginning only in the *West.* There the spirit is submerged in itself, immerses itself in itself, posits itself as free, and is free for itself. Only under such conditions can philosophy exist; and by the same token, only in the West do we find free political institutions. The happiness and the infinity which characterize the individual in the West are determined in such a way that within the substantial the subject holds its own, is not demeaned, does not appear as a slave, destined for annihilation in its dependence on the substance.

II. Progress in the History of Philosophy

In the West, then, we stand on philosophy's own proper ground. There we must consider two great forms, we must distinguish two main periods: (1) *Greek* philosophy, and (2) *Germanic* philosophy. The latter is philosophy in the framework of Christianity or philosophy insofar as it pertains to the Germanic peoples, which is the reason why it can be called Germanic philosophy. Through the influence of the Germanic nations the other European nations Italy, Spain, France, England, etc. have taken on a new form.

Greek philosophy differs from Germanic philosophy just as much as Greek art does from Germanic art. Greek influence, however, reaches into the Germanic world, and the Romans constitute the link between the two. In speaking of Greek philosophy we must speak of it as settling in the Roman world, because Greek culture

was adopted in the Roman world. The Romans, however, no more produced a philosophy of their own than a poetry of their own; even their religion is properly speaking Greek.

To characterize more precisely the two major con-

trasting forms we can say that the Greek world developed thought into the Idea, whereas the Christian or Germanic world comprehended the thought of Spirit. The line of demarcation is that between idea and spirit.

We can describe this advance more precisely in the following way. The first step in the process is necessarily the most abstract; it is the simplest and most impoverished, in contrast to the concrete. It is not yet diversified, not yet determined in a variety of ways; and, thus, the most ancient philosophies are the poorest of all. The first stage, then, is totally simple. After this, more precise determinations and figurations are constructed on this simple basis. When, for example, it is said that the universal, the absolute, is water or the infinite or being, then the universal has been determined as water, the infinite, or being. Still, the determinations themselves remain thoroughly general, non-conceptual, and undetermined. Likewise, when it is said that the universal is the atom, the one, this too is an indeterminate determination. The next stage in the development is the grasp of the universal as aware of itself, self-determining it is thought as active in a universal way. What comes at this stage is more concrete, but it is still somewhat abstract. It is the vovs * of Anaxagoras or, better still, of Socrates, the beginning of a subjective totality, where thinking comprehends itself, and vovs * is determined as being thinking activity. At a third stage this abstract totality has to realize itself, and that in diversified determinations (active thought is that which determines and diversifies), and these diversified, realized determinations are themselves elevated to totalities. On this level the universal and the particular are contrasted, as are thinking as such and external reality, or indications of externality, such as sensations, etc.

Stoicism and Epicureanism become contrasting philosophies; and these contraries are united in a higher. This latter can consist in a destruction of the other two, as in skepticism; but the affirmative union of the two is their

synthesis (*Aufhebung*) in a higher totality, in the Idea. This stage can be called a realization of the concept. The concept is the universal, which is determined for itself and yet retains its unity along with its determination into individualities in such a way that the latter are transparent to it.

Thus, when I say *I*, many determinations are involved, but the determinations are *mine,* they do not become independent; in them I continue to be the same myself. A further step is the realization of the concept, such that the determinations themselves become totalities (the infinite goodness of the concept), participating fully in the concept, with the result that the latter's aspects become totalities separated from each other, whether indifferently side by side or in conflict with each other. This third level is one of unification, where the Idea is such that differences are concrete and at the same time are contained (or have been held) in the unity of the concept. Greek philosophy came that far. It closes with the intellectual, ideal world of Alexandrian philosophy.

In this world, however, in this idea of totality, *one* determination is still lacking. I said, you will recall, that the Idea is, that the concept determines itself, particularizes itself, that it develops its two major aspects, positing them as identical. In this identity the independent totalities which are the aspects are also posited as negative; and it is through this negation that the identity becomes subjectivity, absolute being-for-itself, i.e., actuality. In this way the Idea is elevated to Spirit. Spirit is the subjectivity which knows itself. It is its own object; and its object (i.e., itself) it makes into a totality. Thus, it is itself totality and knows itself as totality for itself. This principle of absolute being-for-itself or of freedom is the principle

of the Christian world, wherein the one determination is precisely this, that as such man has an infinite worth. Christian religion expresses this more precisely by saying that each individual is to attain blessedness. Thereby an infinite worth is

attributed to each individual. The principle of the second epoch, therefore, is the Idea knowing itself.

If we want to represent this advance to ourselves imaginatively we can speak of thinking as though it were space. First of all appear the most abstract determinations of space, i.e., points and lines; thereafter the union of these in a triangle. This latter, it is true, is already concrete, but still in the abstract element of surface; a stage which corresponds to what we called vovs. * The next stage is that the three lines which bound it become whole figures, i.e., become the realization of the abstract, of the abstract sides of the whole. At a third stage the three surfaces, triangular sides, are joined together into a body, a totality. That is as far as Greek philosophy goes.

Once we have such a body there enters in a distinction between the center of the [enclosed] space and that which fills it [its area]. This then results in a contrast between what is totally simple and ideal (which the center is) and what is real and substantial. The uniting of both, then, is the totality of the self-knowing Idea no longer, however, a disinterested uniting, but such that the center is self-knowing personality over against objective, physical corporeity. Within this totality of the self-knowing idea the substantial is, on the one hand, essentially distinguished from subjectivity; and yet, on the other hand, the latter as self-positing also becomes substantial. At first, of course, subjectivity is merely formal, but it is the real possibility of the substantial. Subjectivity in and for itself consists precisely in this, that the subject has the determination of fulfilling its universality, of realizing it, and of positing itself as identical with the substance.

Thus, the principle of philosophy in the modern era on the one

hand consists in the moment of ideality or subjectivity being for itself as such or in existing as singularity. With this there comes into being what we call subjective freedom. This latter, however, is at the same time

universal, since the subject as such, i.e., man as man, is free and has the infinite determination of becoming substantial, which is the other determination found in Christian religion, namely that man has the capacity to be spirit. The sort of subjective *and* universal freedom which we see here is something entirely different from the partial freedom which we saw in Greece. Among the Greeks it was properly speaking only contingent that the subjectivity be free. In the Oriental world only one is free, i.e., the substance. The Spartan or Attic citizen is free, but among them there were also slaves, and so in the Greek world only some are free. What we are now saying is something else again; we say that man as man is free. In this way the characteristic freedom is completely universal. The subject as such is thought of as free, and the characteristic applies to all.q

In the Christian religion the principle of which we speak has been rather expressed in the form of feeling and representation than articulated in the form of pure thought. The religion includes the belief that man as man, each individual, is an object of divine grace and mercy; thus each is a subject for himself and has an infinite, absolute value. More precisely, this principle is to be found in the fact that the Christian religion contains as a dogma the recognition of the unity between divine and human nature, a truth which has been revealed to men through Christ. Here man and God, the subjective and the objective idea, are one. This latter is the Germanic principle, the uniting of objectivity and subjectivity. The same teaching is already contained in a different guise in the story of the Fall. What is essential in this story is that the tree from which Adam eats is the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; the rest

q Where the possession of rights is contingent upon such arbitrary factors as birth or belonging to a particular class, not spiritual but "natural" factors, there can be no consciousness of being essentially free, essentially the subject of rights.

is simply imaginary. From this point of view the serpent *did not* deceive man, for God says: "See, Adam has become like one of us; he knows what is good and evil." In that is contained the infinite, divine worth of subjectivity. Still, the unity of the subjective principle with substantiality, the unity of knowledge and truth, is not immediate; it is a process, the process of spirit. This means that in its unity subjectivity divests itself of its natural, immediate manner of being one and makes itself identical with what has been called the simply substantial (subjectivity as such is merely formal). Here, then, the goal of man is announced to be supreme blessedness and perfection first of all in principle, *in abstracto;* the goal, then, is subjectivity which has in itself infinite worth, determined in regard to possibility.

We see, then, that speculative thought and religious representation are not separated, above all not so widely separated as is customarily believed. I have introduced such notions for another reason, i.e., in order that we be not of the opinion that as notions belonging to an earlier stage in the Christian world they are no longer of interest to us, even though we belong to that world. As a result of this, even though we may well have advanced beyond this stage we have no reason to be ashamed of our ancestors, for whom religious notions such as these were of supreme importance.

Properly speaking, then, we have two ideas, the subjective idea as knowing and the substantial or concrete idea; and the development or extension of this principle in such a way that it comes to consciousness in thought is the concern of modern philosophy. Here it is, then, that determinations are of a more concrete sort than they were among the ancients, determinations such as distinctions

between thought and being, individuality and substantiality, freedom and necessity, etc. In modern philosophy, subjectivity is for itself but posits itself identically with the substantial or concrete, so that the substantial in question reaches

thought. The knowing of what is for itself free is the principle of modern philosophy. There it is that this knowing, both as immediate certainty and as a knowing which is yet to be developed, is of particular interest, because through it the opposition between certainty and belief or even between belief and the sort of knowing that develops within itself is constructed. Thus a knowing which is first to be developed in some subject or other and also the belief which is a knowing are opposed to certainty or to the true in general. Consequently subjectivity and objectivity are opposed to each other. In both, however, the unity of thinking or subjectivity and truth or objectivity is presupposed. The difference is that in the first form it is said: existing man (i.e., natural man in his immediate ordinariness) cognizes the true in immediate knowing, in believing; the way he believes it is, so it truly is. In the second form, on the other hand, it is true that the unity of knowing and truth is also present, but at the same time there is the fact that man, the subject, raises himself above sensible consciousness, above the immediate manner of knowing, and only through thought makes himself what he is, thus attaining to truth.

On the whole, then, we have two philosophies: (1) Greek and (2) Germanic. With regard to the second of these we must distinguish between the period in which it makes its appearance as philosophy and the period of preparation. We can begin to deal with Germanic philosophy only at the point where it makes its appearance in a form peculiar to itself. Between the two great periods, then, lies a middle period, one of fermentation.

The point at which we now stand is the result of all the work that has been done over a period of 2300 years; it is what the World-

Spirit has brought before itself in its thinking consciousness. We should not wonder at the slowness of this. Universal, knowing Spirit has time, it is not in a hurry; it has at its disposal masses of peoples and nations

whose development is precisely a means to the emergence of its consciousness. Nor should we become impatient because particular insights are not brought out at this time but only later, or that this or that is not yet there in world-history advances are slow. Thus, insight into the necessity of such a long time is a remedy for our impatience.

We have, then, to consider three periods in the history of philosophy: (1) Greek philosophy from Thales, about 600 B.C. (Thales was born in either 640 or 629 B.C. and died in either the 58th or 59th Olympiad, i.e., about 550 B.C.), to the Neoplatonists, among whom was Plotinus who lived in the third century after Christ. It can be said, however, that this period stretched into the fifth century, at which time on the one hand all pagan philosophy is at an end a fact which is connected with the great migration and the downfall of the Roman Empire (the death of Proclus, last of the great Neoplatonists, is put in A.D. 485 and the sack of Rome under Odoacer in 476) whereas on the other hand Neoplatonism continues without interruption in the work of the Church Fathers many philosophies within Christendom have as their only foundation Neoplatonism. The time-span, then, takes in about 1000 years. (2) The second period is that of the Middle Ages, the period of fermentation and of preparation for modern philosophy. Here belong the Scholastics. There are also Arab and Jewish philosophies to be mentioned, but the most important ones were those of the Christian Church. This period, too, lasts about 1000 years. (3) The third period, when modern philosophy makes its formal appearance, does not begin until the time of the Thirty Years' War, with Bacon (d. 1626), Jakob Boehme (d. 1624), or Descartes (d. 1650). With Descartes thinking began to enter into

itself. *"Cogito ergo sum"* are the first words of his system; and it is precisely these words which express the difference between modern philosophy and all that preceded it.

D. Sources and Literature for the History of Philosophy

A few remarks are now in order regarding the sources for the history of philosophy. The sources here are of a different kind from those of political history, for in philosophy what has taken place is right there, whereas in political history the historians have conceptually transformed what has taken place, by making connections and presenting the whole thing historically. The term history has this double meaning: on the one hand it signifies actions and events themselves, and on the other it signifies the same actions and events insofar as they have been worked on in thought and presented to thought. In our case, however, historians are not our sources; we still have the works of the philosophers themselves. They are the actions of spirit itself; they are the most important sources. There are, of course, periods whose writings, the actions in question, are not extant, and for these we must turn to the historians e.g., for earlier Greek philosophy we turn to Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus; we can do without everything else. At the beginning of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle expressly treats earlier Greek philosophy, and even in his other works he frequently introduces their philosophical positions; and he is the man who could well judge regarding them. Even when cleverness seeking to be erudite finds fault with Aristotle, especially because he did not correctly interpret Plato, it need only be said that he spent a long time with Plato and that he, too, was very clever (Rötscher, Lectures).[11] Sextus Empiri-

11 [From Hoffmeister's footnote at this point:] "There is obviously question here of an approving reference to a lecture by . . . Hegel's former student H. Th. Rötscher on Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. Unfortunately the editor has no knowledge of this lecture

from the winter semester of 1825-1826. Presumably, however, Rötscher expressed himself as he did in a similar lecture in the summer semester of 1829. . . ."

cus is equally important. There are also periods where it is desirable that others should have read the works of the philosophers and provide us with excerpts from them.

What must be done is first to learn the simple principles, then their development, and thirdly their application to the concrete and particular. With regard to the more abstract philosophies of the ancients, however, it is not necessary to know all their opinions, for their principles attain only a certain degree of development and are not adequate to a true grasp of the concrete. Thus, the application which Stoicism makes of its logic and dialectic to nature is of no interest, and there we can be satisfied with excerpts.

Now that I have drawn attention to the sources, it seems that to study them is an enormous task; still, nothing presents more distinctly and clearly the views of the philosophers. Nevertheless one can frequently be satisfied with principles and with their development only up to a point. Among the Scholastics, for example, there are works comprising 18, 24, and 26 folio volumes; there one must content oneself with the work of others who have made excerpts from them, a highly valuable undertaking. Other works are rare and difficult to secure; there, too, excerpts have their place.

With regard to books about the history of philosophy, they can be found rather completely listed in Wendt's selection from Tennemann's *History of Philosophy.* The outstanding works on the subject, however, are the following.

The earliest to have written a history concerning philosophy was Diogenes Laertius. We shall have further occasion to speak of him.

One of the first histories of philosophy in modern times is *The History of Philosophy*, by Thomas Stanley, London, 1701 (translated into Latin by Godofridus Olearius, Leipzig, 1711). This work is no longer in use; it is of interest only from a literary point of view, containing as it does

merely the history of ancient philosophical schools, as sects as though there were not any later ones. There we meet the peculiar notion that there were philosophies properly so called only among the ancients and that with Christianity the era of philosophy simply ran out or was broken off. A distinction is drawn between truth as it is grasped by natural reason and truth revealed in Christian religion. The idea is, then, that Christianity made philosophy superfluous and degraded it to a pagan affair in fact, that truth is now to be found only in religious form. It should be remarked, however, that before the revival of the sciences there were no particular philosophies and the philosophies which in fact were current in Stanley's time were in part mere repetitions of the ancient philosophies, the Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Epicurean, and partly to the extent that they manifested any independence they were still too young to gain any such respect from the old gentlemen as to be allowed any value of their own.

The second is *Johannis Jacobi Bruckeri Historia critica philosophiae*, Leipzig, 1742-1767. It comprises four parts in six quarto volumes; Part 4 is in two volumes, and the sixth volume is a supplement. In it one finds collected a great mass of information regarding ideas which this or that scholar of the time had about philosophies. It is, then, a compendious compilation, particularly useful for reference. The treatment is otherwise extremely unhistorical, not derived from the sources alone, interspersed throughout with the writer's own reflections and inferences, drawn in the manner of Wolff's metaphysics; and these inferences are put forth as being historical. In the case where only the principal proposition of a philosophical system was known e.g., Thales' dictum that the principle of all things is water Brucker infers from

this simple proposition twenty to thirty others which contain not one word which is true. That is thoroughly unhistorical. And yet, nowhere should

the treatment be more historical than in the history of philosophy, for in philosophy it is indispensable to have an accurate grasp of just what a philosopher has expressed. The premises and the conclusions which can be drawn from his principle belong to the further development of philosophy.

Another work on the history of philosophy is Dietrich Tiedemann's *Spirit of Speculative Philosophy*, Marburg, 1791-1797, seven volumes in 8vo. In it, political history is handled in a manner which is unnecessarily extensive, unintelligent (*geistlos*), and wooden. The language and style are stiff and affected. The whole thing points up the sorry example of a man who has as a learned professor dedicated his whole life to the study of speculative philosophy without at the same time having the faintest notion of what either the speculative spirit or the concept is. He quotes from philosophical works, provided they stick to discursive reasoning. When, however, he comes upon matters dialectical or speculative he usually becomes angry, loses his patience, and declares it mere subtle mysticism. Thus, where philosophy really begins to be interesting, he stops. There are some interesting things in the work, because he has given us some selections from certain rare medieval books, e.g., cabalistic writings of the period. Otherwise the book is of little value. By the same token his *Argumenta dialogorum Platonis* merits no special attention.

Far better is Johann Gottlieb Buhle's *Manual* (*Lehrbuch*) *of the History of Philosophy and of Critical Literature on the Subject*, Göttingen, 1796-1804, 8 Parts (9 volumes) in 8vo. Unfortunately the treatment of ancient philosophy is too brief out of proportion to the extensive treatment of modern philosophy. As Buhle gets

further along, the more comprehensive he becomes. For this reason the earlier volumes are of little worth. On some points he is quite useful, especially as he gives numerous selections from rare

works of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries e.g., from English and Scottish works and from those of Giordano Bruno, all of which are in the Göttingen library.

The most comprehensive work of this sort is Tennemann's *History of Philosophy*, Leipzig, 1798-1819, 11 Parts (12 vols.) in 8vo. Part 8 which contains Scholastic Philosophy is in two volumes. This work is famous and is frequently used. Individual philosophies are given comprehensive treatment, and the more modern ones are handled better than the ancient, as is common in works of this kind. It is, however, also a lot easier to present the more recent philosophies. One need but quote from philosophical works; and, if they are written in Latin, it is easy to translate them. Their content corresponds more to our own way of thinking (*Vorstellung*). The older philosophies represent a different conceptual point of view and are more difficult to comprehend. Besides, little is known of them, and it requires more constructive talent to transform their systematic thoughts into modern form, to present them in modern style, and at the same time to reproduce them as they are. There can be no literal translation; it would be inexact. Their views (*Vorstellungen*) must be translated into different expressions, without thereby becoming other than they are. One is easily tempted, however, to turn the old into something more familiar to ourselves, which happens frequently with Tennemann. This is where he shows the greatest deficiencies. Apart from the fact that the selections he gives are poor ones, he does not correctly understand them. Frequently text and translation contradict each other, and one would have a false picture of a Plato or an Aristotle, if one were to rely on Tennemann. With regard to Aristotle, for example, the misunderstanding is so great that Tennemann ascribes

to him the opposite of what he held, with the result that by taking the opposite of what Tennemann proposes as Aristotelian one gets a more accurate view of Aristotle's own position. At the same time,

Tennemann is so honest that he quotes Aristotle's original text under his own. For this sort of interpretation, then, he is practically useless.

There are a great many short *compendia*. Of these three deserve mention.

1) Friedrich Ast, *Elements of a History of Philosophy,* Landshut, 1807 one of the better compendia. The spirit in which it is written is good. The author is versed in Schelling's form of philosophizing although somewhat confusedly and he distinguishes in rather formal fashion between idealism and realism.

2) A. Wendt, *Elements of the History of Philosophy,* Leipzig an excerpt from Tennemann.

3) Most recommendable is Theodor A. Rixner, *Manual of the History of Philosophy,* Sulzbach, 1822-1823, 3 vols. in 8vo. He is an intelligent (*von Geist*) man. It is the most recent and the best work of its kind, with regard not only to its literary quality (*Reichtum*) but also for the thoughts it presents, even though it does not satisfy all the demands of a history of philosophy. There are some things to find fault with, e.g., that he has interspersed it with expositions of the other sciences, with the result that the work contains much that is heterogeneous. There is much, however, to recommend it: the inclusion in an appendix to each volume of the principal texts in the original; the exactness of the quotations; and a great deal more.

With this we end our Introduction. As for political history, it will be presupposed in what follows that it is familiar. The principle which animates the spirit of a people and whatever therein has

reference to the political is something else again; this is more in line with what we are considering. I shall also include biographical sketches, to the extent that they are pertinent, but only in passing; since the matter in question is not the history of philosophers, but only of philosophy. I shall likewise leave out a lot of names which are included in scholarly presentations

but which are of little profit in relation to philosophy. The main interest is philosophy itself, which means for each period the determinate thought, the determinate stage in the development of reason.

When a history of philosophy confines itself to giving nothing but selections, at first glance this seems to be the best procedure. Still, to treat the history of philosophy merely after the manner of a chronicle does not do it justice; this would be out of place even in political history. Even in political history there is a purpose involved, i.e., the purpose of showing development in the history of peoples. Thus, in Livy's *History of Rome* the primary center of attention is Rome. We see Rome rise, defend itself, exercise domination, etc. The overall purpose, then, is Rome, the expansion of its hegemony, the evolution of its constitution, etc. By the same token in the history of philosophy the purpose is self-developing reason. Nor is this purpose simply imposed; rather it is the matter in question which as universal is here basic and thus appears as purpose and serves as a basis of comparison for individual manifestations. Our purpose is to present the development of spirit, of thought.

Appendix

In his admirable book on Hegel's religious thought[1] Emil Fackenheim has emphasized the supreme paradox of Hegel's philosophy. On the one hand Hegel has developed a system which is totally secular, in the sense that its appeal to autonomous human reason knows no exceptions. Because they are obstacles to pure thought, authority, tradition, "the positive," have no place in philosophy.

> In a very real sense Hegel is the most modern of modern philosophers. He is heir to a long tradition which, from Francis Bacon and Descartes to his own day, sought to secularize philosophical thought and to make it autonomous, as the self-activity of supremely rational consciousness.[2]

There is nothing which escapes reason, not even God Himself, and the task of philosophy is to explicitate reason's consciousness that it must look into itself to find the totality of reality.

On the other hand, however, Hegel never ceased to be a religious thinker, not merely in the sense that as a philosopher he continued to be a religious man (in the traditional sense he was not particularly religious), but in the sense that he identified the God to whom

1 Emil L. Fackenheim, *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967).

2 Quentin Lauer, S.J., Review of Emil Fackenheim's book in *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 8.4 (December, 1968), 630.

his philosophy was oriented with the God of which religion speaks. The very autonomy of human thinking was, for Hegel, rooted in the suprarational character of a reason which is truly reason only as spirit. Thus, although philosophy is the supreme achievement of human thought at any stage in its development a condition for its being adequately human is that it also be divine. Hegel had no patience either with the Enlightenment, which made the object of religion unworthy of serious consideration by rational man, or with the attempts of Kant and Fichte to confine philosophy to mundane considerations and to make God the object of a non-rational faith. For him, the divine does not cease to be divine in becoming the content of human thought; rather human thought takes on a divine character in thinking the divine. "The mystery of human thought is that its origin is both human and divine, that it is no less human for being divine."[3] It is precisely this "divine" character of thought which is essential to its being the "free thought" of which Hegel speaks so eloquently. If all thought has is the autonomy of individual conviction and the assurance of being its own master, it is not truly. "free," precisely because it does not have the guarantee of adequate rationality. To have that guarantee it must be more than merely human, merely finite. The difference between knowledge and opinion, after all, lies not merely in the degree of certainty which knowledge possesses but in its grounding, and the adequate ground of a thought which is knowledge can only be the ultimate ground of all being and truth.

Hegel's thought is religious, then, in that he sees both

[3]*Ibid.*, 634.

its origin and its ultimate object in the divine the divine with which religion, too, is concerned. A religion whose only ground is an authority extrinsic to the whole rational process is a religion not worthy to command the assent of rational man. This, however, does not call for the abandonment of religion but for the establishment of a ground worthy of its affirmations; it calls for a reconciliation of religion and philosophy, not for the elimination of the former by the latter.

To elucidate the religious-philosophical paradox in Hegel's thought, then, it seems apropos to append here a rather long passage taken from the lectures on the history of philosophy which he delivered in Berlin during the winter semester of 1827-1828. The text is found in the Hoffmeister-Nicolin edition of the *Introduction,* pages 193-201.

The thought here is not different from what we have already seen in the 1825-1826 *Introduction,* but the relationship in question is made more precise from a number of points of view, including the implications for the political institution of the state which is to be the embodiment of human rationality and, therefore, the locus where the reconciliation of religion and philosophy can be concretely achieved.

In the political atmosphere of a Prussia where Fichte could be dismissed from his university post because the government felt that his philosophy was inimical to the religion professed by the state, it was imperative for Hegel to defend the rights of autonomous reason against the arbitrary authority of both Church and State. At the same time this permitted him to emphasize his conviction that

the autonomy of merely individual reason was no less arbitrary than the authority of

ecclesiastical or secular powers. Individual reason could be autonomous and, therefore, authoritative only to the extent that it participated in a Reason which validated all reasoning. This, for Hegel, did not mean that individual thinking could guarantee itself as reason by adhering to a set of rules established for reason as such. It meant much more than that; it meant that individual thinking had to be concretely universalized in such a way that absolute Reason speaks through it. Philosophy itself can be guaranteed only when its voice is the voice of Reason, and if its voice is truly the voice of Reason it will be able to show that what it says in the language of thought is exactly the same as what religion says in the language of metaphor, because in both cases it is the one *Reason* which speaks.

Little would have been accomplished, however, if Hegel's defense of autonomous reason in philosophy had left the field open for those who claimed that religion was independent of reason and was justified in its dependence on feeling alone. This would involve the paradox of seeking to make religion superior to philosophy and succeeding only in making it inferior of making it, in fact, something less than human by refusing to make it more than human. Hegel was convinced that a feeling divorced from thought (a religion without theology) had abdicated its truly human dignity and that, therefore, a religion rooted in mere feeling was unworthy of rational man. That feeling and emotion should play their part in man's religious life in fact, in the whole of his cultural life was something Hegel never doubted. He did insist, however, that feeling and emotion could not be genuinely human, if the rational thought which characterizes man as man

were absent from them. Thus, no solution which would separate philosophy and religion will be a solution at all; the only possible solution is to remove from both philosophy and religion the elements of arbitrariness and contingency.

What Hegel is saying, ultimately, is that both religion and philosophy are integral to the life of the human spirit. They can and do, it is true, come into conflict; but their conflict is of the sort which makes reconciliation, not separation, imperative. The ideal of perfect rationality (in spirit) is at the same time the ideal of perfect autonomy or freedom. The enemies of rationality and freedom, then, are the same arbitrariness and contingency. To the extent that either religion or individual conviction is grounded in the arbitrariness or contingency of any authority whatever, it is opposed to reason. Only philosophy can resolve the opposition since only philosophy has as its proper form the form of thought and the history of philosophy is the path which philosophy has taken in resolving the opposition.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Authority and Freedom[a]

Proper to philosophy is what has been produced under the form of free thought and not through authority. In contradistinction or in opposition to religion, philosophy adheres to the following principle: form of thought, reproduction of thought. What distinguishes philosophy from religion, then, is that the former accepts only what thought is conscious of as being its own. When consciousness has reached the point where it knows its own innermost self as thinking, what happens is that reason will deliberately assent to whatever it has to recognize as true and will not relinquish this, no matter what authority may be opposed to it. Frequently reason is said to be wrong in this. Today, however, it is no longer possible to find fault with philosophy on this count, for religion, at least that of our Protestant Church, lays claim to reason in saying that religion must be the product of one's own conviction and, thus, must not be based on mere authority. Still, recently there has been heard the simultaneous assertion that religion is truly genuine only in the form of religious feeling, only as feeling. If, however, any insight into concepts is denied religious content, then all theology is denied also, since as a

[a] The source of the following excerpt is not too clear. From Hoffmeister's Preface we can gather that it represents what is common to the notes taken by a number of students during Hegel's lectures in 1827-1828. It does not, even in the original, read as smoothly as the text of the 1825-1826 *Introduction.* A few explanatory notes, therefore, will be in order.

science theology is supposed to be a knowledge of God and of that relationship of man to God which is determined by the nature of God. Otherwise it would be nothing more than historical acquaintance (*historische Kenntnis*). The feeling in question has, in fact, even been called the source of science and reason, whereas in reality it is unknowing. If feeling is to be true, reason must be in it; in fact the feeling itself must be the result of insight and conviction.

The right of free thought as opposed to authority in general is here to be subjected to closer scrutiny. The reason for this is that religion, which has a common content with philosophy, is in form different from philosophy, because it depends on authority and is, therefore, positive. On the other hand, however, religion itself demands that man adore God in spirit, i.e., that he be himself present in what he holds to be true.[b] This principle is now acknowledged by all, and that is why the principle which insists on personal conviction, interior intuition, etc., is common to philosophy and to all other elements of the culture of our age, including religion. But, we must take a look at the kind of authority which particularly concerns us. Wherever something is presupposed, there authority enters in. But, where any form of human thinking in regard to religion is forbidden, or where authority has given secular protection to religion, it is of no interest to thinking reason.

Religion in general, which for the most part is based on positive grounds, and particularly the Christian religion, essentially has this one characteristic: if man is to hold something as true, his spirit must be involved. In other words, the truth of religion essentially demands the testimony of spirit. With regard to the Christian

religion this is expressly the case. Christ reproaches the Pharisees for

b To be present in is in some sense to be responsible for. The responsibility for asserting that something is true cannot rest solely on someone else's say-so; the spirit must be responsible for its own activity.

having demanded that He make His teaching acceptable through signs and wonders.[1] He clearly states that it is not something external but the spirit which grounds the true; that a doctrine has been simply accepted does not make it yet true, it awaits its essential foundation in the testimony of spirit. The testimony of spirit, then, contains also the universal determination of spirit's freedom, of what spirit holds to be true.[c] Thus, this testimony of spirit is the foundation.

Each man's faith and conviction, however, is brought to him (*vermittelt*) through instruction, education, acquired culture, and then through the acceptance of the views (*Vorstellungen*) common to his age, with its principles and convictions. An essential aspect of this sort of instruction is that it be directed to man's heart, his emotions. In addition, however, it is directed to his consciousness, his understanding and reason; he is to be convinced. To believe in the truth, to be convinced of the truth, are to be his own conviction, his own insight. It would seem, then, that no authority is involved. Still, even in this, authority plays an essential role; for the very fact that conviction comes from our own interior revelation bespeaks a kind of authority. That is the way it is found in consciousness; it is a fact of consciousness. We know (*wissen*) about the being of God; and this knowing (*Wissen*) is present in us in such an immediate way that it itself becomes an authority, the interior authority of conscience (*Gewissens*). Because we find something like this in ourselves we are immediately convinced that it is also correct, true, good. Still, even superficial experience makes clear to us that we have in us a great many such immediate views (*Vorstellungen*), with regard

[1] John 4:48.

[c] To hold something to be true is an activity, not merely a passive acceptance. The activity, then, is one of determining oneself to an affirmation, and self-determination is freedom. Free thought is self-determining thought.

to which we must later admit that they could be erroneous. If, then, we accept these interior views and feelings immediately as authority, it can happen that in the very same way a diametrically opposed content can come to us; and if we grant the principle, then the contrary content is also validated. On the basis of feeling we can very easily misjudge something good as being false, evil, unjust. On the other hand the wicked believe that what they do has had such an interior guarantee, an interior revelation. In the insight into and the conviction of what is held to be true, then, the form of authority persists. "From the heart come evil thoughts,"2 Scripture says. It cannot be taken for granted, therefore, that this sort of thing is true.

By the same token, where insight is more reflective, in an individual's thoughts, which are not considered simply to come from the interior with such immediacy, but are products of self-thinking, even here, because certain fixed points are presupposed, there can still be question of authority, or we can at least find the form of authority, since we assume such views (*Ansichten*) to be true. This is common in the case of what we call the overall view (*Vorstellung*), conviction, or culture of an age. Such a view is made fundamental, and on the basis of it everything else in us is determined. In a given age, for example, we have a particular view of God, the state, etc. In any insight of this kind it can be the case that a baseless assumption is the foundation for whatever follows. Men say, of course, that they have done their own thinking, and this sort of self-thinking can very well have taken place, but it has a definite limit. For, apart from the fact that one and the same spirit has characterized an age, and that the individual cannot escape this, we do find that this sort of thinking rests on presuppositions which

we frequently recognize to be false. If, then, philosophy is to be completely free of au-

2 Matt. 15:19.

thority, if it is to have established its principle of free thought, it must have attained to the concept of free thought, must have free thought as its point of departure, its principle. To do one's own thinking, to have one's own conviction, does not, then, guarantee that one is free of authority.

In the history of philosophy this sort of free thought is examined in its development. Here thought comes into conflict with the authority of religion popular religion, the Church, etc. and, thus, the history of philosophy presents one aspect of the struggle between free thought and this kind of authority. That there is a struggle between them, however, cannot constitute the ultimate or highest point of view; rather, philosophy must in the final analysis make the resolution of this struggle possible, and it must bring about the resolution the resolution must be its absolute goal. Philosophy must accomplish this, however, in such a way as to satisfy itself as thinking reason. Whatever resolution there is must come from *reason.*

Still, there is such a thing as false peace. Peace between philosophy and religion can be presented as a matter of each going its own way, each moving in a separate sphere. Thus the demand has been made that philosophy go its way by itself without coming into conflict with religion, and it has been asserted that there is something irresponsible and insecure in philosophy's interfering with religion. This view (*Ansicht*) has frequently been expressed, but as far as we are concerned it is a false contention, since what philosophy and religion both need is one and the same to ground what is true. In this context, philosophy is a thinking, and the thinking spirit is pure, the simplest, the most interior. There can be

only *one* most interior, with the result that there can be only one satisfying of this most interior through its own activity. Philosophy cannot admit of a separate religious satisfaction. Each of the two can up to a point give its own satisfaction, but reason cannot admit

of a satisfaction which would be opposed to what it itself gives.

Another demand that is made as a means of bringing about peace would be, then, that reason be subjected to belief, either to external or to internal authority. There was a time in the history of philosophy when a pretext was made of just such a subjection, but in such a way that it was quite obviously a delusion, i.e. in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Philosophical affirmations were made which conflicted with the Christian religion, principally on rational grounds, but with the additional claim that reason gave way to faith (cf. Bayle, *Philosophical Dictionary,* e.g. the article on the Manicheans). Because of such philosophical affirmations Vanini was burned at the stake, even though he claimed they did not represent his conviction. By condemning him to the stake the Catholic Church demonstrated its own conviction that it is impossible for thought when it is alive to relinquish its freedom. This sort of subjection, then, is something impossible

Another attempt to establish a reconciliation (*Vermittelung*) was that of giving to philosophy the position of a natural theology. It was said: reason, of course, recognizes this and that, but revelatory religion has doctrines other than rational doctrines, i.e. those that are *above* that form of knowledge, with the result that it need not come in conflict with reason. Strictly speaking this relationship corresponds completely with the former;d for, reason can tolerate nothing else parallel with itself, still less superior to itself.

Another sort of solution is for religion on its own to relinquish the positive. One way of looking at the positive in question is from the point of view of its formal element,

d Both attempts at reconciliation are in fact affirming that there can be a rational truth and a religious truth which do not agree with each other but yet are not in conflict, because they are unrelated.

the historical, the mythical, etc. Religion relinquishes this by substituting for it the form of thought. The result, however, is mere ratiocination, abstract thinking, abstract understanding.

Here, then, are the two solutions offered. On the one hand, religion can at best cling to its stubborn resistance to philosophical thinking. But, when it says, "The gates of hell shall not prevail against it,"[3] it should be remembered that the gates of reason are even stronger.[4] On the other hand, positive religion can relinquish its content, and from the positive point of view this to a great extent has frequently happened, particularly in modern times.

From this last point of view religion is looked upon as being in me simply as a capacity, a feeling, and it is asserted that religion should appeal to feelings only, and that not merely because thinking and knowledge are harmful to religion; rather, the assertion itself is supposed to be the *result* of knowledge, of insight.[e] Religion is said to rely merely on feeling, because [in it] there is no question of cognitive knowledge. Thinking in concepts conflicts with this form of feeling. If one wants only sentiment and feeling, then reason cannot be satisfied. Self-conscious feeling, however, which is thought, cannot repudiate feeling; thinking is not opposed to feeling. (More precise considerations of cognition and non-cognition, non-knowing, come up in the history of philosophy itself.)

This last point of view is one which today in Germany has gained considerable external recognition. Enlightened

3 Matt. 16:18.

4 Addition from the Michelet edition: "than the gates of hell not for the

purpose of overcoming the Church but of being reconciled with it" (Glockner, XIII, 97).

e Philosophers (or theologians) of the "Romantic" school were convinced that they had philosophical reasons for saying that religion is a matter of feeling and not of thought. Hegel insists that there is no inconsistency in the simultaneous presence of feeling and thought.

understanding, abstract understanding, and abstract thinking, demand only the abstract. About God, understanding knows only that He is its representation of God is only indeterminate; it is without content. Thus, when theology rests merely on abstract understanding it has as little content as possible, has wiped the slate clean of dogmas, has been reduced to a minimum. But, a religion which is to satisfy the spirit must in itself be essentially concrete, must have a richness to it. As content it must have what has been revealed of God in the Christian religion, i.e. it must be dogmatic. Christian dogmatic is the complex of doctrines whose presentation makes the Christian religion distinctive; it informs us of God's revelation, the knowledge of what God is. So-called common sense has arisen in opposition to this and has, with the help of abstract understanding, pointed out the contradictions in Christian dogmatic. By thus reducing its content to a minimum it has, so to speak, emptied it of content. This empty theology was called rational theology. All it was, however, was exegesis i.e. reflection on a certain object which was ratiocination, not the concept of the object in question. Arbitrarily, then, a transition is made from the notions (*Vorstellungen*) thus made available to further determinations. To this so-called enlightened theology is opposed the rational concept, because the latter presents the development of religion's concrete content and gives to it its own validation, thus knowing it as thought, purified of and distinct from sensible forms and manners of being represented. Concrete thinking reason, then, is opposed to abstract understanding. Because, however, thought has grasped itself so profoundly that it is characteristic of it to develop out of itself, it is also capable of attaining the absolute goal, the reconciliation of religion and philosophy, of truth in the

form of religious representation with truth in the form in which reason has developed it.

Such is the relationship of religion and philosophy which

in the history of philosophy develops by means of contrast. Both forms have as their basis one and the same truth.

With regard to the *connection between philosophy and art*, it can be said that the latter at its highest and in its true determination stands on the side of religion. Its task is to express externally what is the internal content of religion.

Here would be the place to say a few words also about the *connection between philosophy and the state*. The state has a close link with religion also. Under certain circumstances we must in the history of philosophy touch also on political history; even though the question here is more one of extrinsic connection. Religion and the state, however, are connected essentially, necessarily. The constitution of the state is grounded in a determinate principle of spirit's self-consciousness, in the manner in which spirit knows itself in respect to freedom. In the state, freedom is to be distinguished from arbitrariness. Essential to the state is that the in-and-for-itself rational will, which is universal and substantial, should be actual.[f] Laws are the expression of what is rational from the point of view of will. All depends, then, on the consciousness which a people has of its own freedom, which in turn is connected with the notion (*Vorstellung*) which the state or the people have of God. (The universal truth is that there is *one* God; the notion of freedom seems to include this notion.)[g]

Now, because the constitution of the state has a connection with religion, philosophy too has a connection through religion with the state. Greek philosophy could not have

f If universality is to be other than abstract generalization, it must be

embodied in a concrete whole which embraces all particulars. For Hegel, individual freedom is a desideratum but is unattainable outside a concrete whole which is the social framework ultimately the state.

g Only if there is one God for all men are all men essentially the same, i.e. free.

arisen in the Orient. Orientals were peoples in whom, it is true, freedom began; but the principle of freedom in the Orient was not yet the principle of a right. By the same token, modern philosophy could not arise in Greece or Rome. Germanic philosophy came into being with Christianity; in common with religion it had the Christian principle as its foundation. This connection, then, is important.

Moreover, philosophy exhibits an even more important relationship to the state and to the external, historical relationship between state and religion. The sphere of religion is separate from that of the state. For, the latter, in contrast to religion, can be looked upon as a secular sphere and, thus, to a certain extent as something ungodly, unsacred. The rational, however, which is law, i.e. rational law, is related to truth and must, therefore, also be related to religious truth. In fact it must agree exactly with what is truth in both religion and philosophy. Religion and the state, the spiritual and secular realms, must be in harmony with each other.h

The means of relating them to each other can be of several kinds, e.g. in the form of *theocracy*, as we see it especially in the Orient. There freedom, in the form of subjective, moral freedom, is wholly lost together with right and will. Herein the situation is such that religion sets up its own independent sphere, degrading secular freedom, and behaving in a negative way toward the secular sphere. We see this, for example, in the Roman Catholic Church, where the religious as a spiritual caste has cut itself off completely from the laity and where the Roman patricians, too, have been in possession of the *sacra* to the exclusion of the plebeians. In

theocracy the secular realm is considered something without rights, un-

h If the state is the embodiment of the rational truth of man's essential freedom, then religion can be true only if it harmonizes with that truth.

sacred, not in agreement with the religious, with the result that what we call right, morality, civic virtue (*Sittlichkeit*), have no value. But, secular law, the secular order, can at the same time have a thoroughly divine character. When, however, the sort of religious element we have described considers itself independent and looks upon truth as something which cannot be immanent in the sphere of human freedom, then its attitude is negative in regard to human freedom itself.

Philosophy is an immanent, present, actual thinking, which involves the presence of freedom in [human] subjects. Now, whatever has been known in thought pertains to human freedom. Thus, because the principle of freedom is present in philosophy, the latter stands on the side of the secular. The secular belongs to its content; for this reason it has been called world-wisdom[i] (Friedrich Schlegel and his imitators have proposed this name as a term of opprobrium). Of course, philosophy demands that the divine be present in the secular, that what is just and moral should be made present in the actuality of freedom. It cannot let the divine float aimlessly in feeling or in the mist of devotion. So long as the commandments, the will of God, have a place in human feeling, then they also belong in the human will, in the rational will of man. Philosophy recognizes the divine, but it also recognizes the manner in which the said divine finds application and is actualized on the side of the secular. Thus, philosophy is in fact world-wisdom; for that reason it appears on the side of the state and opposed to the presumptions of religious leadership in the world. On the other hand, however, it is equally opposed to the arbitrariness and contingency of secular leadership.

¡*Weltweisheit.* The term can also be translated as "worldly" or "secular" wisdom. Hegel seeks to break down the dichotomy of "the sacred and the secular."